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This thesis is made of stand-alone essays on the capital structure and financing of Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana and South Africa. Chapter Two reviews issues on 
SME development in Ghana and South Africa. Chapter Three compares the capital 
structures of large, quoted firms and SMEs in Ghana. The results show that quoted firms 
exhibit higher debt ratios than those of SMEs. The results suggest that age, size, asset 
structure, and profitability of the firm affect the capital structures of quoted firms and SMEs. 
For the SME, it is evident that level of education and gender of the entrepreneur, industry, 
and location of the firm are also important in explaining their capital structure. Chapter Four 
examines the determinants of bank financing of SMEs in Ghana. The results reveal that 
bank financing accounts for less than a quarter of SMEs’ debt financing, with short-term 
bank credit representing the greater proportion of bank finance. The results show that age, 
size, asset tangibility, and growth of the firm have positive associations with long-term bank 
debt, while profitability is negatively related to long-term bank debt. The short-term debt 
indicates a positive relationship with size, but negative relationships with profitability, and 
growth. Chapter Four also investigates the awareness and use of various financing schemes 
available to the Ghanaian SME sector. The results reveal low awareness and usage levels of 
these financing initiatives. Chapter Five explores the determinants of Ghanaian small and 
medium sized non-traditional exporters’ (NTEs) choice of formal/informal finance. The 
results show that NTEs depend on formal financing sources with bank finance representing 
the greater percentage of NTEs’ financing. The results suggest that, newer firms depend 
more on formal finance and less on informal finance. The results show positive relationships 
between formal finance and size, and growth of the firm. Chapter Six assesses how 
corporate governance affects the performance of SMEs in Ghana and what the implications 
are for financing opportunities. The results reveal that better corporate governance 
structures lead to better performance of SMEs. The paper concludes that the adoption of 
good corporate governance structures could lead to better management decisions and enable 
SMEs to attract financing resources. Chapter Seven examines the relationship between 
agency factors and the capital structure of quoted SMEs in South Africa. The results indicate 
that firms with one institutional blockholder are able to monitor the opportunistic behaviour 
of management more effectively than those with more than one institutional blockholders. 
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Chapter Eight looks at the financial market and financing choice of SMEs and large firms in 
South Africa. The results indicate that developments in the financial market affect both long-
term debt/equity and short-term debt/equity decisions of large firms. However, for SMEs, it 
is the long-term debt/equity decision that is affected by the financial market. The final essay 
examines the effect of debt policy on the performance of SMEs in Ghana and South Africa. 
The results indicate that long-term debt and total debt ratios negatively affect performance 
of SMEs. These findings have important implications for policy-makers, entrepreneurs and 





























Hierdie tesis bestaan uit losstaande essays oor die kapitaalstruktuur en finansiering van klein- 
en middelgrootte-ondernemings (KMO's) in Ghana en Suid-Afrika. Hoofstuk Twee kyk na 
kwessies oor KMO-ontwikkeling in Ghana en Suid-Afrika. Hoofstuk Drie vergelyk die 
kapitaalstrukture van groot genoteerde maatskappye en KMO's in Ghana. Die resultate dui 
daarop dat genoteerde maatskappye groter skuldverhoudings as KMO's toon. Hierdie 
resultate wys ook dat ouderdom, grootte, batestruktuur en die winsgewendheid van die 
maatskappy die kapitaalstruktuur van genoteerde maatskappye en KMO's beïnvloed. Dit is 
vir die KMO voor die hand liggend dat die opvoedingsvlak en geslag van die entrepreneur, 
die bedryf en die ligging van die maatskappy ook belangrik is om die kapitaalstruktuur 
daarvan te verduidelik. Hoofstuk Vier ondersoek die bepalende faktore vir bankfinansiering 
vir KMO's in Ghana. Die resultate toon aan dat bankfinansiering rekenskap gee van minder 
as 'n kwart van die KMO se skuldfinansiering en dat korttermynbankkrediet die grootste 
gedeelte van die bankfinansiering verteenwoordig. Die resultate toon aan dat ouderdom, 
grootte, die tasbaarheid van bates en maatskappygroei op 'n positiewe verwantskap met 
langtermynskuld dui, terwyl winsgewendheid 'n negatiewe verband met langtermynbankskuld 
het. Die korttermynskuld toon 'n positiewe verwantskap met grootte maar 'n negatiewe 
verwantskap met winsgewendheid en groei aan. Hoofstuk Vier ondersoek ook die 
bewustheid en gebruik van verskeie finansieringskemas wat aan die Ghanese KMO-sektor 
beskikbaar is. Die resultate bring 'n lae bewustheid en gebruiksvlakke van hierdie 
finansieringsinisiatiewe aan die lig. Hoostuk Vyf verken die bepalende faktore van die 
Ghanese klein- en middelgrootte nie-tradisionele uitvoerders (NTU's) se keuse van 
formele/informele finansiering. Die resultate toon aan dat NTU's op formele 
finansieringsbronne staat maak en dat bankfinansiering die grootste persentasie van die 
NTU's se finansiering uitmaak. Uit die resultate kan afgelei word dat nuwer maatskappye 
meer op formele finansiering staat maak en minder op informele finansiering. Die resultate 
dui op 'n positiewe verwantskap tussen formele finansiering en grootte, en die groei van die 
maatskappy. Hoofstuk Ses evalueer die invloed van korporatiewe bestuur op die prestasie 
van KMO's in Ghana en watter implikasies dit vir finansieringsgeleenthede inhou. Die 
resultate toon aan dat beter korporatiewe finansieringstrukture by KMO's tot beter prestasie 
lei. Hierdie essay kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die aanvaarding van goeie korporatiewe 
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bestuurstrukture tot beter bestuursbesluite kan lei en KMO's in staat kan stel om 
finansieringsbronne te lok. Hoofstuk Sewe ondersoek die verwantskap tussen 
agentskapfaktorering en die kapitaalstruktuur van genoteerde KMO's in Suid-Afrika. Die 
resultate dui daarop dat maatskappye met een institusionele blokhouer die opportunistiese 
gedrag van bestuur meer doeltreffend kan monitor as dié met meer as een institusionele 
blokhouer. Hoofstuk Agt kyk na die keuses wat KMO's en groot maatskappye in Suid-Afrika 
ten opsigte van finansiële markte en finansiering maak. Resultate toon aan dat ontwikkelings 
in die finansiële mark besluite oor die langtermynskuld/aandelekapitaal sowel as die 
korttermynskuld/aandelekapitaal van groot maatskappye beïnvloed. By KMO's is dit egter 
besluite oor langtermynskuld/aandelekapitaal wat deur die finansiële mark beïnvloed word. 
Die laaste essay ondersoek die uitwerking van skuldbeleid op die prestasie van KMO's in 
Ghana en Suid-Afrika. Die resultate toon aan dat langtermynskuld en totale 
skuldverhoudings die prestasie van KMO's negatief beïnvloed. Hierdie bevindinge het 
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1.1 Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
 
There is growing recognition of the important role small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
play in economic development. They are often described as efficient and prolific job 
creators, the seeds of big businesses and the fuel of national economic engines. Even in the 
developed industrial economies, it is the SME sector rather than the multinationals that is 
the largest employer of workers (Mullineux, 1997a). Interest in the role of SMEs in the 
development process will for that matter continue to be in the forefront of policy debates in 
most countries. Governments at all levels have undertaken initiatives to promote the growth 
of SMEs (Feeney and Riding, 1997). SME development can encourage the process of both 
inter- and intra-regional decentralisation; and, they may well become a countervailing force 
against the economic power of larger enterprises. More generally, the development of SMEs 
is seen as accelerating the achievement of wider economic and socio-economic objectives, 
including poverty alleviation (Cook and Nixson, 2000). According to an OECD report, 
SMEs produce about 25% of OECD exports and 35% of Asia’s exports (OECD, 1997).  
 
SMEs represent over 90% of private business in the African continent and contribute to 
more than 50% of employment and of GDP in most African countries (UNIDO, 1999). 
Small enterprises in Ghana are said to be a characteristic feature of the production landscape 
and have been noted to provide about 85% of manufacturing employment of Ghana (Steel 
and Webster, 1991; Aryeetey, 2001). SMEs are also believed to contribute about 70% to 
Ghana’s GDP and account for about 92% of businesses in Ghana (Villars, 2004). In the 
Republic of South Africa, it is estimated that 91% of the formal business entities are Small, 
Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) (Hassbroeck, 1996; Berry et al., 2002). They also 
contribute between 52 and 57% to GDP and provide about 61% of employment (CSS, 1998; 
Ntsika, 1999; Gumede, 2000; Berry et al., 2002). SMEs therefore have a crucial role to play in 
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stimulating growth, generating employment and contributing to poverty alleviation, given 
their economic weight in African countries. 
 
However, an important problem that SMEs often face is access to capital (Lader, 1996). A 
recent World Bank study found that about 90% of small enterprises surveyed stated that 
credit was a major constraint to new investment (Parker et al., 1995). Levy (1993) also found 
that there is limited access to financial resources available to smaller enterprises compared to 
larger organisations and the consequences for their growth and development. The role of 
finance has been viewed as a critical element for the development of SMEs (Cook and 
Nixson, 2000). A priori, it might seem surprising that finance should be so important. 
Requirements such as identifying a product and a market, acquiring any necessary property 
rights or licenses, and keeping proper records are all in some sense more fundamental to 
running a small enterprise than is finance (Green et al., 2002). Some studies have 
consequently shown that a large number of small enterprises fail because of non-financial 
reasons (Liedholm et al., 1994). Other constraints SMEs face include: lack of access to 
appropriate technology; the existence of laws, regulations and rules that impede the 
development of the sector; weak institutional capacity and lack of management skills and 
training (see Sowa et al., 1992; Aryeetey et al., 1994; Parker et al., 1995; Kayanula and Quartey, 
2000). However, potential providers of finance, whether formal or informal, are unlikely to 
commit funds to a business which they view as not being on a sound footing, irrespective of 
the exact nature of the unsoundness. Lack of funds may be the immediate reason for a 
business failing to start or to progress, even when the more fundamental reason lies 
elsewhere. Finance is said to be the “glue” that holds together all the diverse aspects 
involved in small business start-up and development (Green et al., 2002). 
 
One of the areas of financial theory that is of great concern to academics and professionals 
is the issue of capital structure or financing decisions in companies. Capital structure 
decisions are crucial for any business organisation. The decisions are important because of 
the need to maximise returns to various organisational constituencies, and also because of the 
impact such decisions have on an organisation’s ability to deal with its competitive 
environment. Finance theories have been developed to explain financing preferences 
focusing on large listed firms. However, the issue of whether these findings are valid for 
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other firms, especially SMEs, has received limited attention. Zingales (2000) asserts that 
“empirically, the emphasis on large companies has led us to ignore (or study less than 
necessary) the rest of the universe: the young and small firms, who do not have access to 
public markets”. The scientific community has only started to pay attention to the small firm 
sector much more recently. The few empirical studies in this area tend to concentrate mainly 
on developed economies with varied and inconclusive results (see Van der Wijst and Thurik, 
1993; Chittenden et al., 1996; Cressy and Olofsson, 1997a; Jordan et al., 1998, Michaelas et al., 
1999; Esperança et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). For instance, some authors 
such as Hutchinson (1995), and Cressy and Olofsson (1997a) argue that, because SMEs have 
limited access to equity market and the fear of loss of control, they tend to rely more on debt 
finance. Others such as Petersen and Rajan (1994), and Berger and Udell (1998), however, 
have pointed out that SMEs depend more on equity finance, especially retained earnings. 
They explain that SMEs often have difficulty obtaining external debt finance because of their 
inability to resolve issues of information asymmetry with external debt providers.  
 
It is important to note that different countries have different institutional arrangements, 
mainly with respect to their tax and bankruptcy codes, the existing market for corporate 
control, and the roles banks and securities markets play. There are also differences with 
respect to social and cultural issues, and even the levels of economic development. These 
differences actually warrant the need to look at the issue from the perspective of developing 
economies, especially sub-Saharan Africa. This present thesis examines the capital structure 
and financing of SMEs with empirical evidence from Ghana and South Africa. The reason 
for including Ghana and South Africa is to examine the capital structure issue from the 
perspectives of different economic settings in sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana being a relatively 
less developed economy and South Africa, a relatively more developed economy offer 
interesting settings for this study, given the particular importance both countries give to the 
SME sector as the engine of economic growth. This thesis is made up of a collection of 





Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
This thesis examines the capital structure and financing issues of SMEs, by focusing on 
Ghana and South Africa in a collection of stand-alone essays. Specifically, the overall study 
seeks to:  
 
i. compare the capital structures of SMEs with those of listed firms in Ghana; 
ii. examine SMEs’ access to bank finance and their perceptions of non-bank financing 
initiatives in Ghana; 
iii. ascertain the relative importance of formal and informal sources of financing 
internationalising SMEs in Ghana; 
iv. examine the effect of ownership structure on the performance of SMEs in Ghana 
and its implications for financing; 
v. explore the relationship between the agency problem and the capital structure of 
SMEs in South Africa; 
vi. investigate the development of the South African financial market and financing 
choices of SMEs; 
vii. compare the effect of debt policy on the performance of Ghanaian and South 
African SMEs.  
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
This thesis makes significant contributions in a number of areas. It has important 
implications for policy makers, finance providers, entrepreneurs and managers of SMEs. The 
findings and recommendations will assist entrepreneurs and managers of SMEs in tackling 
their financing problems. It is hoped that SMEs will be able to improve on their managerial 
capabilities to better position themselves to gain access long-tem financing.  
 
The findings of the thesis will provide finance providers with adequate information on the 
financing behaviour of SMEs. This will enable suppliers of finance to developed products in 
meeting SMEs’ financing needs.  
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Also, it is hoped that the results obtained from the various essays or papers will enable policy 
makers to come up with policies aimed at addressing the financing problem that confront 
the SME sector. It will give policy makers a better appreciation of the financing constraints 
confronting this important sector and to formulate policies in addressing them.  
  
Finally, this thesis also seeks to add to existing academic knowledge in that it will serve as a 
source of reference for subsequent research in the area. 
 
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
This current thesis focuses on the capital structure and financing of SMEs in Ghana and 
South Africa. The main limitation of this thesis was the availability of data. The problem of 
data on SMEs posed a big challenge. The researcher originally intended to focus on only 
unquoted SMEs. However, data on South African unquoted SMEs were difficult to obtain. 
Considering the sensitive nature of financing issues, the firms were unwilling to disclose the 
required information, especially financial statements. Papers focusing on South Africa have 
therefore been limited to quoted SMEs for which information on financial statements was 
readily available. The thesis is limited to only two countries, Ghana and South Africa. The 
papers were therefore done in the context of these two countries.  
 
In spite of these limitations, the issues examined in the various empirical papers are very 
relevant in addressing the main objectives of the entire thesis. These limitations did not have 
any effect on the results of the research. The findings from the various papers could be 
applicable to SMEs in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Study 
 
This thesis is made up of a collection of stand-alone essays or papers and organised into ten 
chapters: 
 
Chapter One, includes the introduction and statement of the problem, the objectives of the 
study, the significance of the study, and the limitations of the study.  
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Chapter Two reviews some relevant issues on SMEs in developing countries, particularly in 
Ghana and South Africa. 
 
Chapter Three examines the determinants of capital structures of listed firms and unquoted 
SMEs in Ghana. 
 
Chapter Four covers SMEs’ access to bank finance and their perceptions of non-bank                     
financing initiatives in Ghana. 
 
Chapter Five examines the relevance of formal and informal finance among 
internationalising SMEs in Ghana. 
 
Chapter Six focuses on corporate governance, ownership structure and the performance of 
Ghanaian SMEs and the implications for financing opportunities. 
 
In Chapter Seven, the issue of agency problems and the capital structure of South African 
SMEs is dealt with. 
 
Chapter Eight looks at the development of the South African financial market and financing 
choice of SMEs. 
 
The effect of debt policy on the performance of Ghanaian and South African SMEs is 
covered in Chapter Nine. 
 
In Chapter Ten, the important points emerging from the results of the various papers are 
summarised. Conclusions from all the papers are based on the findings, and valid 
suggestions and recommendations in line with the objectives of the entire thesis are made. 
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This chapter reviews some important issues on SMEs. It begins with a review of the various 
definitions of SMEs. This is followed by a discussion on the roles and characteristics of 
SMEs. It then considers the contributions of SMEs to economic development and the 
constraints to SME developments. 
 
2.2 What is an SME? 
 
The issue of what constitutes a small or medium enterprise is a major concern in the SME 
literature. Different authors have usually given different definitions of this sort of business. 
SMEs have indeed not been spared with the definition problem that is usually associated 
with concepts which have many components. The definition of firms by size varies among 
researchers. Some attempt to use the capital assets; others use skill of labour and turnover 
level. Some even define SMEs in terms of their legal status and method of production. 
Storey (1985) tries to sum up the danger of using size to define the status of a firm by stating 
that in some sectors all firms may be regarded as small, whilst in other sectors there are 
possibly no firms which are small. The Bolton Committee (1971) first formulated an 
“economic” and “statistical” definition of a small firm. Under the “economic” definition, a 
firm is said to be small if it meets the following three criteria: 
 It has a relatively small share of their market place; 
 It is managed by owners or part owners in a personalised way, and not through the 
medium of a formalised management structure; 
 It is independent, in the sense of not forming part of a large enterprise. 
                                                 
*
 A paper based on this chapter was presented at the Third CEED International Entrepreneurship Conference 
at the United States International University, Nairobi, Kenya, May, 2006. 
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Under the “statistical” definition, the Committee proposed the following in terms of: 
 The size of the small firm sector and its contribution to GDP, employment, exports, 
etc.; 
 The extent to which the small firm sector’s economic contribution has changed over 
time; 
 Applying the statistical definition in a cross-country comparison of the small firms’ 
economic contribution.  
 
The Bolton Committee applied different definitions of the small firm to different sectors. 
Whereas firms in manufacturing, construction and mining were defined in terms of number 
of employees (in which case 200 or less qualified the firm to be a small firm), those in the 
retail, services, wholesale, etc. were defined in terms of monetary turnover (in which case the 
range is 50,000-200,000 British Pounds to be classified as small firm). Firms in the road 
transport industry are classified as small if they have 5 or fewer vehicles. There have been 
criticisms of the Bolton definitions. These centre mainly on the apparent inconsistencies 
between defining characteristics based on number of employees and those based on 
managerial approach. 
 
The European Commission (EC) defined SMEs largely in term of the number of employees 
as follows: 
 firms with 0 to 9 employees - micro enterprises; 
 10 to 99 employees - small enterprises; 
 100 to 499 employees - medium enterprises. 
 
Thus, the SME sector is comprised of enterprises (except agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing) which employ less than 500 workers. In effect, the EC definitions are based solely 
on employment rather than a multiplicity of criteria. Secondly, the use of 100 employees as 
the small firm’s upper limit is more appropriate, given the increase in productivity over the 
last two decades (Storey, 1994). Finally, the EC definition did not assume the SME group is 
homogenous; that is, the definition makes a distinction between micro, small-, and medium-
sized enterprises. However, the EC definition is too all-embracing to be applied to a number 
of countries. Researchers would have to use definitions for small firms which are more 
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appropriate to their particular “target” group (an operational definition). It must be 
emphasised that debates on definitions turn out to be sterile, unless size is a factor which 
influences performance. For instance, the relationship between size and performance 
matters when assessing the impact of a credit programme on a target group (Storey, 1994). 
 
Weston and Copeland (1998) hold that definitions of size of enterprises suffer from a lack of 
universal applicability. In their view, this is because enterprises may be conceived of in 
varying terms. Size has been defined in different contexts, in terms of the number of 
employees, annual turnover, industry of enterprise, ownership of enterprise, and value of 
fixed assets. Van der Wijst (1989) considers small and medium businesses as privately held 
firms with 1 – 9 and 10 – 99 people employed, respectively. Jordan et al (1998) define SMEs 
as firms with fewer than 100 employees and less than €15 million turnover. Michaelas et al 
(1999) consider small independent private limited companies with fewer than 200 employees 
and López and Aybar (2000) analyse companies with sales below €15 million. According to 
the British Department of Trade and Industry, the best description of a small firm remains 
that used by the Bolton Committee in its 1971 Report on Small Firms.  This stated that a 
small firm is an independent business, managed by its owner or part-owners and having a 
small market share (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001).  
 
The UNIDO also defines SMEs in terms of number of employees by giving different 
classifications for industrialised and developing countries (see Elaian, 1996). The definition 
for industrialised countries is given as follows:                                  
 Large - firms with 500 or more workers;  
 Medium - firms with 100-499 workers;          
 Small - firms with 99 or less workers.  
 
The classification given for developing countries is as follows:   
 Large - firms with 100 or more workers; 
 Medium - firms with 20-99 workers;                                          
 Small  -  firms with 5-19 workers;  
 Micro - firms with less than 5 workers.  
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It is clear from the various definitions that there is not a general consensus over what 
constitutes an SME. Definitions vary across industries and also across countries. It is 
important now to examine definitions of SMEs given in the context of Ghana and South 
Africa.  
 
2.2.1 The Ghanaian Situation 
There have been various definitions given for small-scale enterprises in Ghana but the most 
commonly used criterion is the number of employees of the enterprise (Kayanula and 
Quartey, 2000). In applying this definition, confusion often arises in respect of the 
arbitrariness and cut off points used by the various official sources. In its Industrial Statistics, 
the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) considers firms with fewer than 10 employees as small-
scale enterprises and their counterparts with more than 10 employees as medium and large-
sized enterprises. Ironically, the GSS in its national accounts considered companies with up 
to 9 employees as small and medium enterprises (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). 
 
The value of fixed assets in the firm has also been used as an alternative criterion for 
defining SMEs. However, the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) in Ghana 
applies both the “fixed asset and number of employees” criteria.  It defines a small-scale 
enterprise as a firm with not more than 9 workers, and has plant and machinery (excluding 
land, buildings and vehicles) not exceeding 10 million Ghanaian cedis. The Ghana 
Enterprise Development Commission (GEDC), on the other hand, uses a 10 million 
Ghanaian cedis upper limit definition for plant and machinery. It is important to caution that 
the process of valuing fixed assets in itself poses a problem. Secondly, the continuous 
depreciation of the local currency as against major trading currencies often makes such 
definitions out-dated (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). 
 
In defining small-scale enterprises in Ghana, Steel and Webster (1991), and Osei et al (1993) 
used an employment cut-off point of 30 employees. Osei et al (1993), however, classified 
small-scale enterprises into three categories. These are: (i) micro - employing less than 6 
people; (ii) very small - employing 6-9 people; (iii) small - between 10 and 29 employees. A 
more recent definition is the one given by the Regional Project on Enterprise Development 
Ghana manufacturing survey paper. The survey report classified firms into: (i) micro 
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enterprise, less than 5 employees; (ii) small enterprise, 6 - 29 employees; (iii) medium 
enterprise, 30 – 99 employees; (iv) large enterprise, 100 and more employees (see Teal, 
2002). 
 
2.2.2 The South African Situation 
The most widely used framework in South Africa is the definition of the National Small 
Business Act 102 of 1996, which defines five categories of businesses in South Africa. The 
definition uses the number of employees (the most common mode of definition) per 
enterprise size category combined with the annual turnover categories, the gross assets 
excluding fixed property. The definitions for the various enterprise categories are given as 
follows: 
• Survivalist enterprise: The income generated is less than the minimum income 
standard or the poverty line. This category is considered pre-entrepreneurial, and 
includes hawkers, vendors and subsistence farmers. (In practice, survivalist 
enterprises are often categorised as part of the micro-enterprise sector). 
• Micro enterprise: The turnover is less than the VAT registration limit (that is, R150 
000 per year). These enterprises usually lack formality in terms of registration. They 
include, for example, spaza shops, minibus taxis and household industries. They 
employ no more than 5 people. 
• Very small enterprise: These are enterprises employing fewer than 10 paid 
employees, except mining, electricity, manufacturing and construction sectors, in 
which the figure is 20 employees. These enterprises operate in the formal market and 
have access to technology.  
• Small enterprise: The upper limit is 50 employees. Small enterprises are generally 
more established than very small enterprises and exhibit more complex business 
practices. 
• Medium enterprise: The maximum number of employees is 100, or 200 for the 
mining, electricity, manufacturing and construction sectors. These enterprises are 
often characterised by the decentralisation of power to an additional management 
layer.  
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The National Small Business Act’s definitions of the different categories of business may be 
summarised as set out in Table 2.1 below. 
 







(in South African rand) 
Gross Assets, Excluding 
Fixed Property 
Medium Fewer than 100 to 200, 
depending on industry 
 
Less than R4 million to 
R50 million, depending 
upon industry 
Less than R2 million to 
R18 million, depending on 
industry 
 
Small Fewer than 50 Less than R2 million to 
R25 million, depending 
on industry 
Less than R2 million to 




Fewer than 10 to 20, 
depending on industry 
 
Less than R200 000 to 
R500 000, depending on 
industry 
Less than R150 000 to 
R500 000, depending on 
industry 
Micro Fewer than 5 Less than R150 000 Less than R100 000 
 
Source: Falkena et al. (2001) 
 
2.3 Characteristics of SMEs in Developing Countries 
 
Fisher and Reuber (2000) enumerate a number of characteristics of SMEs in developing 
countries under the broad headings: labour characteristics, sectors of activity, gender of 
owner and efficiency. Given that most SMEs are one-person businesses, the largest 
employment category is working proprietors. This group makes up more than half the SME 
workforce in most developing countries; their families, who tend to be unpaid but active in 
the enterprise, make up roughly another quarter. The remaining portion of the workforce is 
split between hired workers and trainees or apprentices. SMEs are more labour intensive 
than larger firms and therefore have lower capital costs associated with job creation (Anheier 
and Seibel, 1987; Liedholm and Mead, 1987; Schmitz, 1995).   
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In terms of activity, they are mostly engaged in retailing, trading, or manufacturing (Fisher 
and Reuber, 2000). While it is a common perception that the majority of SMEs will fall into 
the first category, the proportion of SME activity that takes place in the retail sector varies 
considerably between countries, and between rural and urban regions within countries. 
Retailing is mostly found in urban regions, while manufacturing can be found in either rural 
or urban centres. However, the extent of involvement of a country in manufacturing will 
depend on a number of factors, including, availability of raw materials, taste and 
consumption patterns of domestic consumers, and the level of development of the export 
markets. In Ghana, SMEs can be categorised into urban and rural enterprises. The former 
can be sub-divided into “organised” and “unorganised” enterprises. The organised ones 
mostly have paid employees with a registered office, whereas the unorganised category is 
mainly made up of artisans who work in open spaces, temporary wooden structures, or at 
home, and employ few or in some cases no salaried workers (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). 
They rely mostly on family members or apprentices. Rural enterprises are largely made up of 
family groups, individual artisans, women engaged in food production from local crops. The 
major activities within this sector include:- soap and detergents, fabrics, clothing and 
tailoring, textile and leather, village blacksmiths, tin-smithing, ceramics, timber and mining, 
bricks and cement, beverages, food processing, bakeries, wood furniture, electronic 
assembly, agro processing, chemical-based products and mechanics (Osei et al., 1993; 
Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). 
 
Taking sole-proprietorships and microenterprises into consideration, it can be said that the 
majority of SMEs are female-owned businesses. Female-owned SMEs more often than not 
are home-based compared to those owned by males. That is, they are operated from home 
and are mostly not considered in official statistics. This clearly affects their chances of 
gaining access to financing schemes, since such financing programmes are designed without 
sufficient consideration of the needs of businesses owned by females. These female 
entrepreneurs often get the impression that they are not capable of taking advantage of these 
credit schemes, because the administrative costs associated with the schemes often outweigh 
the benefits. 
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Measures of enterprise efficiency (e.g. labour productivity or total factor productivity) vary 
greatly both within and across industries. Firm size may be associated with some other 
factors that are correlated with efficiency, such as managerial skill and technology, and the 
effects of the policy environment. Most studies in developing countries indicate that the 
smallest firms are the least efficient, and there is some evidence that both small and large 
firms are relatively inefficient compared to medium-scale enterprises (Little et al., 1987). It is 
often argued that SMEs are more innovative than larger firms. Many small firms bring 
innovations to the market place, but the contribution of innovations to productivity often 
takes time, and larger firms may have more resources to adopt and implement them (Acs et 
al., 1999).   
 
2.4 Contributions of SMEs to Economic Development  
 
There is a general consensus that the performance of SMEs is important for both economic 
and social development of developing countries (Levy et al., 1999). From the economic 
perspective, SMEs provide a number of benefits (Advani, 1997; Leidhom and Mead, 1999). 
SMEs have been noted to be one of the major areas of concern to many policy makers in an 
attempt to accelerate the rate of growth in low-income countries. These enterprises have 
been recognised as the engines through which the growth objectives of developing countries 
can be achieved. They are potential sources of employment and income in many developing 
countries. 
 
SMEs seem to have advantages over their large-scale competitors in that they are able to 
adapt more easily to market conditions, given their broadly skilled technologies. They are 
able to withstand adverse economic conditions because of their flexible nature (Kayanula 
and Quartey, 2000). SMEs are more labour intensive than larger firms and therefore have 
lower capital costs associated with job creation (Anheier and Seibel, 1987; Liedholm and 
Mead, 1987; Schmitz, 1995). They perform useful roles in ensuring income stability, growth 
and employment. Since SMEs are labour intensive, they are more likely to succeed in smaller 
urban centres and rural areas, where they can contribute to a more even distribution of 
economic activity in a region and can help to slow the flow of migration to large cities. Due 
to their regional dispersion and their labour intensity, it is argued, small-scale production 
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units can promote a more equitable distribution of income than large firms. They also 
improve the efficiency of domestic markets and make productive use of scarce resources, 
thus facilitating long-term economic growth (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000).  
 
SMEs contribute to a country’s national product by either manufacturing goods of value, or 
through the provision of services to both consumers and/or other enterprises. This 
encompasses the provision of products and, to a lesser extent, services to foreign clients, 
thereby contributing to overall export performance. In Ghana and South Africa, SMEs 
represent a vast portion of businesses.  They represent about 92% of Ghanaian businesses 
and contribute about 70% to Ghana’s GDP and over 80% to employment (Villars, 2004). 
SMEs also account for about 91% of the formal business entities in South Africa, 
contributing between 52 and 57% of GDP and providing about 61% of employment (CSS, 
1998; Ntsika, 1999; Gumede, 2000; Berry et al., 2002).  
 
From an economic perspective, however, enterprises are not just suppliers, but also 
consumers; this plays an important role if they are able to position themselves in a market 
with purchasing power: their demand for industrial or consumer goods will stimulate the 
activity of their suppliers, just as their own activity is stimulated by the demands of their 
clients. Demand in the form of investment plays a dual role, both from a demand-side (with 
regard to the suppliers of industrial goods) and on the supply-side (through the potential for 
new production arising from upgraded equipment). In addition, demand is important to the 
income-generation potential of SMEs and their ability to stimulate the demand for both 
consumer and capital goods (Berry et al., 2002). 
 
2.5 General Constraints to SME Development 
 
SME development in developing countries is hampered by a number of factors, including 
finance, lack of managerial skills, equipment and technology, regulatory issues, and access to 
international markets (Anheier and Seibel, 1987; Steel and Webster, 1991; Aryeetey et al, 
1994; Gockel and Akoena, 2002). The lack of managerial know-how places significant 
constraints on SME development. Even though SMEs tend to attract motivated managers, 
they can hardly compete with larger firms. The scarcity of management talent, prevalent in 
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most countries in the region, has a magnified impact on SMEs.  The lack of support services 
or their relatively higher unit cost can hamper SMEs’ efforts to improve their management, 
because consulting firms are often not equipped with appropriate cost-effective management 
solutions for SMEs. Despite the numerous institutions providing training and advisory 
services, there is still a skills gap in the SME sector as a whole (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). 
In terms of technology, SMEs often have difficulties in gaining access to appropriate 
technologies and information on available techniques (Aryeetey et al., 1994). In most cases, 
SMEs utilise foreign technology with a scarce percentage of shared ownership or leasing. 
They usually acquire foreign licenses, because local patents are difficult to obtain. With 
regard to regulatory constraints, although wide-ranging structural reforms have improved, 
prospects for enterprise development remain to be addressed at the firm-level. The high 
start-up costs for firms, including licensing and registration requirements, can impose 
excessive and unnecessary burdens on SMEs. The high cost of settling legal claims, and 
excessive delays in court proceedings adversely affect SME operations. In the case of Ghana, 
the cumbersome procedure for registering and commencing business are key issues often 
cited. Meanwhile, the absence of antitrust legislation favours larger firms, while the lack of 
protection for property rights limits SMEs’ access to foreign technologies (Kayanula and 
Quartey, 2000). Previously insulated from international competition, many SMEs are now 
faced with greater external competition and the need to expand market share. However, their 
limited international marketing experience, poor quality control and product standardisation, 
and little access to international partners, continue to impede SMEs’ expansion into 
international markets (Aryeetey et al., 1994). They also lack the necessary information about 
foreign markets. 
 
Of particular concern to this study is the area of financing. Lack of adequate financial 
resources places significant constraints on SME development. Cook and Nixson (2000) 
observe that, notwithstanding the recognition of the role of SMEs in the development 
process in many developing countries, SMEs development is always constrained by the 
limited availability of financial resources to meet a variety of operational and investment 
needs. A large portion of the SME sector does not have access to adequate and appropriate 
forms of credit and equity, or indeed to financial services more generally (Parker et al., 1995). 
In competing for the corporate market, formal financial institutions have structured their 
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products to serve the needs of large corporates. A cursory analysis of survey and research 
results of SMEs in South Africa, for instance, reveals common reactions from SME owners 
interviewed. When asked what they perceive as constraints in their businesses and especially 
in establishing or expanding their businesses, they answered that access to funds is a major 
constraint. This is reflected in perception questions answered by SME owners in many 
surveys (see BEES, 1995; Graham and Quattara, 1996; Rwingema and Karungu, 1999). The 





This chapter has reviewed various definitions of SMEs and also discussed the roles, 
characteristics, contributions of SMEs to economic development, and the constraints to 
SME development. In reviewing the definitions of SMEs, it was concluded that there is no 
single, universal, uniformly acceptable definition of SMEs. Several measures or indicators 
have been used to define the SME sector. The most commonly used is the number of 
employees of the enterprise. However, in applying this definition, confusion often arises in 
respect of the arbitrariness and cut-off points used by various official sources. The 
definitions of SMEs within the context of Ghana and South Africa were also examined, 
given that this thesis focuses on these two countries. SMEs often fall into two categories, 
that is, urban and rural enterprises. The former can be sub-divided into “organised” and 
“unorganised” enterprises. The organised groups have registered offices and paid workers, 
whilst the unorganised ones are mainly made up of artisans. Rural enterprises are largely 
made up of family groups and individual artisans. The activities in the SME sector range 
from pottery and ceramics to manufacturing of spare parts and electronic assembly. SMEs 
constitute a vital element of the development process, and their contributions in terms of 
production, employment and income in developing countries is widely recognised. Hence, 
interest in the role of SMEs in the development process continues to be high on the agenda 
of policy makers. Notwithstanding the recognition, the development of SMEs is always 
constrained by a number of factors such as, lack of access to appropriate technology, limited 
access to international markets, the existence of laws, regulations and rules that impede the 
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development of the sector; weak institutional capacity and lack of management skills and 
training. However, financing remains the greatest concern for the majority of SMEs.  
 
The study reported in this thesis focuses on the capital structure and financing of SMEs, 
with particular focus on Ghana and South Africa in a collection of essays. The rest of the 
chapters (Chapter Three to Chapter Nine), which are empirical papers, examine various 
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This study compares the determinants of capital structure of SMEs and listed firms in 
Ghana. The capital structure of a firm is the relative amount of debt and equity the firm uses 
to finance its operations. Capital structure decisions are vital for the survival of any business 
organisation. The key is for firms to choose a portfolio of capital structure that will maintain 
sustainability and generate more wealth. In general, a firm can choose among many 
alternative capital structures. This subject matter is one of the most contentious issues, if not 
a puzzle, in finance. A number of theories have attempted to explain the variation in debt 
ratios across firms. The theories suggest that firms select capital structure depending on 
attributes that determine the various costs and benefits associated with debt and equity 
financing. Explanations vary from the irrelevancy hypotheses (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) 
to the optimal capital structure, where the cost of capital is minimised and the firm value is 
maximised, hence maximising the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Company financing decisions involve a wide range of policy issues. At the macro level, they 
have implications for capital market development, interest rate and security price 
determination, and regulation. At the micro level they have implications for capital structure, 
corporate governance, and company development (Green et al., 2002). Very little, however, is 
known about the financing decisions of firms in developing countries. Knowledge on capital 
                                                 
† Two papers have been published out of this chapter. They are: 1. “What Determines the Capital Structure of 
Listed Firms in Ghana?”, African Finance Journal, Vol. 7(1), pp. 37- 48, 2005. 
2. “SMEs’ Access to Debt Finance: A Comparison of Male-Owned and Female-Owned Businesses in Ghana”, 
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Vol. 7(2), pp. 105 - 112, 2006, UK.  
 
A paper based on this chapter was presented at the Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of South 
Africa at Durban, South Africa, September, 2005. 
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structures has mostly been derived from data from developed economies that have many 
institutional similarities (Booth et al., 2001).  
 
This study attempts to extend the capital structure theory in explaining the financing 
behaviour of SMEs by comparing the capital structure of listed firms and that of SMEs in 
Ghana. This will help in ascertaining whether there are any differences in the capital 
structures of large listed firms and SMEs or whether they all follow similar capital structure 
decisions. This current paper also includes heterodox factors which are not typically included 
in the conventional financial model, but are relevant in explaining the financing decisions of 
SMEs. A study on the determinants of the capital structures of listed firms and SMEs in sub-
Saharan Africa is an important area that needs to be explored. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides discussion on the 
background literature. Section 3.3 discusses the research methodology and hypotheses. 
Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, section 3.5 
summarises the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Capital structure is defined as a specific mix of debt and equity that a firm uses to finance its 
operations. Equity also includes the firm’s retained earnings. The firm’s debt is comprised of 
short-term debt and long-term debt. Short-term debt is defined as the proportion of the 
company’s debt repayable within one year, while long-term debt is the firm’s debt repayable 
beyond one year (Hall et al., 2004). The theory of capital structure choice focuses on several 
determining factors: life-cycle approach, differential taxation of income from different 
sources, bankruptcy cost/risks, the agency theory, pecking order hypothesis, and signaling 
theory.  
 
First, the life-cycle approach suggests that a firm’s access to finance depends on its stage of 
development. Newer firms rely on owners’ initial equity, because they may not initially be in 
a position to present an attractive investment avenue for finance providers (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). If they survive the dangers of under-capitalisation, they are then likely to be 
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able to make use of other sources of funds such as trade credit and short-term loans 
(Chittenden et al., 1996). Survival and moderate growth open access to short-term debt, 
especially for SMEs, and that remains a continued source of funds due to the difficulty in 
attracting long-term debt and/ or equity. High-growth SMEs also rely on short-term debt 
initially until such a time that they are capable of entering the public equity market.  
 
Second, taxation would encourage debt financing provided the interest paid on the debt is 
tax deductible. Since payment with respect to equity financing such as dividend is not tax 
deductible, the tax effect is likely to bias the financing choice towards debt, as more debt 
increases the after-tax proceeds to the owners (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977).  
 
Third, if firms increase their debt position as a result of the tax benefit indicated above, then 
their ability to meet their fixed interest payment obligation reduces. Such a situation 
increases the probability (risk) of bankruptcy and consequently the cost of financing. Firms 
that adjust their capital structure away from excessive debt reduce the risk of exposure to 
debt-equity mix and thus lower their cost of finance (Agarwal and Mohtadi, 2004). The 
potential costs of bankruptcy may be both direct and indirect. Examples of direct 
bankruptcy costs are the legal and administrative costs in the bankruptcy process. Haugen 
and Senbet (1978) argue that bankruptcy costs must be trivial or nonexistent if one assumes 
that capital market prices are competitively determined by rational investors. Examples of 
indirect bankruptcy costs are the loss in profits incurred by the firm as a result of the 
unwillingness of stakeholders to do business with them. Customer dependence on a firm’s 
goods and services and the high probability of bankruptcy affect the solvency of firms 
(Titman, 1984). If a business is perceived to be close to bankruptcy, customers may be less 
willing to buy its goods and services due to the risk of the firm not being able to meet its 
warranty obligations. Also, employees might be less inclined to work for the business and it 
would be less likely for suppliers to extend trade credit.   
 
Fourth, agency costs arise as a result of the relationships between debt-holders and 
shareholders, and those between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The conflict between debt-holders and shareholders is due to moral hazard. The conflict 
arises because equity-holders have an incentive to invest sub-optimally in very risky projects 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, the conflict between shareholders and 
managers arises because shareholders hold the entire residual claim and consequently 
managers do not capture the entire gain from their profit-enhancing activities, but they do 
bear the entire cost of these activities (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Since SMEs are mostly 
shareholder-managed, they are not likely to suffer from this second problem (Sogorb-Mira, 
2005). However, the agency conflict between shareholders/owners and debt providers may 
be particularly severe for SMEs, increasing moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
(Van der Wijst, 1989; Ang, 1992; Chittenden et al., 1996). The agency costs of debt can be 
resolved by the entire structure of the financial claim. Barnea et al (1980) argue that the 
agency problems associated with information asymmetry, managerial (stockholder) risk 
incentives and forgone growth opportunities can be resolved by means of the maturity 
structure and call provision of the debt. For example, shortening the maturity structure of 
the debt and the ability to call the bond before the expiration date can help reduce the 
agency costs of under-investment and risk-shifting. Barnea et al (1980) also demonstrate that 
both features of the corporate debt serve as identical purposes in solving agency problems. 
 
Fifth, the pecking order theory, initially proposed by Myers (1984), suggests that firms follow 
a certain hierarchical fashion in financing their operations. They initially use internally 
generated funds in the form of retained earnings, followed by debt, and finally external 
equity. The preference is a reflection of the relative cost of the available sources of funds, 
due to the problem of information asymmetries between the firm and potential finance 
providers. This means that it is more costly to use external debt finance than using internal 
funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
 
Sixth, the signaling theory suggests that if a firm issues debt, it indicates the firm has an 
investment opportunity that exceeds its internally generated funds. So, changes in the capital 
structure often serve as a signal to outsiders about the current situation of the firm as well as 
the managerial expectations concerning future earnings. The debt offering is believed to 
reveal information that the management of a firm is expecting about future cash flows if it 
will cover the debt costs. However, the bankruptcy fears still impact on the signal and 
intensify the cost of this signal (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; and Eckbo, 1986). 
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3.2.1 Differences Between the Capital Structure of Listed Firms and SMEs 
It is well-known that small businesses are not ‘scaled-down versions’ of large businesses. The 
process by which a large business has achieved its current size is, of course, one of evolution 
rather than scaling, and this process of evolution will involve major changes in management 
structure and functioning, in particular in the methods by which the business is financed 
(Penrose, 1959). Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and Berger and Udell (1995) have 
identified four significant differences between the capital structure of SMEs and that of large 
public companies. One major difference is the fact that, whereas large public companies are 
able to access various resources for debt financing, SMEs tend to use short-term debt 
financing from commercial lenders, especially institutional lenders and, in essence, convert 
them to long-term debt financing through renewing these short-term lines of credit (Berger 
and Udell, 1995). 
 
Also, SMEs appear to have more severe information asymmetry problems compared to 
large, publicly listed firms, and as such the traditional solutions to asymmetric information 
problems are not as effective as in public firms. Thus, traditional finance literature dealing 
with credit in small businesses (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995, 1998) 
distinguishes debt financing in small businesses from that in large public companies using 
long-term relationship between lenders and firm owners to deal with the agency problems 
caused by information asymmetry. Berger and Udell (1995) provide a detailed review of the 
relationship lending literature. Signaling and monitoring are both considered important ways 
to deal with agency problems between commercial lenders and SME borrowers. Another 
important feature of monitoring in SME debt financing is that bonding, such as a guarantee 
provided by the entrepreneurs and collateral, is widely used due to the high cost of 
monitoring (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
 
Another difference is that, in SMEs, governance structure and type of business have a 
significant influence on capital structure, especially the accessibility to debt financing due to 
the private information generated and the use of debt in SMEs’ capital structure (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). SMEs are mostly family-owned and tend to be sole-proprietorship businesses. 
The ownership structure is therefore likely to affect capital structure decisions. It is argued 
that family business owners, especially founding family CEOs, tend to take a higher risk by 
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adopting a highly levered capital structure because of their limited growth capabilities, desire 
to maintain control and a high degree of employee well-being, and the preservation of self-
esteem (Davidsson, 1989; Vos and Forlong, 1996; Mishra and McConaughy, 1999).  
 
The discrimination in debt financing of SMEs tends to be more serious than in financing 
large, publicly listed companies (Cavalluzzo et al., 2003). The issue of gender appears to be a 
major point of discrimination. Female-owned businesses, which mostly fall in the category of 
SMEs tend have greater difficulty accessing external debt finance compared to male-owned 
SMEs. 
 
Some other features of SMEs have been identified to include: (a) lower fixed to total assets 
ratios; (b) a higher proportion of trade debt in total assets; (c) a much higher proportion of 
current liabilities to total assets (and in particular a much greater reliance on (especially 
short–term) bank loans to finance their assets); (d) heavily reliance on retained profits to 
fund investment flows; (e) obtain the vast majority of additional finance from banks (with 
other sources, in particular equity, very much less important); (f) financially more risky, as 
reflected in their relatively high debt-equity ratio and in their higher failure rates (see Storey et 
al., 1987; Cressy, 1996b). 
 
3.2.2 Determinants of Capital Structure  
Firm-specific characteristics have been identified in previous empirical studies examining 
capital structure of firms. These firm characteristics which have been noted to affect the 
capital structure decisions of firms are discussed below:  
 
Age of the Firm   
Age of the firm is a standard measure of reputation in capital structure models. From the 
life-cycle perspective, as a firm ages, it establishes itself as a continuing business and it 
therefore increases its capacity to take on more debt; hence age is positively related to debt. 
Before granting a loan, banks tend to evaluate the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs as they 
are generally believed to pin high hopes on very risky projects promising high profitability 
rates. In particular, when it comes to highly indebted companies, they are essentially 
gambling with their creditors’ money. If the investment is profitable, shareholders will collect 
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a significant share of the earnings; but if the project fails, then the creditors have to bear the 
consequences (Myers, 1977). Directors who are concerned with a firm’s reputation tend to 
act more prudently and avoid riskier projects in favour of safer projects, even when the latter 
have not been approved by shareholders, thus reducing debt agency costs (by reducing the 
‘‘temptation’’ to gamble at creditors’ cost).  
 
This perspective has also been seconded within the context of small business (see Ang, 
1991). It is important to note the extension of firm risk to the personal area of the 
businessman (given the unlimited liability of entrepreneurs) to be a way of managing the 
agency costs resulting from cases of more opportunistic behaviour. Given the fragmentation 
of information, the high costs of control and evaluation, the firm and the entrepreneurs’ 
reputation become a valuable asset in the management of relations between the principal 
(investor) and the agent (businessman) (Landström, 1993). Petersen and Rajan (1994) found 
that older firms should have higher debt ratios, since they should be higher-quality firms. 
Hall et al. (2004) agree that age is positively related to long term-debt, but negatively related 
to short-term debt. Esperança et al (2003), however, found that age is negatively related to 
both long-term and short-term debt. Green et al (2002) also found that age has a negative 
influence on the probability of incurring debt in the initial capital equation, and no impact in 
the additional capital equation.  
 
Firm Size  
Size has been viewed as a determinant of a firm’s capital structure. Larger firms are more 
diversified and hence have lower variance of earnings, making them able to tolerate high 
debt ratios (Castanias, 1983; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999).  Smaller firms, on the 
other hand, may find it relatively more costly to resolve information asymmetries with 
lenders, and thus may present lower debt ratios (Castanias, 1983). Lenders of larger firms are 
more likely to get repaid than lenders of smaller firms, reducing the agency costs associated 
with debt. Therefore, larger firms will have higher debts. Another explanation for smaller 
firms having lower debt ratios is that the relative bankruptcy costs are an inverse function of 
firm size (Titman and Wessels, 1988). It is generally believed that there are economies of 
scale in bankruptcy costs: larger firms face lower unit costs of bankruptcy than do smaller 
firms, as shown in Prasad et al (2001). Castanias (1983) also states that, if the fixed portion of 
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default costs tends to be large, then marginal default cost per dollar of debt may be lower 
and increase more slowly for larger firms. Facts about larger firms may be taken as evidence 
that these firms are less risky (Kim and Sorensen, 1986). Cosh and Hughes (1994) add that if 
operational risk is inversely related to firm size, this should rather predispose smaller firms to 
use relatively less debt.  
 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between size and capital structure supports a positive 
relationship. Several works show a positive relationship between firm size and leverage (see 
Friend and Lang, 1988; Barton et al., 1989; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Barclay and Smith, 1996; 
Kim et al., 1998; Al-Sakran, 2001; Hovakimian et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Their results 
suggest that smaller firms are more likely to use equity finance, while larger firms are more 
likely to issue debt rather than stock. Fischer et al (1989), however, found a negative 
relationship between size and debt ratio. Cassar and Holmes (2003), Esperança et al (2003) 
and Hall et al (2004) found a positive association between firm size and long-term debt ratio 
but a negative relationship between firm size and short-term debt ratio. Some studies also 
confirm a negative relationship between firm size and short-term debt ratio (Chittenden et 
al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999). According to Titman and Wessels (1988), small firms seem 
to use more short-term finance than their larger counterparts, because smaller firms have 
higher transactions costs when they issue long-term debt or equity. They further add that 
such behaviour may cause a “small firm risk effect”: by borrowing more short term, these 
types of firms will be more sensitive to temporary economic downturns than larger, more 
longer-geared firms.  
 
Asset Structure 
The asset structure of a firm plays a significant role in determining its capital structure.  The 
degree to which the firm’s assets are tangible should result in the firm having greater 
liquidation value (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991).  Bradley et al (1984) 
assert that firms that invest heavily in tangible assets also have higher financial leverage since 
they borrow at lower interest rates if their debt is secured with such assets. It is believed that 
debt may be more readily used if there are durable assets to serve as collateral (Wedig et al., 
1988). By pledging the firm’s assets as collateral, the costs associated with adverse selection 
and moral hazards are reduced. This will result in firms with assets that have greater 
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liquidation value having relatively easier access to finance at lower cost, consequently, leading 
to higher debt or outside financing in their capital structure. In the case of small firms, the 
concession of collateral reduces the under-investment problem in the firms by increasing the 
probability of obtaining credit – functioning also as a management instrument in conflicts 
between entrepreneur and financiers, since the degree of the entrepreneurs’ involvement in 
sharing business risk, by granting personal collateral, is clearly evident. In the area of bank 
financing it is suggested that bank financing will depend upon whether the lending can be 
secured by tangible assets (Storey, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998).  
 
Empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship consistent with theoretical arguments 
between asset structure and leverage of the firm (Bradley et al., 1984; Friend and Lang, 1988; 
Wedig et al., 1988; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Rajan and Zingles 1995; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
1999; Hovakimian et al., 2004). Kim and Sorensen (1986), however, found a significant and 
negative coefficient between depreciation expense as a percentage of total assets and 
financial leverage. Others studies specifically suggest a positive relationship between asset 
structure and long-term debt, and a negative relationship between asset structure and short-
term debt (see Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall et al., 2004 Sogorb-Mira, 2005). 
Esperança et al (2003) found positive relationships between asset structure and both long-
term and short-term debt. Marsh (1982) also maintains that firms with few fixed assets are 
more likely to issue equity. In a similar work by Mackie-Mason (1990), he concluded that a 
high fraction of plant and equipment (tangible assets) in the asset base make the debt choice 
more likely. Booth et al (2001) suggest that the relationship between tangible fixed assets and 
debt financing is, however, related with the maturity structure of the debt. In such a 
situation, the level of tangible fixed assets may help firms to obtain more long-term debt, but 
the agency problems may become more severe with the more tangible fixed assets, because 
the information revealed about future profit is less in these firms. If this is the case, then it is 
likely to find a negative relationship between tangible fixed assets and debt ratio. 
 
Profitability 
The relationship between firm profitability and capital structure can be explained by the 
pecking order theory (POT). According to this theory, firms prefer internal sources of 
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finance to external sources.  The order of the preference is from the one which is least 
sensitive (and least risky) to the one which is most sensitive (and most risky); this arises 
because of asymmetric information between corporate insiders and less well-informed 
market participants (Myers, 1984). By this token, profitable firms, which have access to 
retained profits, can rely on such profits as opposed to depending on outside sources (debt). 
Murinde et al (2004) observe that retentions are the principal source of finance. Titman and 
Wessels (1988), and Barton et al (1989) agree that firms with high profit rates would, all 
things being equal, maintain relatively lower debt ratios since they are able to generate such 
funds from internal sources. In the case of SMEs, they face a more extreme version of the 
POT described as a “constrained” POT by Holmes and Kent (1991) and a “modified” POT 
by Ang (1991). This is mainly because they have less access to external funds, debt as well as 
equity, than do large enterprises. The theory’s application to SMEs implies that external 
equity finance issues may be inappropriate, since they may not be listed on the stock market 
or may not qualify to go through private placements. However, the tax trade-off model 
predicts that profitable firms will employ more debt since they are more likely to have a high 
tax burden and low bankruptcy risk. Also, profitable firms are more capable of tolerating 
more debt since they may be in a position to service their debt easily and on time. Profitable 
firms appear to be more attractive to financial institutions as lending prospects, therefore, 
they can always take on more debt capital (Ooi, 1999). Scherr et al (1993) found that start-up 
firms with higher anticipated profitability have higher debt to equity ratios. 
 
Empirical evidence from previous studies seems to be consistent with the pecking order 
theory. Most studies found a negative relationship between profitability and capital structure 
(see Friend and Lang, 1988; Barton et al. 1989; Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Chittenden et 
al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999; Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; Shydam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999;). Cassar and Holmes (2003), Esperança et al (2003), and Hall et al 
(2004) also suggest negative relationships between profitability and both long-term debt and 
short-term debt ratios. Petersen and Rajan (1994) however found a significantly positive 
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Firm Growth 
Growth is likely to place a greater demand on internally generated funds and push the firm 
into borrowing (Hall et al., 2004). According to Marsh (1982), firms with high growth will 
capture relatively higher debt ratios. In the case of small firms with more concentrated 
ownership, it is expected that high growth firms will require more external financing and 
should display higher leverage (Heshmati, 2001). There is also a relationship between the 
degree of previous growth and future growth. Michaelas et al (1999) argue that future 
opportunities will be positively related to leverage, in particular short-term leverage. They 
argue that the agency problem and consequentially the cost of financing are reduced, if the 
firm issues short-term debt rather than long-term debt. Myers (1977), however, holds the 
view that firms with growth opportunities will have a smaller proportion of debt in their 
capital structure. This is due to the fact that conflicts between debt and equity holders are 
especially serious for assets that give the firm the option to undertake such growth 
opportunities in the future. He agues further that growth opportunities can produce moral 
hazard situations and small-scale entrepreneurs have an incentive to take risks in order to 
grow. The benefits of this growth, if realised, will not be enjoyed by lenders who will only 
recover the amount of their loans, resulting in a clear agency problem. This will be reflected 
in increased costs of long-term debt which can be mitigated by the use of short-term debt.  
 
Empirical evidence seems inconclusive. Some researchers found a positive relationship 
between sales growth and leverage. (see Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Barton et 
al., 1989). Other evidence, however suggests that higher-growth firms use less debt (see Kim 
and Sorensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Mehran, 1992; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Roden and 
Lewellen, 1995; Al-Sakran, 2001). Michaelas et al (1999) found future growth to be positively 
related to leverage and long-term debt. Cassar and Holmes (2003), Hall et al (2004) and 
Sogorb-Mira (2005) showed positive associations between growth and both long-term and 
short-term debt, while Chittenden et al. (1996), Jordan et al. (1998) and Esperanc¸a et al 
(2003) found mixed evidence. 
 
Firm Risk 
The level of risk is said to be one of the primary determinants of a firm’s capital structure 
(Kale et al., 1991). The tax shelter-bankruptcy cost theory of capital structure determines a 
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firm’s optimal leverage as a function of business risk (Castanias, 1983). Given agency and 
bankruptcy costs, there are incentives for the firm not to fully utilise the tax benefits of 
100% debt within the static framework model. The more likely a firm is exposed to such 
costs, the greater its incentive to reduce its level of debt within its capital structure. One firm 
variable which impacts upon this exposure is the firm’s operating risk, in that the more 
volatile the firm’s earnings stream, the greater the chance of the firm defaulting and being 
exposed to such costs. According to Johnson (1997), firms with more volatile earnings 
growth may experience more states where cash flows are too low for debt service. Kim and 
Sorensen (1986) also observe that firms with a high degree of business risk have less capacity 
to sustain financial risks and thus use less debt.  
 
Despite the broad consensus that firm risk is an important determinant of corporate debt 
policy, empirical investigation has led to contradictory results. A number of studies have 
indicated an inverse relationship between risk and debt ratio (see Bradley et al., 1984; Friend 
and Lang 1988; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Mackie-Mason 1990; Kale et al., 1991; Kim et al., 
1998). Other studies suggest a positive relationship (Jordan et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 
1999). Esperança et al (2003) also found positive associations between firm risk and both 
long-term and short-term debt.   
 
Other Factors 
Certain heterodox factors which are not typically included in conventional financial models 
are believed also to affect the capital structure decisions of SMEs. Green et al (2002), in 
analysing the financing behaviour of small enterprises in Kenya used an eclectic but 
heterodox empirical model of the capital structure and financial decisions of micro and small 
enterprises. This present study includes such factors as: location of the firm, entrepreneur’s 
educational background, gender of the entrepreneur, form of business and export status in 
explaining the financing decisions of SMEs in the sample. These are discussed below. 
 
Variations due to industry effects are likely to be more pronounced for SMEs since most of 
them are “unitary firms” (Bolton, 1971) and this could have an impact on their capital 
structure. Service businesses, for instance, are less likely to be candidates for bank loans 
because they often lack assets which can be used as collateral (Hisrich, 1989; Riding et al.., 
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1994). Correspondingly, businesses that are highly capital intensive such as manufacturing, 
transportation and construction may be more likely to use external capital. Bradley et al. 
(1984) found that industry classification accounted for 25 percent of the variation in firm 
leverage, with capital-intensive firms showing significantly higher debt ratios. Scherr et al 
(1993) also found industry effects in a study of the capital structure of start-ups. It is, 
however, argued that service businesses, because of the nature of their business, are able to 
return profits faster than manufacturing firms. This means they may be in a position to repay 
their debt on time and take on more debt.  
 
The corporate finance literature is not very clear on the effect of location and the choice of 
finance. However, it is expected that firms close to the capital city or urban centre would 
have easier access to debt finance than those located outside the capital city.  
 
The educational background of the entrepreneur is believed to be positively related to debt, 
implying that more educated owners do have greater possibilities of borrowing. Better-
educated owners would find it easier to present a plausible case for a loan to an outside 
body. This would be particularly important if the owner had no book-keeping knowledge. 
Overall, the level of education appears to have an important positive impact on micro and 
small enterprises' debt-raising capacities (Green et al., 2002).  
 
Gender of the small business owner may affect the capital structure choice of the firm. It is 
argued that female-owned businesses are less likely to use debt for a variety of reasons 
including discrimination and greater risk aversion (Riding and Swift, 1990; Brush, 1992; 
Scherr et al.., 1993). In addition, women may not network as effectively as men (Aldrich, 
1989; Brush, 1992) and therefore may not have the same access to sources of information 
and debt capital as men do. Thus, they may turn to informal sources of finance such as 
personal financial resources. Others also contend that female-owned businesses do not 
require as much external capital as male-owned businesses, because they are smaller and 
more likely to be concentrated in lines of business that do not require many assets 
(Kallenberg and Leicht, 1991; Loscocco and Robinson, 1991). Aryeetey et al (1994) agree that 
the access of women entrepreneurs is limited principally by their concentration in smaller 
enterprises and their lack of fully-documented property as collateral. 
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The form of business could affect the debt-equity decisions of SMEs. Shareholders of 
corporations and limited companies have limited liability against losses, whereas general 
partners and owners of sole proprietorships have unlimited liability. Consequently, 
shareholder–creditor conflicts are more likely among corporations and limited companies 
than they are for general partners and sole proprietorships. Thus, corporations and limited 
liability companies may be more likely to finance their projects with equity while sole 
proprietors are more likely to employ debt financing (Brewer et al., 1996). 
 
Ownership is defined in terms of the family-owned business and non-family ownership.  
Ownership could also have an important impact on the capital structure decisions of firms. 
Family-owned firms are more enclosed and often refuse opening up to external equity 
investment and therefore likely to accommodate more debt than group-owned businesses. 
Family-owned SMEs generally avoid sources of finance, especially equity that weaken links 
and control. Again, family-owned businesses seem to be averse to pursuing external equity 
financing and therefore may be reluctant even to employ managers and non-executive 
directors who are not family members. In emerging markets with strong family ties, the issue 
of control may play a larger role, deterring firms from issuing equity to avoid dilution. More 
equity increases control risk and this is associated with higher probability of loss of family 
control. Also, monitoring costs are lower in the presence of relatively few large shareholders, 
and this should increase gearing. Obviously, the choice of finance could impact on the firm’s 
capital structure, growth opportunities and long-term survival (Romano et al., 2000).  
 
Following from the reasoning of the trade-off model, it is posited that international 
diversification reduces the expected cost of bankruptcy and allows for increased debt 
capacity. Firms involved in export business tend to be more diversified and as such are 
capable of accommodating more debt capital (Abor, 2004), implying that debt ratio rises 
with increasing international activities. Thus, as firms engage more in international business 
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3.2.3 Hypotheses 
In the light of the above theories, the following hypotheses are formulated to test the 
relationship between the capital structure and firm level characteristics; 
 
H1a: Age of the firm is positively related to long-term debt ratio 
H1a: Age of the firm is negatively related to short-term debt ratio 
 
H2a: Firm size should be positively related to long-term debt ratio  
H2b: Firm size should be negatively related to short-term debt ratio  
 
H3a: Asset structure is positively related to long-term debt ratio 
H3b: Asset structure is negatively related to short-term debt ratio 
 
H4a: Profitability is negatively related to long-term debt ratio 
H4b: Profitability is negatively related to short-term debt ratio 
 
 H5a: Growth is positively associated with long-term debt ratio 
 H5b: Growth is positively associated with short-term debt ratio 
 
H6a: Risk will be negatively related to long-term debt ratio 
H6b: Risk will be negatively related to short-term debt ratio 
 
H7a: Industry has a relationship with long-tem debt ratio 
H7b: Industry has a relationship with short-term debt ratio 
 
H8a: Location has a relationship with long-term debt  
H8b: Location has a relationship with short-term debt 
  
H9a: Education should be positively related to long-term debt ratio 
H9b: Education should be positively related to short-term debt ratio 
 
H10a: Gender is expected to be positively related to long-term debt ratio  
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H10b: Gender is expected to be positively related to short-term debt 
  
 H11a: Business form has a relationship with long-term debt 
 H11b: Business form has a relationship with short-term debt 
  
H12a: Ownership of the firm is positively associated with long-term debt 
 H12b: Ownership of the firm is positively associated with short-term debt 
 
 H13a: Exports should have a positive relationship with long-term debt 
 H13b: Exports should have a positive relationship with short-term debt  
 
3.3       Methodology 
 
3.3.1 The Model 
The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data 
involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods 
and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series 
studies. The panel regression equation differs from a regular time-series or cross-section 
regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The model for the empirical 
investigation for the listed firms is given as follows: 
 
        itititititititit RKGRPRASSZAGLDR µβββββββ +++++++= 6543210 ….….. (1) 
 
        itititititititit RKGRPRASSZAGSDR µβββββββ +++++++= 6543210 …….... (2) 
 
        itititititititit RKGRPRASSZAGTDR µβββββββ +++++++= 6543210 …….... (3) 
 
where: 
       itLDR  = long-term debt/ (equity + debt) for firm i in time t 
       itSDR  = short-term debt/ (equity + debt) for firm i in time t 
       itTDR  = total debt/ (equity + debt) for firm i in time t 
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         itAG  = number of years in business 
          itSZ  = the size of the firm (log of total assets) for firm i in time t 
          itAS = tangible fixed assets divided by total assets for firm i in time t 
         itPR  = profit before interest and taxes divided by total assets for firm i in time t      
         itGR  = growth in sales for firm i in time t 
        itRK  =  the standard deviation of the difference between the firm’s profitability in    
                      time t and the mean profitability  
           itµ  = the error term 
 
In the case of the SME sample, the empirical model is given as: 
 
itititit HXLDR µβββ +++= 210 ………………………... (4) 
 
itititit HXSDR µβββ +++= 210 ………………………... (5) 
 
itititit HXTDR µβββ +++= 210 ………………………... (6) 
 
where: 
  X  = vector of conventional firm characteristics (as stated in equations 1 - 3).      
  H  = vector of heterodox factors  
 
The exogenous variables consist of both the conventional and heterodox factors. These are: 
  X  = made up of conventional or traditional factors (as stated in equations 1 – 3), 
including; Age, Size, Asset Structure, Profitability, Growth, and Risk. 
 
  H  = made up of heterodox factors including: 
 Industry = constructed as a categorical variable (=0 if manufacturing, 1 if agriculture, 2 if 
construction & mining, 3 if hospitality, 4 if information & communication, 5 if 
pharmaceuticals & medical services, 6 if wholesale and retail trading, 7 if general business 
services);  
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Location = constructed as a categorical variable (=0 if located in Accra, 1 if in Kumasi, 2 if in 
Cape Coast, 3 if in Takoradi, 4 if in Koforidua, 5 if in Sunyani, 6 if in Tamale, 7 if in Ho); 
Education = a continuous variable, representing total years of education by the entrepreneur. 
This assumes that primary = 6 years; middle school = 10 years; secondary = 14 years; 
university = 19 years; secondary plus vocational = 15 years; and secondary plus polytechnic 
= 16 years; 
Gender = constructed as a binary (= 1 if firm is male-owned, otherwise 0); 
Form = constructed as a categorical variable (=0 if sole proprietorship, 1 if partnership, 2 if 
limited liability company); 
Ownership = constructed as binary (=1 if firm is a family-owned business, otherwise 0); 
Export = constructed as a binary (=1 if firm is engaged in exports, otherwise 0). 
 
Capital structure which is the dependent variable is defined in terms of debt ratio. This is 
given as debt divided by total capital of the firm. Debt contains both long-term and short-
term debts. Measures of capital structure thus include; long-term debt ratio and short-term 
debt ratio. Short-term debt includes bank overdraft, bank loans payable within a year and 
other current liabilities. Long-term debt also includes long-term bank loans and other long-
term liabilities repayable beyond one year, such as directors’ loans, hire purchase and leasing 
obligations. All the variables used in this study are based on book value in line with the 
argument by Myers (1984) that book values are proxies for the value of assets in place. 
 
3.3.2 Data and Estimation Methods 
This study sampled all firms that have been listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 
during the six-year period 1998-2003. Twenty two firms qualified to be included in the study 
sample. The SME sample was selected from the Association of Ghana Industries’ and the 
National Board for Small Scale Industries’ databases of firms. A total of one hundred and 
sixty firms having fewer than a hundred employees were included. The definition of SMEs is 
based on the Regional Development for Enterprise Development firms’ classification in 
Ghana. The data for the empirical analysis was derived from the financial statements of these 
firms during the six-year period, 1998–2003. Information on the heterodox factors was 
obtained through questionnaire survey. 
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The general form of the panel data model can be specified more compactly as: 
 
       ititit XY µβα ++= ………………………… (7) 
 
with the subscript i denoting the cross-sectional dimension and t representing the time-series 
dimension. The left-hand variable itY , represents the dependent variable in the model, which 
is the firm's debt ratio. itX  contains the set of explanatory variables in the estimation model, 
α  is the constant, and β  represents the coefficients. The itµ  is a random term and itµ  = 
iti νµ + ; where iµ  is the firm specific effects and itν  is a random term. The choice of the 
model estimation whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on the underlying 
assumptions. In a random effects model, iµ  and itν  are random with known disturbances. 
In a fixed effects model, iµ , the firm-specific effects, and itν , a random term, are fixed 
parameters and are estimated together with the other parameters.  
 
To examine the differences in the capital structure, the study used Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) to examine the nature and differences in the debt ratios and firm-specific 
characteristics of listed firms and SMEs. Specifically, we use the F-test to compare the capital 
structure and the firm-level variables for the two sample groups. The F-test takes the form: 
 











where N is the total number of observations. The F-statistic has an F-distribution with G-1 
numerator degrees of freedom and N-G denominator degrees of freedom under the null 
hypothesis of independent and identical normal distribution, with equal means and variances 
in each subgroup. We also report on the results of the Bartlett’s test for equal variances. The 
Bartlett’s test compares the logarithm of the weighted average variance with the weighted 
sum of the logarithms of the variances. Non-parametric methods (Wilcoxon test and Median 
tests) were then conducted to establish whether the model is robust under non-normality of 
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data used. The results generally indicate that we can reject the hypothesis that the 
populations are the same. 
 
3.4       Empirical Results 
 
3.4.1 Differences in Capital Structure 
Table 3.1 illustrates that leverage or debt ratio varies across sample groups. Average debt 
ratio for listed firms of 59.39% is higher than the 41.73% reported for the SME sector. It 
could be expected that the age of the firm, size of the firm, asset structure, growth of the 
firm and the firm’s level risk are likely to affect its capital structure and that the different 
sample groups exhibit significantly different debt ratios or capital structures. To determine 
whether there is any difference between the capital structures of the two sample groups, the 
ANOVA test was applied to examine the nature and difference in the capital structure of the 
listed firms and that of SMEs. The results indicate statistically significant difference between 
the capital structure of listed firms and that of SMEs. Large, publicly quoted companies 
seem to have more debt in their capital structure than SMEs do. The test of difference 
between the mean capital structure of listed firms and that of SMEs suggests that access to 
debt finance could be significantly influenced by size of the firm. This implies that debt 
financing actually increases with size of the firm, since bigger companies appear to have 
relatively easier access to external debt finance than their SME counterparts. Clearly, the 
finding is consistent with the size effect in capital structure theories. 
 
The mean long-term debt represents about 5.20% and 9.75% of the capital of SMEs and 
listed firms respectively. The higher short-term debts of 36.53% (for SMEs) and 49.64% (for 
listed firms) highlight the importance of short-term debt over long-term debt in financing 
Ghanaian firms. These findings are consistent with existing empirical evidence (see Cassar 
and Holmes, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). The results from the study of Hall et 
al (2004) indicate that in countries such as Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
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Table 3.1: Average Leverage Across Sample Groups 
Sample Group                                  Long-term              Short-term             Total debt 
                                                         debt ratio (%)         debt ratio (%)           ratio (%)  
SMEs                                                   5.20                       36.53                       41.73 
 
Listed Firms                                         9.75                      49.64                       59.39 
                                                                               
One-way analysis of variance 
F-statistics                                          9.38***               24.78***                    51.33*** 
 
Bartlett’s test: Chi-square                   6.02**                10.71***                     27.12*** 
(***), (**): significant at 1%, 5% levels respectively. 
Bartlett’s test is test for equal variances  
 
Table 3.2 illustrates the mean figures of the other firm-specific variables. Age, size, and 
profitability of listed firms were found to be statistically higher than that of SMEs. The 
average ages of quoted firms and SMEs are 38.5 and 9.4 respectively. Similarly, quoted firms 
appear to be larger, since they exhibit a higher asset value. Clearly, the oldest and largest 
firms tend to be listed on the stock exchange. Surprisingly, SMEs were found to have 
significantly higher fixed assets in their total assets, recording asset structure of 48.36%, 
while quoted firms show the lower asset structure of 36.92%. In terms of growth, SMEs 
exhibit a growth rate of 50.39% higher than that of listed firms with 36.14% growth rate. 
The quoted firms may be experiencing stability in their growth and that could explain the 
low growth rate compared to the SME sample. It is not surprising to find that the unquoted 
SMEs are more risky, given that they are faster growing. Quoted firms exhibit lower levels of 
risk. This could be explained by the fact that listed firms are more regulated and therefore 
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Table 3.2: Mean Variables Across Sample Groups 
Sample Group                                 Age         Size           Asset      Profitability    Growth      Risk      
                                                                        (¢)           Structure      
SMEs                                              9.4        7.666e+09      48.36%   9.25%       50.39%    11.11%                     
 
Listed Firms                                  38.5       8.624e+11      36.92%   11.63%     36.14%      7.22%   
 
One-way analysis of variance 
F-statistics                               764.90***  42.38***       17.91***    0.64          2.29          1.18 
 
Bartlett’s test: Chi-square     378.33***  4.4e+03***   14.86***  165.95***  78.84***  297.28*** 
(***): significant at 1% level. 
 
In addition to the ANOVA test, the analysis was also done using non-parametric tests to 
confirm results were robust for the anticipated difficulty of assuming distribution 
comparability. These are reported in Table 3.3. All the debt ratios are statistically significant 
using both parametric and no-parametric tests. Age, size, and asset structure are all also 
statistically significant using both parametric and no-parametric tests. Profitability is 
significant for all the tests except the F-test. Growth and risk failed to reveal consistent 



















Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50
Table 3.3: Test Using Both Parametric and Non-parametric Methods 
Means for each variable           ANOVA                  Wilcoxon Test   Median Test 
 
 F        P       Chi2       P           Z        P         Chi2      P 
 Variable                      SMEs   Listed Firms 
Long-term debt ratio   0.0520      0.0975  
 
Short-term debt ratio   0.3653      0.4964     
 
Total debt ratio           0. 4173      0.5939 
 
Age                             9.4              38.5 
 
Size                         7.666e+09    8.624e+11 
 
Asset Structure          0.4836        0.3692 
 
Profitability               0.0925        0.1163 
 
Growth                     0.5039         0.3614 
 
Risk                          0.1111         0.0722 
9.38    0.002   6.02   0.014   -8.75  0.000   99.75  0.000 
 
24.78   0.000  10.71  0.001   -5.59  0.000  37.38  0.000 
 
51.33   0.000  27.12  0.000   -7.10  0.000  67.58  0.000 
 
764.00 0.000 378.33 0.000  -16.10 0.000 145.86 0.000 
 
42.38 0.000 4.4e+03 0.000 -16.59  0.000 152.81 0.000 
 
17.91  0.000  14.86  0.000    4.10  0.000   9.18   0.002 
 
0.64 0.425  165.95 0.000   -3.11  0.002   6.11  0.013 
 
2.29  0.131   78.84   0.000   0.40  0.688    0.34  0.559 
 
1.18  0.278  297.28  0.000   0.71  0.478    0.14  0.704 
 
3.4.2 Regression Results 
Both fixed and random effects specifications of the model were estimated. After this the 
Hausman test was conducted to determine the appropriate specification. For the SME 
sample, the Hausman test results of χ2(26) = 10.01, χ2(26) = 39.27, and χ2(26) = 21.48 were 
obtained for the long-term debt, short-term debt, and total debt models respectively. The 
test statistics are all significant at 1%, confirming that the fixed-effects model is the more 
appropriate one. However, under the fixed effects for the long-term debt model, there is the 
presence of statistically significant correlation (-0.1733) between iµ  (errors across cross 
sections) and itX  (explanatory variables), as shown by the significance (F (87, 216) = 4.29; 
Prob > F = 0.0000) of the F-test that all 0_ =iµ . Under the short-term debt model, the 
statistically significant correlation (-0.3304) between iµ  and itX  is shown by the significance 
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(F (87, 217) = 5.13; Prob > F = 0.0000) of the F-test that all 0_ =iµ . For the total debt 
model, the statistically significant correlation (-0.2090) between iµ  and itX  is also shown by 
the significance (F (86, 213) = 5.32; Prob > F = 0.0000) of the F-test that all 0_ =iµ . In 
the case of listed firms, the Hausman test results of χ2(6) = 20.93, χ2(6) = 14.01, and χ2(6) = 
13.79 were obtained for the long-term debt, short-term debt, and total debt models 
respectively. The test statistics are significant at 1%, 5%, and 5% respectively, implying that 
the fixed effect is preferred over random effect. Again under the fixed effects iµ  are 
significantly correlated with itX . The correlation coefficients are given as -0.0521, -0.9419, 
and -0.9465 as shown by the significance (F (21, 104) = 37.93; Prob > F = 0.0000), (F (21, 
104) = 18.77; Prob > F = 0.0000), and (F (21, 104) = 10.34; Prob > F = 0.0000) of the F-
test that all 0_ =iµ , for the long-term debt, short-term debt, and total debt models 
respectively.  
 
An alternative panel specification is the Prais-Winsten regression which is useful for 
estimating linear cross-sectional time series models when the disturbances are assumed to be 
either heteroscedastic across panels or heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated 
across panels. Considering the correlation bias in the fixed effect, the estimation was 
therefore done using Prais-Winsten regression. Generally, the Prais-Winsten regression 
results also show signs consistent with theoretical predictions. The regressions proved to be 
statistically significant at 1% for all the models.  
 
The Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) with heteroscedastic-consistent panel 
regression results for the two sample groups are presented in Table 3.4. The results show 
that the age of the firm has statistically significant positive relationships with long-term and 
total debt ratios among SMEs. This indicates that older firms, especially SMEs, tend to have 
easier access to long-term debt given that over time they are able to resolve issues regarding 
information asymmetries with lenders and present good credit history. Since SMEs do not 
have access to the public equity market, long years of business could connote long business 
relationship with external debt providers and that increases their chances of acquiring 
external debt finance. This also supports Petersen and Rajan (1994) argument that older 
SMEs should have higher debt ratios since they should be higher quality firms. Age is also 
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significantly and positively related to short-term debt and total debt ratios among quoted 
firms. Quoted firms with longer years of business are significantly more likely to depend on 
short-term debt. However, the results reveal a statistically significant negative association 
with long-term debt ratio. This is expected for firms that are listed on the stock market, in 
that over time, they are in the position of attracting more equity investors and therefore are 
able to capture high equity finance.  
 
Contrary to theorising, the results of this study show that size is positively related to short-
term debt of SMEs. Size of the firm was also found to have statistically significant positive 
relationship with total debt ratio for the SME sample. In case of listed firms, the results 
show significantly positive signs for long-term debt and total debt ratios. The significantly 
positive relationships suggest that large firms are more likely to access long-term debt 
finance. Relatively larger SMEs find it easier to attract short-term credit (such as trade 
credits). In the quoted firms’ sample, the results indicate that larger firms are more likely to 
acquire long-term finance in their operations. Past studies have also confirmed these findings 
(see Friend and Lang, 1988; Barton et al., 1989; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Barclay and Smith, 
1996; Kim et al., 1998; Al-Sakran, 2001; Hovakimian et al., 2004).  
 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the results of this study show significantly positive relation 
between asset structure and long-term debt ratio, and significantly negative relation between 
asset structure and short-term debt ratio for the SME sample. The coefficient for the long-
term debt of quoted firms is not significant, however, that of the short-term debt is negative 
and significant. The relationship between asset structure and total debt ratio is also negative 
for both sample groups. The findings generally signal the relevance of fixed assets (collateral) 
in securing long-term debt as shown by the direct relationship between asset structure and 
long-term debt, especially for SMEs. Since small firms are perceived as risky ventures, they 
are often required to provide more valuable collateral when applying for long-term debt 
financing. As the assets substitution effect is stronger within small firms, the owner has 
greater discretion, leading to higher monitoring costs by banks and other suppliers of long-
term debt financing. This leads these institutions to require for more valuable collateral 
rather than concentrating on accounting information. With respect to the short-term debt 
for both sample groups, it is generally expected that firms tend to match their duration of 
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assets and liabilities. This means that firms with more fixed assets rely on more long-term 
debt while those with more current assets (or less fixed assets) depend on more short-term 
debt in financing their assets. In other words, they finance their fixed assets with long-term 
debt, and their current assets with short-term debt. 
 
The results also reveal that all the debt ratios (long-term, short-term debt and total debt) 
appear to have inverse associations with profitability in both sample groups except short-
term debt ratio in the case of listed firms. The results of this study confirm the hypothesis 
that less profitable firms are more likely to require external debt financing than more 
profitable ones. This implies that higher profits increase the level of internal financing; thus, 
firms that generate internal funds generally tend to avoid external debt finance. While 
profitable firms may have better access to debt finance than less profitable ones, the need 
for debt finance may possibly be lower for highly profitable firms if the retained earnings are 
sufficient to fund new investments. Therefore the more profitable the firm, the less need it 
has to borrow either long-term or short-term. This clearly supports the pecking order 
hypothesis, in that profitable firms initially rely on less costly internally generated funds and 
subsequently look out for external resources if additional funds are needed. In the case of 
SMEs, since they do not have access to the public equity, the theoretical predictions that 
seem to explain their capital structure is the “constrained” POT by Holmes and Kent (1991) 
and a “modified” POT by Ang (1991).  This means profitable SMEs will initially rely on 
retained earnings, if they are unable to do this, they will seek debt financing. This is 
consistent with our hypotheses and previous findings by Esperança et al (2003) and Hall et al 
(2004).  
 
The growth variable has a statistically and significantly positive association with only the 
long-term debt ratio of only the listed firms. This could be explained by the fact that growth 
is likely to put a strain on retained earnings and push the listed firms to borrow long-term. In 
other words, firms with high growth require more external financing to finance their growth. 
The result of the listed firms in this study suggests that growth is associated in a direct 
manner with financial leverage. If this is generally the case, then firms with high growth will 
require more external financing to finance their growth and should therefore display higher 
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leverage. This view is supported by previous empirical studies (Kester, 1986; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Barton et al., 1989).  
 
Contrary to the hypothesis of an inverse relationship, the results in the SME sample show 
direct relationships between risk and short-term debt, and total debt ratios. This may be 
explained by the positive association between the economic impact of small activity 
variations and leverage of the firm. This higher risk may leave the indebted small firm little 
choice but to demand short-term debt. This position is also supported by Scherr and 
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Table 3.4: Regression Model Results 




























































































































































   

















   













   
















































   






   
R-squared  0.2963 0.5288 0.5311 0.2149 0.4447 0.5333 
Wald chi2 (26)(6) 108.17 13802.45 23196.62 32.99 272.27 406.26 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: (Standard Error), (***), (**), (*): significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The model was estimated 
via the FGLS heteroscedastic method. Gender is a binary variable with male as the reference term. Export is a 
binary variable with exporters as the reference term. Ownership of the business is also a binary variable with 
family-owned businesses as the reference term. The industry categorical variable has manufacturing as the 
reference point. Accra is the reference point for the location categorical variable. The business form categorical 
variable has sole-proprietorship as the reference term.  
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In terms of the heterodox factors in the SME sample, we found the educational level of the 
entrepreneur to be significantly and negatively related to long-term debt ratio, contrary to 
our expectation. It may well mean that highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to open 
up to external equity capital and may be more willing to invite new equity investors. This is 
not likely to be the case with less educated entrepreneurs who may still want to maintain 
control by employing debt finance. A possible interpretation is the fact that highly educated 
owners may be over-confident in their loan applications and apply for more than they can 
reasonably expect. Less educated owners with less formal businesses may be more cautious, 
and therefore enjoy a better success rate. This confirms the findings of Green et al (2002). 
 
Gender was found to be statistically significant and positively related to the long-term debt 
ratio, indicating that male-owned SMEs are significantly more likely to employ more long-
term debt than female-owned SMEs. This appears to support the results of earlier studies 
that female-owned firms have greater difficulty accessing debt finance (see Riding and Swift, 
1990; Brush, 1992; Scherr et al.., 1993; Aryeetey et al., 1994). Other studies attribute the 
causes as being sexual stereotyping and discrimination in the lending process placing women 
at a disadvantage. Women are said not to network as effectively as men. Therefore, they may 
not have the same access to sources of information and capital. It is also argued that women 
lack personal assets and a credit track record to qualify them for accessing debt finance. This 
finding supports hypothesis 10a. 
 
We also found that family-owned SMEs are not less likely to use debt than non-family-
owned or group-owned SMEs. The ownership variable is not significant in the regression 
model, meaning both family-owned and group-owned SMEs do have equal access to sources 
of debt finance. Exporting firms are found to be significantly less likely to depend on short-
term debt. The export variable is not significant in the long-term debt model. 
 
With manufacturing as the reference, agriculture appears to be significantly and positively 
related to all debt ratios (long-term, short-term, and total debt ratios). This suggests that the 
agricultural sector depends on more long-term and short-term debt than the manufacturing 
sector. This finding is not surprising in the case of Ghana, where the government sees the 
agricultural sector as very strategic to the growth of the economy and as such seems to be 
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providing much support for the industry through innovative financing schemes. Compared 
to manufacturing, construction & mining is significantly and negatively related only to short-
term debt ratio. The construction & mining industry is significantly less likely to employ 
more short-term credit than the manufacturing sector. The sign in the long-term debt model 
is insignificant. The signs for hospitality, information technology, pharmaceutical & medicals 
services, trading, and general services industries are also not significant in both the long-term 
and short-term debt models. 
 
With respect to location, all the other locations exhibit statistically significant negative 
interaction with short-term debt compared to the reference point (Accra), except Takoradi, 
which exhibits a positive relation with short-term debt. Long-term debt is not significant in 
all the other locations, with the exception of Sunyani, which shows a significantly negative 
relation with long-term debt. The results generally suggest that SMEs located outside the 
capital city (Accra) encounter greater difficulty in acquiring debt especially short-term debt 
finance. 
 
The results of this study also indicate that partnerships and limited liability companies are 
significantly more likely to obtain debt finance compared to sole-proprietorships. It is 
generally believed that sole proprietorships are smaller than other organisational forms in 
terms of asset value, sales volume and number of employees and therefore may encounter 
greater difficulties in accessing external debt finance compared to partnerships and limited 
liability companies. In the case of limited liability companies, we found that the coefficients 
for both long-term debt and short-term debt are positive and statistically significant, 
signaling the fact that shareholders of limited liability are capable of invoking their limited 
liability status in case of default and the firm is being wound up. This finding clearly 
contradicts our hypothesis and the position of Brewer et al (1996). 
 
3.5       Conclusion and Implications 
 
This paper compared the capital structures of large, publicly quoted firms and unquoted 
SMEs in Ghana. It also examined the determinants of capital structure decisions for the two 
sample groups. Publicly quoted firms were found to exhibit significantly higher debt ratios 
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than SMEs do. The regression results indicated that the age of the firm has statistically 
significant positive relationships with long-term and total debt ratios among SMEs. Age was 
also significantly and positively related to short-term debt, and total debt ratios among 
quoted firms. However in the case of quoted firms, the results revealed a statistically 
significant negative association between age and long-term debt ratio. Size of the firm was 
found to have statistically significant positive relationships with short-term debt and total 
debt ratios of SMEs. In the case of large firms, size was found to have positive associations 
with long-term debt and total debt ratios. The results revealed significantly negative relations 
between asset structure and the debt ratios, except in the case of SMEs, where the long-term 
debt model was positive, and the long-term debt ratio of large firms, which was insignificant.  
The results of this study seem to support the pecking order hypothesis, given that all debt 
ratios for both sample groups (except short-term debt ratio of large firms) registered 
significantly negative associations with profitability. In the case of SMEs, since they do not 
have access to public equity, the theoretical predictions that seem to explain their capital 
structure is the “constrained” POT by Holmes and Kent (1991) and a “modified” POT by 
Ang (1991). This means profitable SMEs will initially rely on retained earnings, if they are 
unable to do this, they will seek debt financing. Firm growth was found to be significant and 
positive only in the long-term debt model of listed firms. Only the SME sample showed 
significantly direct relationship between risk and short-term, and total debt ratios.  
 
With respect to the heterodox factors in the SME sample, we found the educational level of 
the entrepreneur to be significantly and negatively related to long-term debt ratio, contrary to 
our expectation. Male-owned SMEs seem to have easier access to long-term debt finance 
than female-owned SMEs do. We also found that family-owned SMEs are not less likely to 
use debt than group-owned SMEs. Exporting firms were found to be significantly less likely 
to depend on short-term debt. The results of this study also support the argument that 
industry effect is important in explaining the capital structure of SMEs and that there are 
variations in capital structure across various industries. The results also showed that SMEs 
located outside the capital city encounter greater difficulty in acquiring debt, especially short-
term finance. We also found that partnerships and limited liability companies were 
significantly more likely to obtain external debt finance more easily than sole-
proprietorships. 
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The results of this study have providered some insights into the capital structure of 
Ghanaian SMEs. Clearly, the issue of capital structure is an important strategic financing 
decision that SMEs have to make. However, the results have shown that SMEs are often 
discriminated against, since age, size, and asset ‘collateralbility’ are used as measures for 
SMEs’ access to long-term credit. It is essential to put in place strategies aimed at developing 
the Ghanaian long-term capital market. Government and donor funding agencies could 
consider developing long-term innovative financial packages for Ghanaian SMEs. Policy 
makers would have to place greater emphasis on the facilitation of equity capital since it 
provides a base for further borrowing, reduces businesses’ sensitivity to economic cycles, 
and provides SMEs with access to syndicates of private and institutional venture capital 
suppliers. There could also be policies aimed at encouraging SMEs to access public equity 
capital through the reduction of listing requirements and subsidising flotation cost. This 
should enable SMEs to restructure their financing so as to rely on less debt, particularly 
short-term debt, and thereby improve their liquidity. Also, for academics, trainers and 
consultants, it may be beneficial to help SMEs access equity capital and to work at 
structuring deals that minimise perception of threats to control. 
 
This current study has also contributed to the growing body of literature on discrimination 
in small business debt financing by providing new and strong evidence from Ghanaian data, 
and also sheds light on influences of form of ownership on SMEs’ debt financing. It is 
essential to consider giving female-owned businesses access to long-term credit on more 
flexible terms. Financial institutions should be encouraged to have special credit schemes for 
promoting female-owned businesses in the country. There should be incentives for 
developing female banking models in Ghana like the Women’s World Banking. 
Government, for instance could grant tax relief to financial institutions that focus more on 
financing female-owned SMEs. Government and donor funding agencies should consider 
developing special funding packages for promoting female-owned SMEs. The newly created 
Ministry for Women and Children’s Affair should also be proactive in sourcing funding to 
establish long-term financing schemes under the ministry which would focus on supporting 
female-owned SMEs in Ghana. It is hoped that these policy directions would not only help 
improve female-owned SMEs’ access to long-term finance but would also encourage women 
to aspire to be entrepreneurial. There is the need to also consider creating regional financing 
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schemes for SMEs in the various regions of the country. Sole-proprietorship SMEs are 
encouraged to move towards more organised forms of business such as limited liability 
companies, since such firms are often viewed positively by debt finance providers. SMEs 
with limited liability status tend to gain access to debt finance more easily than SMEs that are 
sole-proprietors can do.  
 
Overall, Ghanaian SMEs show different financial behaviour from that of large, publicly 
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SMES’ RELIANCE ON BANK FINANCE AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF 





SMEs have been noted as important contributors to economic development. In many 
countries, SMEs make up the majority of businesses and contribute largely to employment 
(Mullineux, 1997a). There is also a general consensus that the performance of SMEs is 
important for both the economic and social development of developing countries (Levy et 
al., 1999). The economic and social contributions of SMEs suggest that it is in the public 
interest for SMEs to thrive (Fisher and Reuber, 2000). However, they often have difficulties 
obtaining finance to support their operations. Biekpe (2004), for instance argues that most 
small businesses, especially in sub-Saharan Africa fail in their first year due to lack of support 
from government and traditional banks.  
 
Previous empirical studies have identified a disparity between the demand for bank credit by 
SMEs and the supply of funds by banks in Ghana. According to Sowa et al (1992), most 
SMEs in Ghana complain that, lack of credit limits their operations. Some complain about 
the cumbersome banking procedures and the difficulty in accessing bank loans. It has been 
observed in Ghana that only a half of SMEs’ applications for formal finance such as bank 
loans have any chance of being favourably considered (Aryeetey, 1998). Aryeetey (1998) 
found that about two-thirds of microenterprise loan applications were likely to be turned 
down. The main reason given by bankers for the high rejection rates is the absence of viable 
and bankable projects, but entrepreneurs gave the lack of collateral as the principal reason. 
                                                 
‡
 Two papers have been published out of this chapter. They are: 1. Small Business Financing Initiatives in 
Ghana, Problems and Perspectives in Management, Vol. 4(3), pp. 69 - 77, 2006. 
2. “Small Business Reliance on Bank Financing in Ghana”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Vol. 43(1), 2007, 
USA (forthcoming). 
 
A paper based on this chapter was presented at the Second African Finance Journal Conference at the 
University of Stellenbosch Business School, Cape Town, South Africa, July, 2005. 
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Bigsten et al (2000) agreed in their study that about 90% of small firms are refused loans 
from the formal financial intermediaries, due to their inability to fulfill conditions such as 
collateral security. Buatsi (2002) also confirmed that small and medium-scale exporters in 
Ghana have difficulties accessing bank loans due to the high interest rates and collateral 
requirements. The main financial challenge facing SMEs in Ghana is access to affordable 
credit over a reasonable period. This, according to Tagoe et al (2005) is determined by the 
financing needs of SMEs and the action of investors. They suggest that SME financing 
needs reflect their operational requirements, while the action of investors depends on their 
risk perception and the attractiveness of alternative investment, which affects their 
willingness to invest. These studies however focused mainly on the problems that SMEs face 
in accessing bank loans. What determines SMEs’ access to bank finance still remains 
unexplored in the Ghanaian literature.  
 
This current study examines the determinants of bank financing among SMEs in Ghana by 
employing a panel regression model. The paper also investigates SMEs’ awareness and use of 
financing initiatives (quasi-commercial credit) other than commercial finance by the 
conventional financial institutions available to SMEs in Ghana. The issue is of critical 
significance given the important role SMEs play in the Ghanaian economy. For the current 
Ghana government’s slogan of “Golden Age of Business” to succeed and for the country to 
reach the per capita income of US $1,000 by 2012, there is a need to steadily increase the rate 
of economic growth from the present level of 4-5% to 7-10%. Given that SMEs represent a 
vast portion of the firm tissue in Ghana, they have an important role to play in spurring 
growth.  
 
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section gives an overview of 
SME development and bank financing in Ghana. Section 4.3 provides a review of the 
literature on small business finance. Section 4.4 explains the methodology employed for the 
study. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes 
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4.2 Overview of SME Development and Bank Financing in Ghana 
 
The idea of SME promotion has been in existence since 1970 though very little was done at 
the time. Key institutions were set up to assist SMEs and prominent among them are the 
Office of Business Promotion and the present Ghana Enterprise Development Commission 
(GEDC). The main objective of GEDC was to assist Ghanaian businessmen to enter into 
fields where foreigners mainly operated. It also provided packages for strengthening small 
scale industry in general, both technically and financially (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000).  
 
The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) instituted in 1983 broadened the institutional 
support for SMEs. The National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) was also 
established within the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology to address the needs of 
small businesses. The NBSSI established an Entrepreneurial Development Programme, 
intended to train and assist persons with entrepreneurial abilities to take up self-
employment.  In 1987, the industrial sector also witnessed the coming into operation of the 
Ghana Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS).  It was to supervise the 
operations of Intermediate Technology Transfer Units (ITTUs) in the country.  GRATIS 
aims at upgrading small-scale industrial concerns by transferring appropriate technology to 
small-scale and informal industries at the grass roots level. ITTUs in the regions are intended 
to develop the engineering abilities of small-scale manufacturing and service industries 
engaged in vehicle repairs and other related trades.  They are also meant to address the needs 
of non-engineering industries (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). The setting up of the new 
Ministry for Private Sector Development by the current government is also an attempt to 
focus on the development of the SME sector. 
 
The most significant institutional weakness facing dynamic SMEs is their lack of access to 
external finance. Repressive financial policies in the past, especially low interest rates, and a 
monopolistic banking system minimised the interest of banks in developing this market. To 
reverse the consequences of these practices, a combination of financial liberalisation and 
institutional reform became imperative (Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
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In view of the relatively low level of response from the private sector to early ERP reform 
measures the focus was on the liberalisation of various sectors, including the financial sector 
under the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP). Under the FINSAP, direct 
institutional measures aimed at supporting small enterprises were also put in place. With the 
assistance from the World Bank, the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) created a special fund to assist microenterprises, and the Fund for 
Small and Medium Enterprises Development (FUSMED) was initiated to increase the 
amount of credit available to SMEs through commercial and development banks. This was 
based on the presumption that the lack of availability of credit from formal sources was one 
of the major reasons why private sector investment had not grown as expected. A major 
argument was that small firms with good growth potential were being discriminated against 
(Aryeetey et al., 1994). At the same time, however, the effectiveness of many similar SME 
credit schemes was being called into question (Webster, 1991). 
 
There are currently a number of financing schemes set up by government and the donor 
agencies available to the SME sector, including Private Enterprises and Export Development 
Fund, Export Development and Investment Fund, Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Business Assistance Fund, Ghana Investment Fund, Trade and 
Investment Programme, Africa Project Development Facility, Support for Private Enterprise 
Expansion and Development, Promotion of Small and Micro Enterprise Fund, Business 
Sector Programme Support, Revolving Loan Fund, Ghana Private Sector Development 
Fund etc. In spite of these developments, the finance gap continues to be a major problem 
to SME development in Ghana. 
 
Prior to the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP), lending to the SME sector 
was constrained because of the global and sectoral lending ceiling in force at the time. With 
these ceilings lifted and interest rates freed, SME lending increased by about 20%. However, 
banks were willing to increase lending to SMEs only if there existed some attractive lending 
opportunity at reasonably manageable levels of risk and the availability of outside credit 
funds at a reference rate which makes it possible for banks to cover their costs and realise a 
satisfactory return (Aryeetey el al., 1994). 
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Though the liberalisation progamme positively affected incentives to lend, other measures 
taken to stabilise the economy and strengthen the banking system had a short-run negative 
impact on credit availability for SMEs. Tight monetary policies resulted in higher interest 
rates on government paper than on loans to commercial clients, leading in turn to non-
competitive higher rates of lending to SMEs. Banks would prefer putting their resources into 
government-issued bills and bonds to lending to the SME sector. Efforts to improve on 
portfolio performance led banks to centralise decision-making and maintain their insistence 
on landed property as collateral – often a stumbling block for SMEs. 
 
The reforms have yielded some positive results since some banks now show a growing 
interest in developing small business clients. Since September 1991, Ghana Commercial 
Bank, the largest commercial bank in Ghana for instance has been decentralising its lending 
system to give more authority to regional and branch managers. All loan applications are 
now routed through the branches, and credit analyses are done by credit officers installed at 
regional offices and some branch offices (Aryeetey et al., 1994). A number of banks have 
now set up SME departments to focus on the lending to the SME sector. With banks free to 
set interest rates, increasing competition among banks and lower rates on government 
securities, some banks have started to view SME lending as a possible profitable market 
niche. It is important to emphasise that, though access to bank credit appears to be opening 
up, it is occurring only very gradually and mainly for well-established SME clients rather than 
start-ups.   
 
There have been recent developments in the financial and macroeconomic management of 
the country which would help further free up credit to the SME sector. The central bank 
(Bank of Ghana) revised the prime rate downwards from 18.5% to 16.5% at the end of May 
2005. The volume of government-issued securities continued falling and so did the rates. 
The two main reasons for the falling rates are the signal from the prime rate and the 
dwindling of the public sector borrowing requirement. During the month of June 2005 the 
Bank of Ghana also announced a reduction in the secondary reserve for banks from 35% to 
15%, which is compulsorily invested in government securities. These developments will 
certainly make more money available for banks to expand private sector lending, especially 
to SMEs, and consequently increase SMEs’ access to long-term finance. However, in order 
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to boost such positive developments, additional measures may be needed to address the 
problems of poor information, high cost and risks involved in small business lending. 
 
4.3 Literature Review 
 
Banks make available a wide variety of loans to a wide variety of customers for many 
different purposes. However, small businesses often encounter difficulties when applying to 
providers of finance for credit to support fixed capital investment and to provide working 
capital for their operations (Tucker and Lean, 2003). Small business owners complain that 
they cannot find the funds they need to satisfy their financing needs given that they do not 
have access to public capital.  
 
Prior research has noted that banks are a major source of external capital for small firms (see 
Scherr et al., 1993; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cole and Wolken, 1995). However, small firms 
find it more difficult to obtain bank loans than do large firms (Peterson and Schulman, 1987; 
Orser et al., 1994). Binks et al (1992) caution that restricted access to bank debt by small 
businesses may not be directly attributable to their size, but rather to problems associated 
with the availability of information from which projects are evaluated (information 
asymmetry). They argue that such information problems are not peculiar to the small 
business sector alone, but are predominant there because of the anticipated (proportionately) 
higher costs of information-gathering associated with that sector. Binks et al (1992) suggest 
that the provision of finance by a bank to a firm could be considered as a simple contract 
between the two parties in which the bank is the principal and the small firm is the agent. 
This relationship potentially leads to the problem of information asymmetry. 
 
The information asymmetry problem may not only result in good lending prospects being 
rejected by finance providers, but also poor prospects being accepted by providers (Altman, 
1968). Altman defined the latter as a Type I error and the former as a Type II error. In 
theory, the provider can reduce the risk of Type I/II errors by carefully screening firms at 
the outset and monitoring projects during the life of the loan. However, screening and 
monitoring are high-cost activities associated with the lending proposition. If the lender is to 
recoup these costs, then borrower interest rates may be increased, additional risk may be 
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covered by demanding collateral or may be avoided altogether by rejecting the loan 
application. Of the Altman error categories, it is the Type II error which is of most concern 
to the small business sector - that is, a good investment project which is incorrectly rejected 
by the lender (Tucker and Lean, 2003). Common occurrence of this type of lending error 
would contribute significantly to a finance gap. It is important to note that information 
asymmetry may be even more acute in the case of small firms as, having discovered good 
investment opportunities, they are usually reluctant to disclose relevant confidential 
information to outsiders who are capable of stealing their ideas (Peterson and Schulman, 
1987). 
 
Providers of funds generally prefer borrowers who have a good track record of profitability, 
some degree of longevity, and assets that can be used as collateral (Cole and Wolken, 1995; 
Ennew and Binks, 1995). In minimising the risk associated with dealing with potential loan 
borrowers, banks employ certain strategies. They may raise the interest rate on loans to 
riskier borrowers such as small businesses to reflect the greater uncertainty of repayment 
(Berger and Udell, 1995). Petersen and Rajan (1994) confirm in their study that smaller firms 
pay higher interest on loans than larger firms. Another strategy is collateral requirement 
which could be managed or liquidated to pay off the loan in case of default. A number of 
studies have noted that a high percentage of loans are granted on a collateralised basis (see 
Boot et al., 1991; Ang et al., 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; August et al., 1997) and that these 
loans are associated with risky borrowers. A third strategy for minimising risk is to develop 
long-term relationships with borrowers. Over time, lenders have a good opportunity to get 
enough information on the firm and to learn more about the company. This puts the lender 
in a better position to make the right decisions on loan applications (Coleman, 2000). Some 
studies also found that firms with longer-term banking relationships were monitored less 
frequently and charged lower rates of interest (see  Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and 
Udell, 1995; Blackwell and Winters, 1997). 
 
However, it is argued that the problem with information asymmetry and its resulting effects 
are further compounded by certain trends that are evident in the banking sector. First, 
competition in the banking sector is leading to greater market concentration (Tucker and 
Lean, 2003). This has an important impact on the market for small firm finance, as there is 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 78
evidence that larger/universal banks are less well placed to build close relationships with 
small business customers than smaller/regionally-based banks (Bannock and Doran, 1991; 
Binks et al., 1991). Second, a broad evolving trend is that banks are further centralising 
business lending decisions and/or limiting branch manager discretion to lend outside of very 
strict policy guidelines. The ultimate lending decision maker has thus become even more 
remote to the small business borrower. Third, although authors such as Binks and Ennew 
(1996) argue that the introduction of expert systems and other knowledge-based decision 
support systems to bank lending should reduce information costs while raising quality and 
consistency in lending decisions, such developments may actually lead to greater 
unwillingness to lend to firms with non-standard projects, particularly in highly-innovative or 
high-technology sectors. Fourth, recent evidence reveals a decline in the use of bank 
overdraft facilities and a move towards term-loan lending among businesses (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996). The result might be more cautious lending by banks as such loans are not 
repayable on demand. Tucker and Lean (2003) add that there is likely to be a greater demand 
for collateral (business or private) to support loans with a longer maturity. 
 
It is useful at this point to also examine the problems faced by small firms when attempting 
to raise finance. The nature of the information asymmetry problem on the firm's side is that 
it cannot prove the quality of its investment projects to the provider of finance (usually the 
bank). Small firm managers often suffer from a lack of financial sophistication, as they are 
often product or service specialists, not specialists in the area of finance. Thus, the 
information asymmetry problem is partly one relating to difficulties in the spheres of 
communication and credibility. This is compounded by the fact that new or recent start-up 
businesses may be unable to provide evidence of a good financial performance track record. 
Banks in particular rely on past financial performance as an indicator of the future 
profitability of projects (Tucker and Lean, 2003). A closer relationship between the bank and 
the firm should reduce the information asymmetry regarding the firm's understanding of the 
lending constraints faced by bank managers (Watson, 1986). 
 
Other small firm financing problems relate to the characteristics of the firm itself and the 
attitude and objectives of the owner-manager. Such characteristics include their diversity, 
their higher risk, their inability to provide strong collateral, and stage of development effects. 
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Binks and Ennew (1996), note that there is no such thing as a typical small firm. This 
heterogeneity presents lenders with great difficulty in determining the risk associated with 
the firm's projects. Owing to the lack of business experience of many small owner-managers 
in the early years of the business, business risk may be more significant than for larger firms. 
Small firms generally have smaller financial reserves to draw on in times of crisis and are also 
relatively highly geared compared to larger firms due to the difficulty and expense of 
attracting new equity finance. Thus, such firms are characterised not only by higher business 
risk, but also higher financial distress risk. Banks tend to respond to this risk by adopting a 
capital-gearing rather than an income-gearing approach to lending. Thus, rather than 
focusing their attention on evaluating the income streams flowing from an investment 
project, they may focus more on the value of collateral available in the event of financial 
distress. This creates a problem for small firms in that they often do not have significant 
fixed assets to secure a loan in their early years of establishment. The stage of development, 
then, may be an important determinant of, and constraint on, the type and amount of 
external finance raised. Small firm financing, then, will typically be heavily secured debt, with 
few incidences of external risk capital contribution (Cruickshank, 2000). 
 
The motives and objectives of the owner-manager can greatly influence an SME’s ability to 
secure external finance. Owner-managers are often unwilling to provide their personal assets 
as collateral. Besides, many SMEs have objectives other than growth as a priority (Tucker 
and Lean, 2003). Binks and Ennew (1996), however, argue that many small firms will be 
forced to provide yield expansion to protect their limited liability status (which would 
otherwise be eroded by the provision of personal assets as loan collateral). One main motive 
for starting a small business is to maintain greater control over the operation of the business 
and to internalise the benefits of personal effort and risk-taking. In this regard, it is 
understandable that many SME managers would not tolerate any dilution of this control 
through the introduction of outside equity. Thus, the motives of owner-managers of SMEs 
may constitute a major constraint on the range of external financing sources available to the 
firm (Tucker and Lean, 2003).  
 
In summary, SMEs access to bank lending could be enhanced by the provision of adequate 
collateral, good track record and longer business relationship. The objectives of this study 
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are to empirically examine the determinants of bank financing of SMEs and also investigate 
SMEs’ level of awareness and use of non-bank financing initiatives in Ghana. 
 
4.4 Research Methodology 
 
The methodology of this study is made up of two parts. Sub-section 4.4.1 addresses the first 
objective of the study while sub-section 4.4.2 deals with the second objective of the study. 
 
4.4.1 SMEs and Bank Financing 
This part of the methodology deals with the determinants of bank financing of Ghanaian 
SMEs by employing firm-level characteristics, which have been identified in previous 
empirical studies examining financial structure of SMEs. The firm-level characteristics 
include age of the firm, profitability, size of the firm, asset tangibility, and growth.  
 
4.4.1.1 Sample and Variables  
Empirical analysis is based on a sample of 105 SMEs drawn from the Association of 
Ghanaian Industries’ database of firms and that of the National Board for Small Scale 
Industries. The sample selection was based on the criteria set by the Regional Project on 
Enterprise Development for SMEs in Ghana. That means firms with employee size of less 
than 100 were included in the study sample. The data was derived from the financial 
statements of these firms during the six-year period 1998–2003. The data was unbalanced 
panel. Information on age of the firm was obtained directly from the firms. This study 
focuses on SMEs which had bank finance in their balance sheets during the said period. 
Bank finance is made up of long-term and short-term bank debt.  Long-term bank debt ratio 
and short-term bank debt ratio are the dependent variables. Long-term bank debt or loan 
represents the proportion of the firm’s debt finance obtained from banks which is repayable 
beyond one year. Long-term bank loans are typically used to finance the firm’s investment 
projects. Short-term bank debt is the firm’s debt finance obtained from banks which is 
repayable within one year such as bank overdraft. Short-term bank credits are used mainly in 
financing the operational cycles or working capital of the firm. These measure the role of 
bank financing in the SME sector. The explanatory variables include age, profitability, size, 
asset tangibility, and growth.  
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Firm age is included in the model as a proxy for reputation. It is believed that as a firm 
remains longer in business, it establishes itself as a continuing business and this therefore 
increases its capacity to take on more debt; hence age is positively related to debt. In the 
credit-evaluation process banks tend to evaluate the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs, as 
they are generally believed to pin high hopes on very risky projects promising high 
profitability rates. Diamond (1989) suggests the use of firm reputation in dealing with the 
problems associated with the evaluation of creditworthiness. He refers to reputation as the 
good name a firm has built up over the years, which is understood by the market and which 
has observed its ability to meet its obligations in a timely manner. Rajan (1992), and Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), among others, argue that a long lending or banking relationship reduces 
the severity of the information asymmetries experienced by the bank by providing it with 
information on the borrower’s credit history, her account movements, and the personal 
behaviour of the firm’s manager. Timmons (1994) observes that capital requirements are 
different at different stages of a firm’s growth. Young firms may be able to draw capital from 
internal sources such as earnings and informal sources such as family and friends. As the 
successful firm grows, however, more capital is required to finance growth, and the firm 
typically needs at some point to turn to external sources such as banks. Consequently, the 
expected sign is positive.  
 
Profitable firms have a low bankruptcy risk and therefore are capable of attracting more 
bank loans (Storey, 1994). Profitability is measured as earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets. The higher a firm’s profitability, the lower the probability of default 
and the higher the probability of being successful in obtaining bank loan. This suggests that 
highly profitable SMEs can easily access more bank finance. A positive relationship between 
profitability and bank debt ratio is therefore expected.  
 
Firm size, measured as the logarithm of total assets in the model, represents either the 
largeness or smallness of the firm. The bigger the firm, the lower the probability of default, 
which in turn is related to higher diversification, availability of collateral, or commercial 
success. As a result, its expected effect on the probability of obtaining credit is positive. 
Smaller firms on the other hand may find it relatively more costly to resolve information 
asymmetries with lenders, and thus may present lower debt ratios. Smaller enterprises have 
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greater problems with bank credit than larger firms, since the success rate for large firms 
applying for bank loans, for instance, is higher than that of smaller firms (Aryeetey et al., 
1994). Firm size is predicted to be positively related to the bank debt ratio of SMEs. 
Diamond (1991) and Ooi (2000), however, found in the case of large firms that size of the 
firm is negatively related to bank debt ratio.  
 
Asset tangibility is operationalised as tangible fixed assets of the firm divided by total assets. 
The ratio of tangible fixed assets to total asset is seen as the appropriate measure of collateral 
value. In the area of bank financing, it is suggested that SMEs’ access to finance, especially 
long-term loans will depend upon whether the lending can be secured by tangible assets 
(Boot et al., 1991; Storey 1994; Ang et al., 1995; August et al., 1997; Berger and Udell, 1995, 
1998). SMEs that invest heavily in tangible fixed assets tend to have higher bank debt ratios. 
Tangible fixed assets can be used as collateral, thereby reducing the bank’s potential losses 
for a given interest rate and discouraging moral hazard behaviour. It is therefore 
hypothesised that a positive relationship between asset tangibility and bank debt ratio will 
exist. 
   
Growth is also measured as growth in sales. Firms with high growth will generally capture 
relatively higher debt ratios. According to Hall (2004), growth is likely to place a greater 
demand on internally generated funds and push the firm into borrowing (Hall et al., 2004). It 
is expected that firms with high growth opportunities will require more external financing to 
finance their growth and therefore should display higher leverage (Kester, 1986; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Barton et al., 1989). The firm’s growth potentials represent its prospects and 
may convey valuable information to the bank regarding the firm’s ability to defray its loan 
obligations. Banks perceive firms with high growth potential as having lower probability of 
default and therefore are more willing to extend credit to this segment of firms. Growth is 
predicted to be positively related to bank debt ratio. 
 
4.4.1.2 The Model 
The firm’s reliance on bank loans depends on firm-specific variables. This study adopts the 
model used by Ooi (2000) with modifications where necessary. The new model considers the 
relationship between bank debt ratios (long-term and short-term) and age of firm, 
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profitability, size of the firm, asset tangibility, and growth. The model for the empirical 
investigation takes the following form:  
 
ittiitit Xy υληα +++= ……………. (1) 
where: ity  represents both long-term bank debt ratio (long-term bank debt/total debt for 
firm i in time t) and short-term bank debt ratio (short-term bank debt/total debt for firm i in 
time t), itX   is a vector of firm level characteristics, iη  is the individual specific effects, tλ  is 
the time specific effects, and itυ  is the residual term. 
 
We apply the Generalised Least Square (GLS) panel regression model, which is appropriate 
for an unbalanced panel (see Baltagi, 1995) to test the hypotheses presented in the preceding 
subsection. The panel data set is useful, because it allows for the sorting out of the economic 
effects that cannot be distinguished with the use of either cross-section or time series data 
alone. The method of pooling cross-sectional and time-series data is however susceptible to 
heteroscedasticity. This was corrected using White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors 
and covariance.  
 
4.4.2 Small Business Financing Initiatives 
This part of the methodology addresses the issue of SMEs’ financing initiatives. In order to 
ascertain the potential role of government policy to support other financing initiatives, it is 
imperative to determine the use and awareness of the various financing sources available to 
the SME sector and also to investigate issues that are of importance to SME financing. A 
questionnaire survey was carried out based on a sample of 200 SMEs (firms with less than 
100 employees) drawn from the database of the National Board for Small Scale Industries 
and that of the Association of Ghana Industries. The firms were also drawn from all 
industrial and service sectors in Ghana. Pre-testing exercises were done to inform the 
shaping of the final field questionnaire. This was particularly important given the often 
sensitive nature of such questions. 
 
The field survey was carried out between January and September 2005. Out of the total of 
200 questionnaires, 125 were received back from respondents representing a response rate of 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 84
62.5%. The resulting response rate is high for a survey of this type considering that empirical 
studies involving SMEs have been known to generate far lower percentage response rates. In 
order to determine the perception of ease of accessing the financing schemes, responses 
were measured with a five-point Likert rating scale, where very difficult = 1 and very easy = 
5. Data obtained from respondents were entered into an "SPSS" database application for 
analysis. Descriptive statistics were used in the presentation and analysis of results of the 
second objective of this study.  
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 SMEs and Bank Financing 
 
4.5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the dependent and independent variables. It reports the 
mean statistics for attributes of the firms included in the sample. Firm age has a mean 
(median) age of 11.2082 (8.0). This means that on the average, SMEs in our sample have 
been in business for 11 years. Profitability shows a mean (median) value of 0.1134 (0.0866), 
suggesting a return on assets of 11.34%.  Size in terms of value of total assets has a mean 
(median) of 6.84E+09 (1.81E+09) Ghanaian cedis. Asset tangibility has a mean (median) 
of 0.4453 (0.4153), indicating that tangible fixed assets account for 44.53% of total assets. 
The average (median) growth rate is 43.99% (32.34%). 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Long-term bank debt  ratio      0.0614 0.1953   0.0000 0.0000 0.9937 
Short-term bank debt  ratio    0.1794   0.2690   0.0000           0.0199 0.9261 
Age                  11.2082 8.3484   1.0000 8.0000  43.0000 
Profitability     0.1134 0.1962 -0.7712 0.0866 1.6393 
Size                  6.84E+09 1.52e+10 11509706 1.81E+09 1.40E+11 
Tangibility       0.4453 0.2992 0.0006 0.4153   0.9999 
Growth             0.4399 0.1962  -0.7240 0.3234   4.2565 
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With respect to our investigation of SMEs' reliance on bank borrowings, the financial 
statements identified explicitly the long-term and short-term debt finance employed by the 
firms that constitute bank borrowing. The reported figures only reflect bank loans and credit 
which are actually outstanding and do not take into account undrawn loan commitments. 
Although the amount of non-bank debt is not reported, it can be inferred by deducting the 
amount of total bank debt from total debt outstanding. The mean long-term bank debt and 
short-term bank debt ratios are 0.0614 and 0.1794 respectively, indicating a total bank debt 
ratio of 0.2408. This suggests that on average, less than a quarter of SMEs’ debt financing is 
obtained from banks with short-term bank debt representing a greater proportion of total 
bank finance.  
 
4.5.1.2 Correlation Coefficients of Regression Variables 
To examine the possible degree of collinearity among variables, a correlation matrix of the 
dependent and independent variables is included in Table 4.2. Long-term bank debt is 
significantly and negatively correlated with profitability but has significantly positive 
correlations with size and asset tangibility. Short-term bank debt has a significantly positive 
correlation with size, but a significantly negative correlation with growth. The results show 
significantly positive correlation between age and size. Age is significantly and negatively 
correlated with asset tangibility, and growth. The results indicate that profitability has a 
significantly negative correlation with asset tangibility but a significantly positive correlation 
with growth. Generally, the correlation coefficients are not sufficiently large to cause 
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Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix 
 Long-
term 
bank debt        
Short-
term 
bank debt   
Age    Profitability   Size        Tangibility     Growth 
Long-term 
bank debt   
1.0000       
Short-term 
bank debt   
-0.1295* 
(0.0054) 





1.0000     






1.0000    








1.0000   
























Note: P-values are in brackets 
 
 
4.5.1.3 Regression Results 
 
Table 4.3: Regression Coefficients 
 
Variable                            Long-term bank debt                                 Short-term bank debt 
                                            
                                     B        Std-error        t             Sig.             B       Std-error         t            Sig. 
 
Age                          0.0029     0.0002     12.5692     0.0000      0.0009     0.0006      1.3863    0.1668     
Profitability             -0.0582     0.0147     -3.9645      0.0001     -0.0542    0.0135     -4.0191    0.0001 
Size                          0.0144     0.0018      7.9990      0.0000      0.0313     0.0028    11.2186    0.0000 
Tangibility                0.1491     0.0205      7.2538      0.0000      0.0341     0.0229     1.4871     0.1382 
Growth                    0.0003     1.41E-05  18.0011    0.0000     -0.0163     0.0055    -2.9335     0.0036 
Constant                 -0.3489     0.0428     -8.1964      0.0000     -0.5533     0.0665    -8.3216     0.0000 
 
R2                                                   0.0713                                                      0.1164                        
Adjusted R2                                              0.0563                                                      0.1000 
S.E. of regression                    0.1925                                                      0.2421 
F-statistics                               4.7569                       0.0000                    7.1150                     0.0000 
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The panel regression model is used to estimate the effect of each explanatory variable on the 
long-term bank debt and short-term bank debt ratios. The GLS panel was found to be the 
most robust after testing for various options of the panel data regression such as Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects. The results of the GLS White heteroscedastic-consistent 
standard errors panel regression are therefore presented in Table 4.3.  
 
The empirical results show that age has a significantly positive relationship with long-term 
bank debt ratio. This could be explained by the fact that older SMEs, in terms of how long 
they have been in business or the length of the banking relationship they have with banks, 
tend to have good track records and therefore experience fewer problems acquiring long-
term bank loans. Relatively older and experienced SMEs appear to have high credit ratings 
and therefore gain access to bank loans more easily compared to their newer counterparts. 
The findings support those of Rajan (1992), and Petersen and Rajan (1994). They argue that 
a long lending relationship reduces the severity of the information asymmetries experienced 
by the bank by providing it with information on the borrower’s credit history, her account 
movements, and the personal behaviour of the firm’s manager. It is important to also note 
that the decision of the bank to lend/not lend to new firms is assumed to depend on the 
expected value of the return. Storey (1994) thinks that key elements in this will not only be 
the expected default rate, but also the growth rate of the firm, since faster growing new firms 
are larger users of bank financing than slower growing new firms. The relationship between 
age and short-term bank debt ratio is not statistically significant in the regression results. 
 
The empirical results of this study also show significantly negative relationships between 
profitability and both long-term and short-term bank debt ratios, contradicting the 
hypothesis of positive association. Given that highly profitable firms are unlikely to be 
rejected by banks, the fact that they exhibit low bank debt ratios and refuse to apply for bank 
loans may suggest that, unlike other SMEs they do not require external debt funding or may 
decide to let pass good projects instead of resorting to fresh bank loans. The results of this 
study may also indicate that SMEs that generate internal funds generally seem to avoid 
gearing. This appears to provide support for the pecking order theory that denotes that 
profitable firms prefer internal financing to external financing. The pecking order theory 
suggests that the use of external funds is very much related to profitability on the basis that 
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SMEs, particularly if they are not listed, will make use of internally generated funds as a first 
resort. SMEs which make use of external funds might be those with lower levels of profit. 
 
The significantly positive relationships between size of the firm and both long-term bank 
debt, and short-term bank debt reliance is consistent with the argument that the bigger the 
firm, the lower the probability of default, which in turn is related to higher diversification, 
availability of collateral, or commercial success. The results of this study indicate that SMEs 
with high asset value have easier access to bank financing, especially long-term bank loans. 
Relatively smaller firms denote higher risk and this could cause banks to shy away from 
lending to such firms. Bigger firms may have well structured systems and this may suggest 
adequate information which banks require in granting credit. This means the asymmetric 
cost of information between the firm and banks is lower for bigger firms. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis and also supports the results of Aryeetey et al (1994), who found that the 
success rate for large firms applying for bank loans for instance was higher than that of 
smaller firms. 
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient of the asset tangibility variable is significantly 
positive for the panel data estimation for long-term bank debt ratio. The empirical evidence 
suggests that firms use tangible fixed assets as collateral when negotiating borrowing, 
especially long-term bank borrowing. SMEs that maintain a large proportion of fixed assets 
in their total assets tend to gain easier access to bank loans than those which do not. This 
implies that banks place more merit on fixed assets or collateral before granting loans to 
firms. SMEs are generally perceived as risky ventures by banks and other financiers and 
therefore banks will require adequate collateral as a way of minimising the risk involved in 
lending to this sector. This seems also to support the findings by a number of authors (see 
Boot et al., 1991; Storey 1994; Ang et al., 1995; August et al., 1997; Berger and Udell, 1995, 
1998; Cassar and Holmes, 2003).  
 
The results show a statistically significantly positive relationship between growth and long-
term bank debt ratio, suggesting that growth is likely to put a strain on retained earnings and 
push the firm to borrow long-term. In other words, SMEs with high growth will require 
more long-term external financing to finance their growth. The negative association with 
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short-term bank debt ratio is indicative of the fact that high growth SMEs are less likely to 
require short-term bank credit like an overdraft. SMEs that exhibit high growth rates are 
capable of generating funds internally to finance their operating cycles or working capital 
needs and therefore may not require such short-term funds from the bank.  
 
4.5.2 Small Business Financing Initiatives 
 
4.5.2.1 Characteristics of Sampled Firms 
Table 4.4 presents the characteristics of the firms based on industry classification, size, age 
and trade status. In all, five industries were represented including; agriculture representing 
3.2% of valid respondents, manufacturing (64%), mining and construction (8.0%), trading 
(5.6%) and general services (19.2%). Three size categories were defined on the basis of 
number of employees. Firms with fewer than 5 employees were classified as micro firms. 
Those with between 5 and 29 employees were classified as small firms, and medium-sized 
firms had between 30 and 99 employees. About 4 (3.2%) of the firms surveyed were in the 
microenterprise group, 75 (60.0%) were small firms and 46 (36.8%) were medium-sized 
companies. The firms were also categorised on the basis of date of establishment. Firms 
which have been in business for less than 1 year were labeled “infant”, those  between 1  and 
5 years were classified as “young”, those with between 6 and 10 years were classified “adult”, 
and those with over 10 years were labeled “mature”. There were 3 infant businesses, 
representing 2.4% of the sample. Twenty three were young firms, representing 18.4% of the 
sample, 35 adult firms, representing 28.0%, and 64 mature companies, representing 51.2%. 
The majority of the firms were male (64%) and Ghanaian (91.2%) owned. Only 52, 
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   Table 4.4: Characteristics of Sampled Firms 
Industry 
Agriculture                                                           
Manufacturing 
Mining & Construction 



























 Freq.      %  
    4         3.2 
  80       64.0 
  10         8.0 
    7         5.6 
  24       19.2 
125     100.0 
 
 
    4         3.2 
  75       60.0 
  46       36.8 
 
 
    3         2.4 
  23       18.4 
  35       28.0 
  64       51.2 
 
 
 80        64.0 
 31        24.8 
 14        11.2 
 
  
114       91.2 
  11         8.8 
 
 
  52       41.6 
  73       58.4 
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4.5.2.2 Awareness of Financing Initiatives 
Table 4.5 illustrates the awareness among the firms of the various non-bank financing 
schemes. Most of the firms were unaware of these financing schemes. Apart from EGF and 
DANIDA, less than 50% of the respondents were aware of the other financing schemes. 
This is particularly surprising, given the problems SMEs face in accessing loans from 
commercial banks. Since most (79.2%) of these firms have been in business for over five 
years, one would have expected that they would be reasonably aware of non-bank financing 
schemes available to the SME sector. The low level of awareness may be due to inadequate 
and ineffective marketing communication implemented by these finance providers. Most of 
these schemes, apart from initially touring the country to launch their programmes in the 
regional capitals, do not intensify their marketing communication efforts to make SMEs 
aware of these financing schemes. The small budget mostly assigned to administering these 
financing schemes by the donors could account for this problem. 
   Table 4.5: Awareness of the Various Financing Schemes 
Financing Scheme                                      
EMPRETEC Ghana Foundation (EGF)            
Danish International Devt. Assistance (DANIDA) 
Export Development and Investment Fund (EDIF) 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
Ghana Private Sector Devt. Fund (GPSDF) 
Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
Business Assistance Fund (BAF) 
Department for International Development (DFID) 
Ghana Investment Fund (GIF) 
Trade and Investment Programme (TIP) 
Private Enterprises and Export Devt. Fund (PEED)              
Funds for Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Devt. (FUSMED) 
Africa Project Development Facility (APDF) 
Support for Private Enterprise Expansion and Devt. (SPEED) 
Promotion of Small and Micro Enterprise Fund (PSME) 
Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS) 
Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) 
Freq.     %  
  66      52.8              
  63      50.4 
  56      44.8 
  47      37.6 
  46      36.8 
  43      34.4 
  37      29.6 
  36      28.8 
  36      28.8 
  35      28.0      
  33      26.4    
  32      25.6 
  24      19.2 
  16      12.8 
  14      11.2 
   6         4.8 
   4         3.2 
   Source: Survey data. 
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4.5.2.3 Use of Financing Initiatives 
Table 4.6 indicates the use of the various non-bank financing schemes among the sampled 
firms. The results generally show a very low dependence on these sources of financing. 
Among the sampled firms, less than 10% have been successful in obtaining finance from 
each of these schemes. This simply reflects the fact that the sample contains a high 
proportion of firms (mostly over 50%) that are unaware of these financing schemes. 
Another reason may be the stringent eligibility criteria that make it difficult for SMEs to 
access these funds. The low use of the various financing schemes is not particularly 
encouraging, since SMEs in Ghana do not have easy access to other sources of finance such 
as bank loans. 
 
    Table 4.6: Use of Various Financing Schemes 
Financing Scheme                                      
Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
Export Development and Investment Fund (EDIF) 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
Business Assistance Fund (BAF) 
Trade and Investment Programme (TIP) 
EMPRETEC Ghana Foundation (EGF) 
Private Enterprises and Export Devt. Fund (PEED)              
Funds for Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Devt. (FUSMED) 
Danish International Devt. Assistance (DANIDA) 
Ghana Private Sector Devt. Fund (GPSDF) 
Africa Project Development Facility (APDF) 
Department for International Development (DFID) 
Promotion of Small and Micro Enterprise Fund (PSME) 
Support for Private Enterprise Expansion and Devt. (SPEED) 
Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) 
Ghana Investment Fund (GIF) 
Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS) 
Freq.      %  
  9        7.20 
  8        6.40 
  8        6.40 
  6        4.80 
  6        4.80 
  5        4.00 
  5        4.00 
  5        4.00 
  5        4.00 
  4        3.20 
  4        3.20 
  2        1.60 
  2        1.60 
  2        1.60 
  1        0.80 
  1        0.80 
  0        0.00 
   Source: Survey data. 
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4.5.2.4 Financing Problems 
The respondents were asked to indicate their perception of the various non-bank financing 
initiatives in terms of the ease or otherwise of accessing the schemes. The perception of 
access of the financing schemes is illustrated in Table 4.7. SPEED and RLF are perceived to 
be the easiest to acquire, followed by GPSDF, PSME and APDF. Some (EGF, FUSMED, 
BAF, JICA, TIP and DFID) are also perceived to be relatively easier to access. EDIF, GTZ, 
DANIDA, GIF and PEED are, however, perceived as difficult to acquire, with mean values 
of less than 2.50. Considering the information asymmetry that exists regarding the quality of 
small businesses’ investment projects, finance providers may demand collateral security.  
This clearly makes it difficult for SMEs to qualify for such financing. 
 
   Table 4.7: Perception of Ease of Access to Financing Schemes 
Financing Scheme                                      
Support for Private Enterprise Expansion and Devt. (SPEED) 
Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) 
Ghana Private Sector Devt. Fund (GPSDF) 
Promotion of Small and Micro Enterprise Fund (PSME) 
Africa Project Development Facility (APDF) 
EMPRETEC Ghana Foundation (EGF) 
Funds for Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Devt. (FUSMED) 
Business Assistance Fund (BAF) 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
Trade and Investment Programme (TIP) 
Department for International Development (DFID) 
Export Development and Investment Fund (EDIF) 
Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
Danish International Devt. Assistance (DANIDA) 
Ghana Investment Fund (GIF) 
Private Enterprises and Export Devt. Fund (PEED)        
   Mean  
    5.00 
    5.00 
    3.67 
    3.00 
    3.00 
    2.86 
    2.83 
    2.75 
    2.67 
    2.50 
    2.50 
    2.33 
    2.33 
    2.00 
    2.00    
    1.67 
   Source: Survey data. 
 
Table 4.8 illustrates how respondents rank the difficulty they encounter when applying to 
these financing schemes. The most common difficulty (26.4% of respondents) was the lack 
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of securable assets required by finance providers. Most of these schemes are routed through 
the banks, which also review applications using their criteria such as collateral requirement. 
The essence of involving the banks is to avoid the credit risk involved in lending to SMEs. 
Some (22.4%) indicated that the lack of knowledge by finance providers about the nature of 
the respondent’s business was a problem, while 16.8% mentioned that they did not meet the 
eligibility criteria for accessing the finance. A number of firms (15.2%), however, admitted 
their lack of knowledge about lending criteria used by finance providers represents a 
difficulty in accessing finance, and others (12%) also admitted that they had difficulty finding 
out about available financing schemes. Bureaucracy and delayed processing of applicants’ 
proposals was also identified as a difficulty by some respondents (12%). Eleven (8.8%) 
mentioned the lack of financial performance track record as a problem. This problem is not 
surprising for start-up businesses. A few (3.2%) also indicated the problem of high interest 
rates. The respondents were of the view that relaxing the collateral requirement would 
enable most of the SMEs to access these facilities. 
 
   Table 4.8: Problems Faced in Accessing Financing Schemes 
Problem 
Lack of securable assets  
Lack of knowledge by finance providers about my 
business  
Do not meet eligibility criteria 
Lack of knowledge by my business about lending 
criteria used by providers  
Difficulty in finding out about available finance  
Bureaucracy 
Lack of financial performance track record  
High Interest 
           Freq.     %  
             33       26.4 
 
             28       22.4 
             21       16.8             
              
             19       15.2 
             15       12.0 
             15       12.0            
             11         8.8 
               4         3.2             
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4.6 Conclusion and Implications 
 
The issue of financing has been identified as a dominant constraint facing Ghanaian SMEs. 
This chapter has empirically examined the determinants of SMEs’ reliance on bank financing 
in Ghana. The empirical results revealed that bank financing accounts for less than a quarter 
of total debt financing of SMEs in Ghana, with short-term bank credit accounting for a 
higher percentage of total bank finance. This signaled the fact that SMEs gain easier access 
to bank credit in financing their operating cycles than bank loans for financing investment 
projects. The results also showed that the age of the firm, size of the firm, asset tangibility, 
and growth have significantly positive associations with long-term bank debt ratio, while 
firm profitability has a significantly negative relationship with long-term bank debt ratio. 
Short-term bank debt ratio showed significantly positive association with size, but 
significantly negative associations with profitability and growth. The results of this study 
clearly indicate that older SMEs depend more on long-term bank loans. Relatively bigger 
SMEs depend more on long-term bank loans and short-term bank credit. Also, SMEs with 
large proportions of fixed assets in their total assets often gain easier access to long-term 
bank finance than those with low collateral assets. This finding confirms the importance of 
collateral in obtaining finance, especially long-term bank loans. SMEs that are able to gain 
access to long-term bank loans are therefore in a position to finance their long-term 
investment projects. The results also suggest that profitable SMEs depend less on bank 
borrowing, because of their ability to generate funds internally for their operations. The 
findings of this study reveal that SMEs with high growth rates tend to gain relatively easier 
access to long-term bank loans to finance their investment activities. They, however, require 
less short-term bank credit given that they are often in the position to generate internal 
resources to finance their operating cycles or working capital needs.  
 
This study has examined the economic importance of banks in financing of SMEs in Ghana. 
The results suggest that SMEs that have a long business relationship and those with 
adequate collateral tend to gain access to bank sources of finance more. SME entrepreneurs 
and managers should seek to develop and improve on their information management 
practices by keeping proper and accurate records of the firm’s operations. This has the 
potential of reducing banks’ perception of risks and also facilitates easier access to financing 
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at favourable terms of credit. To expand SME lending, banks need to also develop 
alternatives to property as collateral to secure loans. Personal guarantees, sales contracts, and 
lien on equipment financed could be explored. Banks could also collaborate with informal 
finance providers in granting credit. With this arrangement, banks are able to take advantage 
of informal finance lenders’ superior information on small clients and their relatively low 
cost of frequent small transactions. The other Ghanaian banks are encouraged to emulate 
the good example of setting up departments that will solely concentrate on granting credits 
to the SME sector. It is also essential for the government through the newly established 
Ministry for Private Sector Development and donor funding agencies also to consider 
developing innovative financial packages for Ghanaian SMEs.   
 
This chapter also investigated the awareness and use of the various non-bank financing 
schemes available to the Ghanaian SME sector. The results of this study revealed low 
awareness and usage levels of the various financing initiatives among SMEs. Most of the 
schemes are perceived as difficult to access. The difficulties SMEs often face in accessing 
these funds include: lack of securable assets, lack of knowledge by finance providers about 
the nature of respondents business, stringent eligibility criteria, lack of knowledge about 
lending criteria, difficulty in finding out about available finance, and bureaucratic 
requirements. These really limit SMEs ability to access funds from these initiatives. 
 
In the light of the key findings, policy actions should include better information provision 
regarding the various sources of finance. This could involve the financing initiatives pursuing 
a more aggressive and continuous marketing communication campaigns to inform SMEs of 
the various financing schemes available to the sector. Eligibility criteria should be made a bit 
more flexible to enable more SMEs to qualify for access to these funds. Routing these 
financing facilities through the commercial banks should be reconsidered. Evaluation of 
applicants’ proposals could be done by qualified consultants affiliated to these schemes and 
the banks should rather be appointed as managers of the loan facilities for a fee. In that case, 
government bears the credit risk. This could further expedite processing and give applicants 
a better chance of accessing these facilities. These policy prescriptions could go a long way 
to improve Ghanaian SMEs’ access to long-term financing to spur on growth.  
 




Altman, I. (1968), Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy, Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609. 
 
Ang, J. S., Wuh, L. J. and Tyler, F. (1995), Evidence on the Lack of Separation between 
Business and Personal Risks among Small Businesses, Journal of Small Business Finance 4(2/3), 
197-210.  
 
Aryeetey, E. (1998), “Informal Finance for Private Sector Development in Africa”, Economic 
Research Papers No. 41, The African Development Bank, Abidjan. 
 
Aryeetey, E., Baah-Nuakoh, A., Duggleby, T., Hettige, H. and Steel, W. F. (1994), “Supply and 
Demand for Finance of Small Scale Enterprises in Ghana”, Discussion Paper No. 251, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.  
 
August, J. D., Grupe, M. R., Luckett, C. and Slowinski, S. M. (1997), Survey of Finance 
Companies, 1996, Federal Reserve Bulletin, (July), 543-556.  
 
Baltagi, B. H. (1995), “Econometric Analysis of Panel Data”, Wiley Chichester. 
 
Bannock, G. and Doran, A. (1991), “Business Banking in the 1990s: A New Era of Competition”, 
Lafferty Group, London. 
 
Barton, S. L., Ned, C. H. and Sundaram, S. (1989), An Empirical Test of Stakeholder Theory 
Predictions of Capital, Financial Management, 18(1), 36-44.  
 
Berger, A. N., and Udell, G. F. (1995), Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small 
Firm Finance, Journal of Business, 68(3), 351-381.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 98
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1998), The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles 
of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 22, 613-673. 
 
Bester, H. (1987), The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, 
European Economic Review, 31(4), 887-9. 
 
Bester, H. and Hellwig, M. (1989), Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An 
Overview of the Issues, in Bamber, G. and Spremann, K. (eds.), Agency Theory, Information and 
Incentives, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY and Berlin. 
 
Biekpe, N. (2004), Financing Small Business in Sub-Saharan Africa: Review of Some Key 
Credit Lending Models and Impact of Venture Capital, Journal of African Business, 5(1), 29-44. 
 
Bigsten A., Collier, P., Dercon, S., Fafchamps, M., Guthier, B., Gunning, J. W., Soderbom, 
M., Oduro, A., Oostendorp, R., Patillo, C., Teal, F. and Zeufack, A. (2000), “Credit Constraints 
in Manufacturing Enterprises in Africa”, Working Paper WPS/2000. Centre for the study of 
African Economies, Oxford University, Oxford. 
 
Binks, M.R. and Ennew, C.T. (1996), Financing Small Firms, in Burns, P. and Dewhurst, J. 
(eds.), Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 2nd ed., Macmillan, London. 
 
Binks, M. R., Ennew, C. T and Reed, G. V. (1991), “Small Businesses and their Banks: An 
International Perspective”, National Westminster Bank, London. 
 
Binks, M. R., Ennew, C. T. and Reed, G. V. (1992), Information Asymmetries and the 
Provision of Finance to Small Firms, International Small Business Journal, 11(1), 35-46. 
 
Blackwell, D. W. and Winters, D. B. (1997), Banking Relationships and the Effect of 
Monitoring on Loan Pricing, The Journal of Financial Research, 20(2), 275-289.  
 
 99
Blanton, W. R. and Dorman, T. L. (1994), Small Business Spotlight ... SBA Loans for 
Community Banks, Journal of Commercial Lending, 02/01/1994. 
 
Boapeah S.N. (1993), “Developing Small-Scale Industries in Rural Regions: Business Behaviour and 
Appropriate Promotion Strategies With Reference to Ahanta West District of Ghana”, Spring, 
Dortmund. 
 
Boot, A.W.A., Thakor, A. V. and Udell, G. F. (1991), Secured Lending and Default Risk: 
Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results, The Economic Journal, (May), 
458-472.  
 
Bradley, M., Jarrel, G. A. and Kim, E. H. (1984), On the Existence of an Optimal Capital 
Structure: Theory and Evidence, The Journal of Finance, 39, 857-880. 
 
Buatsi, S. N. (2002), Financing Non-traditional Exporters in Ghana, The Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing, 17(6), 501-522. 
 
Cassar, G and Scott, H. (2003), Capital Structure and Financing of SMEs: Australian 
Evidence, Journal of Accounting and Finance, 43, 123-147. 
 
Cole, R. A. and Wolken, J. D. (1995), Financial Services Used by Small Businesses: Evidence 
from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances, Federal Reserve Bulletin, (July), 629-
666. 
 
Coleman, S. (2000), Access to Capital and Terms of Credit: A Comparison of Men and 
Women-Owned Small Businesses, Journal of Small Business Management, 38(3), 37-52. 
 
Cruickshank, D., (2000), “Competition in UK Banking”, HMSO, London. 
 
Demirgüc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (1999) Institutions, Financial Markets and Firm 
Debt Maturity, Journal of Finance, 54, 295-336. 
 
 100
Diamond, D. W. (1989), Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 
97, 828-62. 
 
Diamond, D. W. (1991), Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and 
Directly Placed Debts, Journal of Political Economy, 99(4), 689-721. 
 
Ennew, C. T. and Binks, M. (1995), The Provision of Finance to Small Businesses: Does the 
Banking Relationship Constrain Performance?, Journal of Small Business Finance, 4(1), 57-73. 
 
Fisher, E. and Reuber, R. (2000), “Industrial Clusters and SME Promotion in Developing Countries”, 
Commonwealth Trade and Enterprise Paper No.3, Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
Hall, G. C., Hutchinson, P. J. and Michaelas, N. (2004), Determinants of the Capital 
Structures of European SMEs, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 31(5/6), 711-728. 
 
Kayanula, D. and Quartey P.(2000), “The Policy Environment For Promoting Small And Medium-
Sized Enterprises in Ghana and Malawi”, Finance and Development Research Programme, 
Working Paper Series Paper No 15, IDPM, University of Manchester 
 
Kester, W. C. (1986), Capital and Ownership Structure. A Comparison of United States and 
Japanese Manufacturing Corporations, Financial Management, 15, 5-16. 
 
Lader, P. (1996), The Public/Private Partnership, Springs Spring', 35(2), 41-44. 
 
Levy, B. (1993), Obstacles to Developing Indigenous Small and Medium Enterprises: An 
Empirical Assessment, The World Bank Economic Review, 7(1), 65-83.  
 
Levy, B., Berry, A. and Nugent, J. (1999), Supporting the Export Activities of Small and 
Medium Enterprise (SME), in Levy, B. A. and Nugent, J. B. (eds.), Fulfilling the Export 
Potential of Small and Medium Firms, MA, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
 
 101
Macmillan, H. (1931), “Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry”, CMD 3897, HMSO, 
London. 
 
Mullinuex, A.W. (1997a), “The Funding of Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) in the EU (1971-
1993): Evidence of Convergence”, Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. 
 
Ooi, J. (2000). Corporate Reliance on Bank Loans:  An Empirical Analysis of U.K. Property 
Companies, Journal of Property Investment and Finance, 18(1), 103-120. 
 
Orser, B., Riding, A. and Swift, C. (1994), Banking Experiences of Canadian Micro-
Businesses, Journal of Enterprising Culture, 1, 321-345. 
 
Parker, R., Riopelle, R. and Steel, W. (1995), “Small Enterprises Adjusting to Liberalisation in Five 
African Countries”, World Bank Discussion Paper, No 271, African Technical Department 
Series, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. (1994), The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence 
from Small Business Data, The Journal of Finance 49(1), 3-38.  
 
Peterson, R. and Schulman, R. (1987), Entrepreneurs and Banking in Canada, Journal of Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship, 5, 41-45. 
 
Rajan, R. G. (1992), Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s-
Length Debt, Journal of Finance, 47, 1367-1406. 
 
Riding, A. L. and Short, D. M. (1987a), Some Investor and Entrepreneur Perspectives on the 
Informal Market for Risk Capital, Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 4, 19-30. 
 
Scherr, F. C., Sugrue, T. F, and Ward, J. B. (1993), Financing the Small Firm Start-Up: 
Determinants of Debt Use, Journal of Small Business Finance, 1(1), 17-36. 
 
 102
Sowa, N. K., Baah-Nuakoh, A., Tutu, K. A. and Osei, B. (1992), “Small Enterprise and 
Adjustment, The Impact of Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme on Small-Scale Industrial 
Enterprises”, Research Reports, Overseas Development Institute, 111 Westminster Bridge 
Road, London SE1 7JD. 
 
Steel, W. F. and Webster, L. M. (1991), “Small Enterprises in Ghana: Responses to Adjustment 
Industry”, Series Paper, No. 33, The World Bank Industry and Energy Department, 
Washington DC. 
 
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A., (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 
The American Economic Review, 71, 393-410. 
 
Storey, D.J. (1994), The Role Legal Status in Influencing Bank Financing and New Firm 
Growth, Applied Economics, 26, 129-136. 
 
Tagoe, N., Nyarko, E. and Anuwa-Amarh, E. (2005), Financial Challenges Facing Urban 
SMEs under Financial Sector Liberalisation in Ghana, Journal of Small Business Management, 
43(3), 331–343. 
 
Timmons, J. A. (1994), “New Venture Creation”, Irwin, Chicago. 
 
Titman, S. and Wessels, R. (1988), The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice, Journal of 
Finance, 43(1), 1–19. 
 
Tucker, J. and Lean, J. (2003), Small Firm Finance and Public Policy, Journal of Small Business 
and Enterprise Development, 10(1), 50-61. 
 
Watson, I. (1986), Managing the Relationship with Corporate Clients, International Journal of 
Bank Marketing, 4(1), 19-34. 
 
Webster, L. (1991), “World Bank Lending for Small and Medium Enterprise”, Discussion Paper 




THE RELEVANCE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL FINANCE AMONG 




5.1  Introduction 
 
Increasing globalisation, international competition and the collapse of trade barriers due to 
regional integrations, have given an incentive to many firms, including SMEs, to expand 
their operations into other countries. Given that SMEs represent a large proportion of firms 
in most countries, governments have sought to develop policies aimed at assisting the SME 
sector to develop an international orientation by adopting effective export strategies. This 
position by most governments especially in developing countries, is mainly in response to 
the continuous debate on the perceived benefits for export diversification into non-
traditional exports (NTEs). This important issue raises some implications for developing 
countries such as Ghana.   
 
The Ghanaian export sector can generally be divided into traditional and non-traditional 
exports. Traditional exports include cocoa beans, gold and other minerals, unprocessed 
timber and electricity. All other exports have generally been categorised as non-traditional. 
Although non-traditional exports contribute immensely to the economic development of the 
country, provision of finance to the sector has traditionally been inadequate. The increasing 
growth of the non-traditional export sector in the face of fluctuations in prices of traditional 
export products such as gold and timber on the world market brings to the fore the need to 
increase funding to this sector. In Ghana the problem of financing small and medium-scale 
enterprises (SMEs), especially those in the non-traditional export (NTE) sector, has been of 
great concern for some time now. This pre-occupation is mainly a result of the role SMEs in 
the NTE sector are playing in the development of the Ghanaian economy.  
                                                 
§
 Part of this chapter has been published as: “How are SMEs Financed?: Evidence from the Ghanaian Non-
traditional Export Sector”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 24(1), (a special issue on small 
business policy), pp. 71-81, 2006, UK. 
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There are apparently many constraints facing the NTE sector given the number of exporters 
in each product category and the diversity of products being exported. However, the 
problem of financing has been identified as a major factor militating against the growth of 
NTEs in Ghana. The scarcity of funds for working capital and investment in machinery and 
equipment was overwhelmingly identified by indigenous Ghanaian businessmen as one of 
the major constraints to production. Mantey (1990) mentions that the rate of growth in the 
NTE sector is apparently stifled by inadequate finance to the sector. Buatsi (2002) also 
found that small and medium-scale exporters hardly meet the requirements of banks to 
access credit, especially collateral. He enumerated a number of financing schemes for 
financing exports in Ghana. According to him, despite efforts at financing exports, 
insufficient export finance to support large-scale production and marketing has remained a 
significant hindrance to the success of Ghana’s export growth strategy. This situation has led 
to the institution of the Export Development and Investment Act of 2000. A relevant issue 
for empirical investigation therefore concerns the financing of Ghanaian NTEs, given that 
about 97% of NTEs fall within the category of SMEs (Buatsi, 2002).  
 
This current paper seeks to identify sources of finance available for NTEs by examining the 
relative importance of both formal and informal sources of financing Ghanaian NTEs. The 
paper also explores the factors which determine NTEs’ choice of a particular type of finance 
using a regression analysis. It specifically focuses on internationalising SMEs or small and 
medium-sized exporters drawn from the Ghana Export Promotion Council’s database of 
NTEs in Ghana. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the extant literature on 
internationalisation and financing of SMEs. It also gives an overview of the informal 
financial market in Africa. Section 5.3 explains the methodology adopted for the study. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5 summarises 





5.2 Literature Review 
 
5.2.1 Internationalisation and Financing of SMEs 
The literature on internationalisation of firms is concerned with why, when, where, and how 
firms engage in international trade. There seem to be no universal definition of 
internationalisation. Wind et al (1973) essentially define the concept as a process in which 
specific attitudes or orientations are associated with successive stages in the evolution of 
international operations. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) conceive internationalisation as a 
sequential process of increased international involvement, whilst Welch and Luostarinen 
(1988) interpret internationalisation as the process of increasing involvement in international 
operations. In a much broader conceptualisation, Calof and Beamish (1995) interpret 
internationalisation as the process of adapting an organisation’s operations to international 
environments. The growing integration of national and regional economies in a global 
network of production and distribution, together with an increased academic interest in 
theory development regarding the internationalisation of organisations, led to the 
development of a number of new approaches during the post-1970 period. These 
approaches have been reviewed comprehensively by O'Farrell et al (1996) and Andersen 
(1997).  
 
One of the earliest approaches, the Uppsala model, suggests that internationalisation 
activities increase incrementally (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). This process is influenced by increased market knowledge, which leads to 
increased commitment to international markets and vice versa. According to this model, an 
organisation follows four stages in the internationalisation process:  no regular export; export 
via independent enterprises or agents; sales subsidiaries; and establishment of production 
plants overseas.  Kuada and Sørenson (2002) also build on the stages theory. They suggest 
that the existing stages model can be divided into the learning stages theory, where a firm’s 
internationalisation follows a sequential order from one stage to the other based on learning 
and accumulated experience and the international product life-cycle theory, where 
internationalisation is based on environmental adaptations and hence development of the 
new product, matured product and standardised product. Another approach draws upon the 
insights gained by transaction cost analysis (TCA). Transaction costs include the expenses 
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associated with the acquisition of information regarding relevant prices, and the costs 
entailed in the negotiation and enforcement of contracts. Asset specificity, the frequency of 
economic exchange, and the level of uncertainty, are the key influences in determining the 
cost of transacting. Within this context, the decision-maker is boundedly rational and aspires 
to minimise the cost of transacting associated with entry into the international marketplace. 
Brouthers and Nakos (2004) suggest that the transaction cost theory is very useful in 
explaining SME mode choice and those SMEs that used transaction cost–predicted mode 
choices performed significantly better than firms using other modes.  
 
In addition, the network approach bears considerable similarities to TCA: it draws on 
theories of social exchange and resource dependency, and focuses on organisational 
behaviour within interorganisational and interpersonal relationships. Thus, the boundaries of 
the organisation are determined not only by formal relationships, but also by informal and 
personalised linkages (Coviello and McAuley, 1999). Also, the eclectic framework developed 
by Dunning (1981), embraces elements of the earlier approaches. It suggests that the level 
and structure of an organisation’s international activities will depend on the configuration of 
particular ownership (organisation-specific assets and skills), location (country-specific 
market potential, investment risk, production costs and infrastructure) and internalisation 
advantages (the cost of transacting), as well as the extent to which the organisation believes 
that investment in a particular country is consistent with its long-term management 
objectives and strategy. Lastly, the Organisational Capability Approach conceptualises the 
organisation as a bundle of relatively static and transferable resources, which are then 
transformed into capabilities through dynamic and interactive organisation-specific processes 
(Amit and Shoemaker, 1993). 
 
There is considerable disparity in the ability to exploit opportunities and confront threats 
emanating from the internationalisation of economic activity by sizeband. Thus, whereas 
large organisations and particularly multinational firms have had considerable experience of 
involvement in global markets, the majority of SMEs have only recently adopted an 
international perspective in their strategies (Bijmolt and Zwart, 1994; Tesar and Moini, 
1998). More specifically, a growing number of publications drawing upon the experience of 
SMEs in advanced industrialised countries suggest that these organisations are confronted 
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with greater difficulties in accessing international markets than their large-scale counterparts 
(Roth, 1992; Stokes, 1992; Smallbone and Wyer, 1995). The inability to control prices 
because of lack of market power, a dependence upon a relatively smaller customer base, and 
limited - if any access to policy-makers, make the external environment of a small 
organisation more uncertain than in a large business.  
 
An altogether different set of constraints emanates from the limited resource base of SMEs. 
Specifically, the financial resources available to a small business can act as a considerable 
constraint in developing an international orientation. The lack of finance or inadequate 
financial resources may impede the organisation’s ability to identify opportunities arising 
from the opening-up of national markets and may also restrict the exploitation of 
opportunities already identified (Smallbone and Wyer, 1995).  SMEs have been traditionally 
considered as weak contributors to internationalisation because of financial and managerial 
constraints. It is important to note that the availability of financial resources can assist the 
firm to increase its export performance by expanding into other markets. Seringhaus and 
Rosson (1990) argue that exporters face different financial challenges depending on their 
stage in the export development process and feel that financial export activities are the most 
difficult in the earlier stages. The stages model indicates that, because small firms with a 
limited domestic track record and have limited knowledge and resource base, they are less 
likely to enter foreign markets. But well-established and large firms with more experience 
and resources are mostly capable of competing in foreign markets. 
 
Small firms have traditionally encountered problems when approaching providers of finance 
for funds to support fixed capital investment and to provide working capital for their 
operations (Tucker and Lean, 2003). The presence and nature of a ‘finance gap’ for small 
firms has been debated for decades, ever since the Macmillan Report (Macmillan, 1931). 
Small business owners complain that they cannot find the funds they need to satisfy their 
financing needs. If applicants who are denied capital are willing to pay higher economic costs 
for financing but cannot get it, credit then appears to be rationed from an apparently finite 
supply of capital. This is a phenomenon known as credit rationing. Theorists have offered a 
variety of theories about situations that might lead to credit rationing, whether it happens, if 
it is a significant economic occurrence, and its effects on businesses. On a conceptual level, 
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credit rationing could have the following consequences: First, if present, credit rationing 
could imply that small or new businesses do not have access to financing and, therefore face 
obstacles to their development, growth, and survival. Second, credit rationing might also 
financially disadvantage, businesses that compete with firms which are part of industrial 
groups or that are owned by larger businesses. Lastly, credit rationing can result in levels of 
investments that differ from optimal levels, thereby affecting economic growth, inflation, 
employment and a variety of other factors.  
 
Credit rationing might arguably oblige risky businesses to seek equity financing, because they 
are unable to obtain debt capital - quite possibly angel investments. Thus, work on credit 
rationing is important in this context because, according to some studies, firms that are 
denied bank credit may be obliged to seek financing in the equity markets (Peterson and 
Schulman, 1987; Orser et al., 1994; Tucker and Lean, 2003). This would be true particularly 
for smaller, riskier businesses and suggests that equity financing sought from private 
investors may not be a matter of choice and that credit rationing may be a factor that 
encourages SMEs to secure informal investments. Theories about capital rationing are based 
on information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Information asymmetries refer 
to the disparity between the information available to businesses seeking capital and suppliers 
of capital, who are typically assumed to be at an information disadvantage with respect to 
insiders of the business (Binks et al., 1992). In a perfect markets setting, with perfect and 
costless information available to both the small firm (i.e. the agent) and the finance provider 
(i.e. the principal), and no uncertainties regarding present and future trading conditions, the 
principal-agent relationship does not suffer from the market failure of information 
asymmetry. However, information in the real world is neither perfect nor costless; 
furthermore, the small business finance market is characterised by risk and uncertainty 
regarding future conditions. Information is distributed asymmetrically between the finance 
provider and the firm (Tucker and Lean, 2003).  
 
Two direct aspects of information asymmetry are usually identified: adverse selection and 
moral hazard. In the case of adverse selection, theoretical models often assume that an 
entrepreneur has private knowledge about the success probability of a project or expected 
profits that are not shared with the financier. Consequently, suppliers of capital cannot 
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differentiate between a high-quality business and a low-quality business, and hence adverse 
selection can result. Moral hazard refers to the inability of the finance provider to control 
fully how the entrepreneur uses funds provided. Owners can conceivably benefit 
economically by, for example, redirecting borrowed funds to invest in higher-risk projects 
than those approved by the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1987; Bester and 
Hellwig, 1989; Binks and Ennew, 1996). To avoid this situation, financiers can implement 
contract provisions that discourage borrowers from acting against the interests of investor or 
lender.  
  
The economic costs incurred by the finance provider to verify the performance or financial 
states of entrepreneurs, can lead to credit rationing. Certain types of moral hazard play a role 
in the costly monitoring problem, but these moral hazard problems do not affect the 
outcome of the entrepreneur’s projects. Instead, moral hazard affects costly monitoring 
problems by adding the risk that entrepreneurs will lie about their returns and profit at the 
expense of the bank. Even in models without adverse selection or certain types of moral 
hazard problems, banks might find it beneficial to ration credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Binks and Ennew, 1996). Finance providers, in order minimise the risk involved in lending 
to SMEs, are also more stringent in their loan application requirements. The provision of 
collateral and track record are considered important in alleviating the problem of adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Given that SMEs have less collateral and reputation than large 
companies, they may encounter more difficulty when accessing capital from formal finance 
providers (Binks et al., 1992). Blanton and Dorman (1994) explain that small firms are 
frequently under-capitalised. That is, the term structure of loans granted to SMEs does not 
suit their needs. Whilst many SMEs need long-term capital, banks are usually only willing to 
grant them short-term loans. SMEs have, therefore, had to rely on short-term sources such 
as lines of credit and informal sources to finance long-term needs such as new equipment 
purchases (Riding and Short, 1987a).  
 
5.2.2 Formal and Informal Financial Markets in Africa 
There are basically two sources of external financing: formal and informal. Formal finance 
includes loans from banks, nonbank financial institutions, government programmes and 
similar facilities, and foreign loans. Informal finance, on the other hand, 
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is made up of credit from noninstitutional sources, such as relatives and friends, 
moneylenders, informal groups, suppliers, clients, and other enterprises. 
 
In most African countries the indigenous private sector consists largely of households and 
small-scale enterprises that operate outside the formal financial system. Analysts refer to the 
informal sector by many terms, such as unorganised, noninstitutional, and curb markets. 
Conforming to recent trends in literature, the term ‘informal finance’ is defined by Adams 
and von Pischke (1992) as all transactions, loans, and deposits occurring outside the 
regulation of a central monetary or financial market authority. This definition permits the 
inclusion of a wide range of financial activities whose operation and scope may differ across 
countries. Informal savings activities in Africa are widespread but generally self-contained 
and isolated from those of formal institutions. There are the general types of informal units 
to be found in Africa (Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). These are: savings mobilisation units that 
do little or no lending, lending units that seldom engage in savings mobilisation, and units 
that combine deposits mobilisation with some amount of lending, albeit mainly of members 
of distinct associations or groups. Their definition of informal financing in Africa covers 
such schemes as the operations of savings and credit associations (SCAs), known all over 
Africa, professional moneylenders, part-time moneylenders, relatives, friends, mobile banks, 
generally known as susu collectors in West Africa, credit unions, and cooperative societies. 
In Ghana, the informal financial sector includes credit unions, savings and credit 
cooperatives, and a number of nongovernmental organisations. Informal financial agents 
include: moneylenders; susu collectors (savings mobilisers); traders, agricultural processors, 
input distributors and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs); and friends and 
relatives. 
 
Jones et al (2000) in their research found that it was unusual for susu collectors to have an 
apex organisation to represent them. They run their businesses from kiosks located in the 
marketplace and act as mobile bankers. Deposits, often of low but regular value, are usually 
taken on a daily basis over the course of a month. At the end of this period the susu 
collector returns the accumulated savings to the client but keeps one day's savings as 
commission. Susu collectors may also provide advances to their clients. 
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The principal reason for the emergence of informal financial market is the unwillingness of 
the formal sector to lend to some (relatively risky) categories of borrowers. Increased risk 
often stems from the difficulty to obtain accurate and reliable information about borrowers. 
Examples that hinder the flow of accurate information are geographical remoteness or 
illiteracy. Small clients are also effectively shut out from the formal market, thanks to high 
collateral requirements and high minimum-deposit requirements, but there is some evidence 
that small enterprises seldom turn to informal financial sources. Two reasons for not 
drawing on informal finance are the expected high costs or the smallness and unreliability of 
lenders (see Levy, 1993; Parker et al., 1995). Isaksson (2002) asserts that another reason for 
the emergence of informal financial activities is that some firms may turn to informal 
sources in case of liquidity shocks. Yet another explanation for using informal sources may 
be that more funds can be raised at a lower cost and without collateral when the source is a 
relative or friend (angel). Interest rates in the informal financial sector tend to be higher than 
the formal financial sector, although among informal lenders, interest rates are seldom used 
as a discrimination device to screen borrowers. Aleem (1990) argues that lenders sometimes 
borrow from the informal market and lend on at higher interest rate to their clients. 
According to Steel et al (1997), higher risk and costs of delinquency are other explanations 
for the relatively high interest rates. To these reasons, the opportunity costs of holding case 
may also be added. 
 
Unlike formal financial institutions, informal lenders use personal, social, and business 
relationships to preselect clients. ROSCAs use group membership as a selection device, 
traders and landlords lend only to their customers and tenants, and savings collectors tend to 
lend to regular customers. Moreover, recommendations from previous clients and personal 
knowledge are important ingredients in the selection process. Informal finance is sometimes 
taken as synonymous with money-lender activity, but Steel et al (1997) show (for the cases of 
Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Tanzania) that angels are the commonest informal creditors. 
Normally such loans bear no interest and social and economic ties replace collateral as well 
as ease enforcement of the loan contracts. The relationship between the borrower and the 
angel reduces the moral hazard involved and hence the monitoring costs. Reciprocity is not 
uncommon, meaning that the borrower can sometimes become the lender and vice versa. 
Firms engage also in reciprocal lending among themselves, often in order to smooth out 
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short-term cash-flow problems. Sometimes angels supply long-term borrowing. It is also 
possible that firms with excess liquidity ‘invest’ in the informal market by placing an amount 
for lending on. However, in such instances, the transactions take place at market terms 
(Montiel et al., 1993). 
 
Isaksson (2002) argues that moneylenders lend without tying the loan to other transactions. 
A moneylender, who, for instance, could be a regular moneylender, a pawnbroker, or an 
indigenous banker, often, has intimate knowledge of the borrowers. Despite the high interest 
rates, small and medium-sized firms turn to moneylenders as a ‘lender of last resort’. As a 
result of this, the moneylenders are sometimes in a monopolistic position. The earned rent 
comes from the information advantage that the moneylender has over competition. The 
high interest rates often charged by moneylenders are not only a monopoly rent because they 
also incur information and transaction costs. The rent also covers the opportunity cost of 
holding cash balances. Except for moneylenders being the last instances of credit, Bolnick 
(1992) argues that moneylenders promptly provide loans to these firms. Furthermore, there 
are low transactions costs and no restrictions on the use of funds. 
 
Traders are another fairly common source of informal credit. They supply either inputs or 
cash advances to firms and the credit is linked to purchases of some product at highly 
discounted price. Interlinked loans have some advantages compared with other types of 
loans because they represent a form of collateral that helps reduce uncertainty, moral 
hazards, and adverse selection (Udry, 1990). Loans attached to transactions tend to have 
lower implicit interest rates and to be larger (Steel et al., 1997). In ROSCAs, individuals pool 
their savings on a regular basis to generate loanable funds, primarily for the members. The 
rotation of access to the funds differs among ROSCAs, but most seem to use lotteries and 
bidding. Without going into a detailed description of the bidding system, the outcome is 
lending at a market-determined interest rate. Organisational and monitoring costs of 
ROSCAs are very low; default rates by the very nature of ROSCAs are low as well. Members 
could be angels as well as traders or exporters. 
 
Informal finance is said to be of significant importance to SMEs (Cuevas et al., 1993). 
Fafchamps et al (1995) showed that informal finance constitutes 34% of total debt for small 
 113
firms in Zimbabwe. For other size categories, the corresponding figure was less than 10%. 
Bigsten et al (2000), covering six sub-Saharan African countries, showed that formal financial 
markets are inefficient and biased against lending to small firms. This bias impels small firms 
often to turn elsewhere for external finance - quite possibly to some informal financial 
lenders. In a Ghanaian study, Aryeetey et al (1994) found that the success rate for large firms 
applying for bank loans, for instance, was higher than that of smaller firms. Aryeetey (1993) 
argues that most surveys of enterprise financing in Africa indicate that start-up or 
microbusinesses are primarily funded by sources from the informal units such as credit 




This study explores the determinants of NTEs’ choice of a particular type of finance. Data 
were essentially from primary source through questionnaire instrument. The main research 
site was within the main Ghanaian NTE sector. The study sampled 150 firms from the 
Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) database of NTEs within Accra, Kumasi, 
Takoradi and Tamale. These locations were chosen due to data availability and also because 
it is acknowledged that most exporting activities are concentrated in these areas. Previous 
surveys confirmed that over 90% of NTEs are based in these areas and about 97% of NTEs 
fall within the category of SMEs (Buatsi, 2002). The selection of exporters was based on a 
random sampling technique from these four research areas. Out of the total of 150 
questionnaires sent out, 62 responses were received from respondents representing a 
response rate of 41%. Although this might not seem a high percentage, empirical studies 
involving SMEs have been known to generate far lower percentage response rates.  
 
Data obtained include proportions of formal and informal finance used by the firm 
(FORMF). This is defined as the ratio of formal finance to total finance, and is used as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables include number of years in business (AGE), 
number of employees (SIZE), growth in sales (GROW), and export intensity (EXPORT) or 
degree of internationalisation. The measure of degree of internationalisation of a firm has 
attracted a lot of attention in the literature. Over the years, attempts have been made to infer 
degree of internationalisation by looking at the evolution, structure, and process of 
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relationships among a firm’s demographic, strategic, market, organisational, product and 
attitudinal characteristics of international expansion. Furthermore, measures have included 
internationalisation of the percentage of sales volume, production, profits, and assets. A 
recent attempt at measurement is provided by Albaum et al (1998), who developed a 
composite measure based on the following factors:      
 Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales 
 Foreign assets as a percentage of total assets 
 Overseas subsidiaries as a percentage of total subsidiaries 
 Physical dispersion of international experience  
 Top managers’ international experience  
 
The measure of internationalisation used in this study is based on foreign sales or export 
sales as a percentage of total sales. For the purposes of this study, sources of finance are 
classified into formal and informal. Formal finance consists of loans from banks, non-bank 
financial institutions, government programmes and similar facilities, foreign loans including 
loans from the International Finance Company (IFC), and others. Informal finance, on the 
other hand, is made up of credit from non-institutional sources such as relatives and friends, 
money lenders, informal groups, suppliers, clients and other enterprises. This study adopts 
descriptive statistics in discussing the sources of financing the firms use. The study also 
employs a multiple regression model for the empirical analysis of the determinants of 
formal/informal finance. This takes the following form: 
 
ë432,10 +++++= EXPORTGROWInSIZEAGEFORMF βββββ , 
 
where ë  is the error term. 
 
5.4 Discussion of Empirical Results 
 
This section includes the empirical results of study. It initially covers a description of the 
sources of formal and informal finance used by NTEs. The section later presents the 
regression results of the determinants of NTEs’ choice of formal/informal finance.  
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5.4.1 Profile of NTE Firms 
Table 5.1 gives a profile of the NTEs in terms of their geographical distribution and 
ownership. The greater proportion (36%) of NTE firms was found in Accra. Eighteen of the 
respondents, representing 29% were located on Kumasi, 17 (27%) were in Takoradi and the 
remaining 5 (8%) were in Tamale. As seen in Table 5.1, out of the 62 NTEs for which 
responses were received, 58 (93%) were male-owned businesses, while 4, representing 7%, 
were female-owned businesses. Regarding the foreign participation in the firms’ operations, 
the results as indicated in Table 5.1 reveal that 40 (65%) firms were Ghanaian-owned, while 
the remaining 22 (35%) were foreign-owned firms. 
 
Table 5.1: Characteristics of Firms 

































































5.4.2 Financing of the Firms 
The evidence from Table 5.2 indicates that most NTEs make use of formal finance in 
financing their businesses. About 79% (49) of respondents employ mainly formal finance for 
their operations. The remaining 21% (13) rely mostly on informal finance sources such as 
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trade creditors, credit unions, loans from friends and relatives, and investment from friends 
and relatives. The relatively low level of use of informal finance compared to formal finance 
could be attributed to the unavailability and unreliability of informal sources of finance in the 
country. Informal finance providers often do not have well-structured financing schemes 
and may not be in the position to fully satisfy the financing needs of the firms. In spite of 
the problems NTEs face in accessing formal finance, informal sources of finance have not 
been able to adequately provide an alternative source of financing NTEs in Ghana. 
 
Table 5.2: Type of Financing Used 




















With respect to the sources of formal finance, Table 5.3 shows that most firms (63%) rely on 
bank loans. They tend to depend less on loans from non-bank financial institutions, 
government programmes and foreign loans. This might be due either to the lack of 
availability of these other facilities, or that NTEs are simply not aware of them. Another 
reason could be the bureaucratic processes involved in accessing such facilities, especially 
government financing schemes. Concerning NTEs’ reliance on informal finance, Table 5.3 
shows that most firms (54%) depend largely on trade creditors. Though loans from friends 
and relatives, investments from friends and relatives and the other sources are really not 
significant, investments from friends and relatives appear to be used more than the other 
sources. The reason for the relatively high use of trade creditors as a source of informal 
finance may be due to the business relationship the firms might have established with their 
creditors over the years. Trade creditors tend to supply either inputs or cash advances to 





Table 5.3: Sources of Formal and Informal Finance 
Sources of Finance Frequency Percentage Cum. Percentage 
Formal Finance: 
Bank loans 










Loans from friends and 
relatives 






















































Table 5.4 provides empirical evidence on the sources of start up capital used by NTEs. The 
results show that personal savings appear to be used the most as the source of start-up 
capital. Twenty, representing 32% of respondents depend on personal savings as their initial 
capital. This means Ghanaian NTEs rely more on personal savings as their main source of 
start up capital. Some (27%) rely on bank loans, while few of them depend on loans from 
friends and relatives (6%), investment from friends and relatives (5%), and susu group (2%). 
This position is similar to the results of studies in other countries (see Migiro, 2005). This 
phenomenon may be due to the difficulties in accessing external debt finance as start up 
capital. Finance providers are usually reluctant to extend credit to start-up business because 
of the associated risks. The issues of information asymmetry and moral hazard have been 
identified as major problems with respect to financing start-up SMEs. The lack of a track 
record and the risk of diverting loans to other ventures are often regarded as threats to 
finance providers.  
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Table 5.4: Sources of Start-up Capital 
Sources of Initial Capital   Frequency Percentage Cum. Percentage 
Trade creditors 
Susu group 
Loans from friends and 
relatives 




































5.4.3 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
Table 5.5 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables. This shows the average indicators of variables used. The mean (median) ratio of 
formal finance to total finance is 0.6816 (0.8000). This suggests that formal finance appears 
to constitute more than half of the firms’ finance. That is, formal finance constituted 68% of 
NTEs’ total financing. The average age is approximately 21.6 years. The mean size in terms 
of number of employees is 23. The mean growth (measured as growth in sales) was 247%. 
This indicates that, on the average, growth rate in sales was 247%. Average export intensity 
is given as 60.18%, suggesting that NTEs’ export sales constitute about 60% of their total 
sales. 
 
Table 5.5: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
                        Mean         Std. Dev.       Minimum           Median          Maximum 
FORMF          0.6816          0.3380            0.0000               0.8000            1.0000                
AGE             21.5673        18.1094            1.0000              21.5673          75.0000 
SIZE             22.9570          3.0956          16.8112             22.9570           34.2701 
GROW           2.4700        16.9189           -9.6821               2.4700         121.5972 




5.4.4 Correlation Analysis  
The correlation coefficients are also considered in examining the relation between formal 
finance and the determinants. Table 5.6 summarises the correlation matrix. The correlation 
analysis indicates significantly positive correlations between the ratio of formal finance to 
total finance and size, and growth. The correlation results also show a significantly positive 
relation between age and size. As firms age, they increase in size. There are positive 
associations between age and growth, and also between size and growth. This suggests that 
older and larger firms tend to exhibit growth tendencies. However, a negative relationship 
was found between growth and export intensity, meaning that growing firms export less. 
Overall, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multi-collinearity is not a 
potential problem in our regression models. 
 
Table 5.6: Correlation Coefficients 
                       FORMF           AGE             SIZE             GROW           EXPORT 
FORMF         1.0000             
                                              
AGE             -0.0209             1.0000 
                     {0.6884}                                                                                                      
SIZE              0.0427 ***       0.1007*       1.0000                                                     
                     {0.0012}          {0.0592}                                                               
GROW          0.00267***      0.0102***   0.0302***     1.0000           
                     {0.0000}          {0.0000}     {0.0000}                                                           
EXPORT       0.1598              0.3529        0.4246           -0.0047***       1.0000 
                     {0.2525}          {0.3554}     {0.2221}       {0.0000} 
Figures in curly brackets are probability values for level of significance.  
(***), (**), (*) indicates significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
5.4.5 Regression Results 
Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between type of financing and firm 
variables (i.e. age, size, growth and export intensity). The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression results are presented in Table 5.7. The R2 of 0.2225 implies that the regression 
equation explains 22.25% of the variation in the dependent variable. From the regression 
results, age is seen to have a negative and significant relation with formal finance. The results 
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suggest that newer NTEs tend to depend more on formal finance. Newer SMEs initially 
require more funds from formal financial institutions as start-up capital. This confirms the 
results shown in Table 5.4. Apart from personal savings, majority of the firms depend on 
banks for seed capital. The results also indicate that over time, older firms rely more on 
informal sources of finance and less on formal finance. A potential explanation is that, as 
firms age, they are able to establish good relationships with informal finance providers such 
as trade creditors and thus may employ more informal sources of finance. 
 
The empirical results show a positive and significant relationship between formal finance and 
size of the firm. The results suggest that as firms expand, they require more funds to finance 
their expansion and therefore tend to depend more on formal finance as opposed to 
informal finance which appears to be inadequate. The results also support findings of 
previous studies that small businesses are primarily funded by informal finance sources while 
formal finance providers prefer giving credit to relatively bigger firms (see Aryeetey, 1993; 
Cuevas et al., 1993; Aryeetey et al, 1994). Though the regression analysis shows a negative 
relationship between age and formal finance and a positive relationship between size and 
formal finance, interestingly, the correlation analysis shows a positive association between 
age and size. 
 
The results, again, show a significantly positive association between growth and formal 
finance. This could be explained by the fact that growing firms require more finance to 
finance their growth opportunities and therefore would require more sustained sources of 
funds (formal finance) to finance their activities, while low-growth firms might seek informal 
(or ‘angel’) investment. The scope for growth does vary from industry to industry and this 
will have a bearing on firms’ financing preferences. That is, the greater prospects for growth 
are perceived to be, the greater the need for external formal finance and vice versa 
(Hamilton and Fox, 1998). Also, formal finance providers are more likely to grant loans to 
firms with high growth potential, given that such firms exhibit good cash inflows and can 
easily repay their loans. Thus, high-growth firms will seek more formal finance.  
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The results show a positive but insignificant relationship between export intensity and 
formal finance. No evidence was found in terms of the relationship between the proportion 
of formal finance and the firms’ export intensity or level of internationalisation.  
 
Table 5.7: Regression Model Results 
Variable                            Coefficient                t-Statistic                Prob.        
AGE                                 -0.005767                -1.828672                0.0738 
SIZE                                  0.050307                 2.898673                0.0057 
GROW                              0.002500                 2.572763                0.0133 
EXPORT                           0.032356                 0.233697                0.8163 
 
R-squared                                          0.222462            
S.E. of regression              0.310464          
F-statistic                           3.361796 
Prob(F-statistics)               0.016838       
 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The problem of financing Ghanaian SMEs, especially those in the NTE sector has been of 
great concern for some time now. This pre-occupation is mainly a result of the role the NTE 
sector is supposed to play in the development of the economy. This study identified the 
various sources of finance by examining the relative importance of formal and informal 
sources of financing Ghanaian NTEs. The paper also explored the determinants of NTEs’ 
choice of formal/informal finance. The results of this study showed that Ghanaian NTEs 
largely depend on formal financing sources. About 79% of NTEs mainly depend on formal 
sources of finance. Bank loan, representing 63%, was identified as the main source of formal 
finance. Just a few firms (54%) depend on informal sources of finance with trade creditors 
(63%), representing the main source of informal finance. In terms of start-up capital, the 
results indicate that most NTEs depend on their own personal savings. 
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The regression results revealed a negative relationship between age and formal finance, 
suggesting that, newer firms depend more on formal finance and less on informal finance. 
The results also showed a positive and significant relationship between formal finance and 
size of the firm. This suggest that, as firms expand, they require more funds to finance their 
expansion and therefore tend to rely more on formal finance as opposed to informal finance. 
In addition, the results of this study showed a significantly positive association between 
growth and formal finance. This could be explained by the fact that growing firms require 
more finance to finance their growth opportunities and thus would require more sustained 
sources of funds (formal finance) to finance their activities. The results of this study did not 
reveal any significant relationship between formal finance and the level of 
internationalisation. 
 
In the light of the key findings, the following policy considerations are suggested. SMEs 
initiatives could be encouraged to assist SMEs NTEs to reduce information asymmetries by 
means of improving managerial capabilities and also building on their asset base. Such an 
important move could give SMEs easier access to external financing. Growth in terms of 
export diversification is also encouraged among SMEs NTEs. This has the tendency of 


















Adams, D. and Pischke, J. D. (1992), Micro enterprise Credit Programs: A Déjà Vu, World 
Development, 20, 1463– 470. 
 
Albaum, G., Strandskov, J. and Duerr, E. (1998), “International Marketing and Export 
Management”, London, Addison Wesley Longman Publishing. 
 
Aleem, I. (1990), Imperfect Information, Screening and the Costs of Informal Lending: A 
Study for a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan, The World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), 329-349. 
 
Amit, R. and Shoemaker, P. J. H. (1993), Strategic Assets and Organisational Rent, Strategic 
Management Journal, 14(1), 33-46. 
 
Andersen, O. (1997), Internationalisation and Market Entry Mode: A Review of Theories 
and Conceptual Frameworks, Management International Review, 37, 27-42. 
 
Aryeetey, E. (1998), “Informal Finance for Private Sector Development in Africa”, Economic, 
Research Papers No. 41, The African Development Bank, Abidjan. 
 
Aryeetey, E. (1993), “Sectoral Credit Allocation Policy and Credit Flows to Small Enterprises in 
Ghana”, The British Council. 
 
Aryeetey, E. (2001), “Priority Research Issues Relating to Regulation and Competition in Ghana”, 
Centre on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series, University of Manchester, 
Manchester.  
 
Aryeetey, E., Baah-Nuakoh, A., Duggleby, T., Hettige, H. and Steel, W. F. (1994), “Supply and 
Demand for Finance of Small Scale Enterprises in Ghana”, Discussion Paper No. 251, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.  
 
 124
Aryeetey, E. and Udry, C. (1997), The Characteristics of Informal Financial Markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Journal of African Economies, 6, 161-203.      
 
Bester, H. (1987), The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information", 
European Economic Review, 31, 4, 887-889. 
 
Bester, H. and Hellwig, M. (1989), Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An 
Overview of the Issues, in Bamber, G. and Spremann, K., Agency Theory, Information and 
Incentives, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY and Berlin. 
 
Bigsten A., Collier, P., Dercon, S., Fafchamps, M., Guthier, B., Gunning, J.W., Soderbom, 
M., Oduro, A., Oostendorp, R., Patillo, C., Teal, F. and Zeufack, A. (2000), “Credit Constraints 
in Manufacturing Enterprises in Africa”, Working Paper WPS/2000. Centre for the study of 
African Economies, Oxford University, Oxford. 
 
Binks, M. R. and Ennew, C. T. (1996), “Financing Small Firms, in Burns, P. and Dewhurst, 
J., Small Business and Entrepreneurship, Macmillan, London. 
 
Binks, M. R., Ennew, C. T. and Reed, G. V. (1992), Information Asymmetries and the 
Provision of Finance to Small Firms, International Small Business Journal, 11(1), 35-46. 
 
Bijmolt, T. H. A. and Zwart, P. S. (1994), “The Impact of Internal Factors on the Export 
Success of Dutch Small and Medium-Sized Firms, Journal of Small Business Management, 32(2), 
69-83. 
 
Blanton, W. R. and Dorman T. L. 1994, `Small Business Spotlight: SBA Loans for 
Community Banks, Journal of Commercial Lending, 76(6) 32-36. 
 
Bolnick, B. (1992), Moneylenders and Informal Financial Markets in Malawi, World 
Development, 20(1), 57 – 68. 
 
 125
Brouthers, K. D. and Nakos, G. (2004), SME Entry Mode Choice and Performance: A 
Transaction Cost Perspective, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28(3), 1042-2587. 
 
Buatsi, S. N. (2002), Financing Non-traditional Exporters in Ghana, The Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing, 17(6), 501-522. 
 
Calof, J. L. and Beamish, P. W. (1995), Adapting to Foreign Markets: Explaining 
Internationalisation, International Business Review, 4(2), 115-131. 
 
Chen, C. J. P., Cheng, C. S. A., He, J. and Kim, J. (1997), An Investigation of the 
Relationship Between International Activities and Capital Structure, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 28, 563-577. 
 
Coviello, N. E. and McAuley, A. (1999), Internationalisation and the Smaller Firm: A Review 
of Contemporary Empirical Research, Management International Review, 39(3), 223–256. 
 
Cuevas, C., Fafchamps, M., Hanson, R., Moll, P. and Srivastava, P. (1993), “Case Studies of 
Enterprise Finance in Ghana”, RPED Case Study Services, World Bank, Washington, DC, 
USA.  
 
Dunning, J. H. (1981), “International Production and the Multinational Enterprise”, London: Allen 
and Urwin.  
 
Fafchamps, M., Pender, J. and Robinson, E. (1995), “Enterprise Finance in Zimbabwe”, RPED 
Case Study Series, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.  
 
Hamilton, R. T. and Fox, M. A. (1998), The Financing Preferences of Small Firms Owners, 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research, 4, 239-248. 
 
Isaksson, A. (2002), “The Importance of Informal Finance in Kenyan Manufacturing”, Working Paper 
No. 5, Statistics and Information Network Branch, United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation, Vienna. 
 126
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J. E. (1977), The Internationalisation Process of the Firm-A Model 
of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 8(1), 23-32. 
 
Johanson, J. and Wiedersheim-Paul, F. (1975), The Internationalisation of the Firm: four 
Swedish case studies, Journal of Management Studies, 12(3), 305-322. 
 
Jones, H., Sakyi-Dawson, O., Harford, N. and Sey, A. (2000), “Linking Formal and Informal 
Financial Intermediaries in Ghana: Conditions for Success and Implications for RNR Development”, 
Overseas Development Institute, 111 Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD 
 
Kuada, J. and SØrensen, O. J. (2002), “Internationalisation of Companies from Developing Countries”, 
The Haworth Press Inc, New York, USA. 
 
Kwok, C. C. Y. and Reeb, D. M. (2000), Internationalisation and Firm Risk: An Upstream 
Downstream Hypothesis, Journal of International Business Studies, 31(4), 611-629.  
 
Levy, B. (1993), Obstacles to Developing Small and Medium Enterprises: An Empirical 
Assessment, World Bank Economic Review, 7(1), 65 – 83. 
 
Macmillan, H. (1931), “Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry”, CMD 3897, HMSO, 
London. 
 
Mantey, J. (1990), “Export Finance: the Catalyst for Successful Export Diversification Drive”, The 
Exporter, Ghana Export Promotion Council.  
 
Migiro, S. (2005), The Financing Perspectives of Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturing 
Enterprises in Kenya, Africanus: Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 35(2), 3-17. 
 
Montiel, P., Agenor, R. and UI Haque, N. (1993), “Informal Financial Markets in Developing 
Countries”, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 127
O'Farrell, P. N., Wood, P. A. and Zheng, J.  (1998b), Regional Influences on Foreign Market 
Development by Business Service Companies: Elements of a Strategic Context Explanation, 
Regional Studies, 32(1), 31-48. 
 
O'Farrel, P. N., Wood, P. A. and Zheng, J. (1996), Internationalisation of Business Services: 
An Interregional Analysis, Regional Studies, 30(2).101-118. 
 
Orser, B., Riding, A. and Swift, C. (1994), Banking Experiences of Canadian Micro-
Businesses, Journal of Enterprising Culture, 1(3/4), 321–345. 
 
Parker, R., Riopelle, R. and Steel, W. (1995), “Small Enterprises Adjusting to Liberalisation in Five 
African Countries”, Discussion Paper No. 271, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.  
 
Peterson, R. and Schulman, R. (1987), Entrepreneurs and Banking in Canada, Journal of Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship, 5, 41-45. 
 
Riding, A. L. and Short, D. M. (1987), Some Investor and Entrepreneur Perspectives on the 
Informal Market for Risk Capital, Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 4, 19–30. 
 
Seringhaus, F. H. R. and Rosson, P. J. (1990), “Government Export Promotion: A Global 
Perspective”, Routlege, London and New York. 
 
Smallbone, D. and Wyer, P. (1995), “Export Activity in SMEs”, CEEDR, Working Paper 
Series, No 9. 
 
Sowa, N. K., Baah-Nuakoh, A., Tutu, K. A. and Osei, B. (1992), “Small Enterprise and 
Adjustment, The Impact of Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme on Small-Scale Industrial 
Enterprises”, Research Reports, Overseas Development Institute, 111 Westminster Bridge 
Road, London SE1 7JD. 
 
Steel, W. F., Aryeetey, E., Hettige, H. and Nissanke, M. (1997), Informal Financial Markets 
Under Liberalisation in Four African Countries, World Development, 25(5), 817–830. 
 128
Steel, W. F. and Webster, L. M. (1991), “Small Enterprises in Ghana: Responses to Adjustment 
Industry”, Series Paper, No. 33, The World Bank Industry and Energy Department, 
Washington DC.  
 
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, 
The American Economic Review, 71, 393-410. 
 
Tesar, G. and Moini, A. H. (1998), Longitudinal Study of Exporters and Non Exporters: A 
Focus on Smaller Manufacturing Enterprises, International Business Review, 7, 291-313. 
 
Tucker, J. and Lean, J. (2003), Small Firm and Public Policy, Journal of Small Business and 
Enterprise Development, 10(1), 50-61. 
 
Udry, C. (1990), Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in Rural Economy, 
World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), 251-269. 
 
Welch, L. S. and Luostarinen, R. K. (1988), Internationalisation: Evolution of a Concept, 


















CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 







Entrepreneurial firms require external financing to finance their growth and investments in 
order to achieve full profit potential of the business. They also require inputs on business 
operations, good strategy and best practices in the industrial sector. These resources can be 
provided for through the presence of non-executive directors or external board members as 
in the case of listed firms. Research on listed firms has shown that strategy influences 
corporate performance (McGahan and Porter, 1997) and external board members challenge 
strategies by management (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). It is also argued that good 
corporate governance practices assist SMEs in improving on their prospects of obtaining 
funding from investors and financial institutions. This is an exact consequence of proper 
bookkeeping and accounting practices and information disclosure which increase the 
confidence of investors in the firm. The SME will also have a healthier growth and be 
committed to business efficiency due to the presence of external supervisory parties. 
 
Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability 
with the ultimate objective of realising long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into 
account the interests of other stakeholders. It includes the structures, processes, cultures and 
systems that engender the successful operation of the organisations (Keasey et al., 1997). The 
Cadbury Committee (1992) defines corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. It is about supervising and holding to account those 
who direct and control management. For an SME, corporate governance is about the 
                                                 
** A paper out of this chapter has been accepted for publication in Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society, Vol. 7, 2007, UK. . 
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respective roles of the shareholders as owners and the managers (the directors and other 
officers). The compliance with corporate governance codes has become the norm for listed 
firms all over the world. In most countries, SMEs do not strictly comply with such codes but 
it has often been argued that such codes should also apply to these SMEs. In SMEs, the 
resources, stewardship and control offered by directors, for instance, may be very different 
from and more direct than in large corporations.  
 
The issue of corporate governance has been a growing area of management research, 
especially among large, publicly listed firms. The limited studies in the area with respect to 
SMEs have focused mainly on developed economies (see Eisenberg et al., 1998; Bennett and 
Robson, 2004). It is crucial to examine corporate governance of SMEs within the context of 
a developing economy and what the implications are for financing opportunities. This 
current study seeks to examine the effects of corporate governance, and ownership structure 
on the performance of Ghanaian SMEs. The paper specifically assesses the adoption of 
corporate governance structures among Ghanaian SMEs by testing for the effects of board 
size, board composition, board and management skills, CEO duality, percentage of shares 
closely held, family ownership, and foreign ownership on the performance of SMEs.  
 
The issue is of critical significance given the important role SMEs play in the Ghanaian 
economy. SMEs have been noted to make major contributions to employment generation, 
GDP and reduction of poverty in Ghana (see Steel and Webster, 1991; Kayanula and 
Quartey, 2000; Aryeetey, 2001). SME development is however hindered by a number of 
factors, notable amongst which is the lack of adequate financing (see Steel and Webster, 
1992; Aryeetey et al, 1994). The problem of financing has been argued to be the main reason 
for many SMEs failing to start or progress. This stems from the fact that SMEs have limited 
access to capital markets, locally and internationally, in part because of the perception of 
higher risk, informational barriers and the higher costs of intermediation for smaller firms. 
As a result, they often cannot obtain long-term finance in the form of debt and equity 
(Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). Also, banks and other formal finance providers are often 
reluctant to extend credit to SMEs. Lack of managerial competencies and proper governance 
systems in the SME sector have been identified as swamping efforts to attract such finance, 
and thus are said to be the main barriers to SME development (Gockel and Akoena, 2002). 
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It is necessary then for proper management of the SME sector to ensure enhanced 
performance, given that this would have major implications for financing opportunities for 
the sector.  
 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 6.2 provides a review of 
the extant literature. Section 6.3 explains the methodology employed for the study. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in the section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes the 
discussion.  
 
6.2 Literature Review 
 
The classic thesis by Berle and Means (1932), on “The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property”, provides the theoretical basis for research in corporate governance. The thesis 
describes a fundamental agency problem in modern firms, where there is a separation of 
ownership and control. It has long been recognised that modern firms suffer from a 
separation of ownership and control. They are run by professional managers (agents), who 
are unaccountable to dispersed shareholders (principals). This view fits into the principal-
agent paradigm. The question is how to ensure that managers follow the interests of 
shareholders. The principals have to solve two problems. First, they face an adverse selection 
problem: select the most capable managers. They are also confronted with a moral hazard 
problem: give the managers the right incentives to put forth the appropriate effort and make 
decisions aligned with shareholders interests (e.g., take the right amount of risk and do not 
engage in empire building). Since the seminal work by Berle and Means (1932), different 
theories have been propounded in explaining the corporate governance issue. These include 
the agency theory, the stewardship theory, the resources dependence theory, and the 
stakeholder theory. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency relationship and identify agency costs. Agency 
relationship is a contract under which “one or more persons (principal) engage another 
person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent”. Conflict of interests between managers or 
controlling shareholder, and outside or minority shareholders refer to the tendency that the 
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former may extract “perquisites” (or perks)  out of a firm’s resources and less interested to 
pursue new profitable ventures. Agency costs include monitoring expenditures by the 
principal such as auditing, budgeting, control and compensation systems, bonding 
expenditures by the agent and residual loss due to divergence of interests between the 
principal and the agent. The share price that shareholders pay reflects such agency costs. To 
increase firm value, one must therefore reduce agency costs. This is one way to view the 
linkage between corporate governance and corporate performance. Fama (1980) aptly 
comments that separation of ownership and control can be explained as a result of “efficient 
form of economic organisation”. Gubitta and Gianecchini (2002) enumerate the main 
indicators for operating in this perspective as follows: 
 
 The composition of the board of directors. For effective control, the board of directors 
must be made up mainly of non-executive directors. In a situation where the board of 
directors is not directly involved in the daily running of the firm, this is likely to 
strengthen the independence and the objectivity of the board with respect to the 
operation of the business. 
 
 Leadership. The position of the CEO should be different from that of the chairman of 
the board of directors. These positions should be occupied by different people. Having 
one individual handle both positions could result in excessive power concentration in 
that person leading to opportunistic behaviour. The size of the board is also important in 
order to avoid the influence of the CEO on the work and independence of the board of 
directors. Smaller board size is not advisable. In addition, to favour the alignment of 
capital interests with ownership, the members of the board should also be stakeholders. 
 
The stewardship theory, on the other hand suggests that managerial opportunism is not 
relevant (see Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
The aim of management is to maximise the firm’s performance since that speaks of the 
success and achievements of management. Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that 
managerial opportunism does not exist because the manager’s main aspiration is “to do a 
good job, to be a good steward of corporate assets”. This clearly replaces the lack of trust to 
which the agency theory refers with the respect for authority and inclination to ethical 
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behaviour. Granted the above position holds, in structuring a corporate governance system, 
the following must be taken into consideration: 
 
 The board composition. The inclusion of executive directors on the corporate board has 
the tendency of strengthening board effectiveness, since directors who are also part of 
the firm’s management have a better knowledge and appreciation of issues impacting on 
the firm’s operations. A board structure with more executive directors may lead to good 
decision making, resulting in better performance. 
 
 Leadership. Adopting a combined leadership board structure (i.e. where the CEO also 
acts as the chairman of the board) could be more beneficial than the separated leadership 
structure (i.e. where the CEO is different from the board chairman). This is because, 
with the board system where the CEO also acts as chairman, the CEO would have 
greater flexibility to pursue the firm’s objectives without hindrances from the board. 
 
 Board size. It is argued that having smaller boards facilitates coordination and speeds up 
the decision-making process. It also makes the contribution of the individual to the 
activity more visible, and enhances commitment. 
 
The resource dependence approach, developed by Pfeffer (1973), and Pfeffer and Salancick 
(1978), emphasises that external directors enhance the ability of a firm to protect itself 
against the external environment, reduce uncertainty, or co-opt resources that increase the 
firm’s ability to raise funds or increase its status and recognition. Firms attempt to reduce the 
uncertainty of outside influences to ensure the availability of resources necessary for their 
survival and development. The board is hence seen as one of a number of instruments that 
may facilitate access to resources critical for company success. There are four primary types 
of broadly defined resources provided by boards of directors. These are: (1) advice, counsel, 
and know-how; (2) legitimacy and reputation; (3) channels for communicating information 
between external organisations and the firm; and (4) preferential access to commitments or 
support from important actors outside the firm (Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978). This resource 
role is played by board of directors mainly through their social and professional networks 
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(Johannisson and Huse, 2000), and through interlocking directorates (Mizruchi and Stearns, 
1988; Lang and Lockhart, 1990). 
 
Similarly, the stakeholder approach also considers the provision of resources as a central role 
of board members. The main resource stakeholder proponents refer to is consensus. 
According to this view, the board should comprise representatives from all parties that are 
critical for a company’s success. This will result in the firm’s ability to build consensus 
among all critical stakeholders. The board of directors is hence seen as the place where 
conflicting interests are mediated, and where the necessary cohesion is created (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). The stakeholder theory argues for the 
importance of a firm paying special attention to the various stakeholder groups in addition to 
the traditional attention given to investors (Freeman, 1984; Gibson, 2000). These various 
groups of stakeholders, which include customers, suppliers, employees, the local community 
and shareholders, are deemed also to have a stake in the business of a firm. The 
representation of all stakeholder groups on boards is therefore necessary for effective 
corporate governance.  
 
Corporate governance has traditionally been associated with larger companies. This is mainly 
due to the separation between ownership and control of the firm. It is tempting to believe 
that corporate governance would not apply to SMEs since the agency problems are less 
likely to exist. In many instances, SMEs are made up of only the owner who is the sole 
proprietor and manager (Hart, 1995). Basically, SMEs tend to have a less pronounced 
separation of ownership and management than larger firms. It is sometimes argued that, 
because SMEs have few employees, who are mostly relatives of the owner and thus there is 
no separation of ownership and control, there is no need for corporate governance in their 
operations. Also, the question of accountability by SMEs to the public is non-existent since 
they do not depend on public funds. Most especially, the sole-proprietorship businesses do 
not necessarily need to comply with any disclosure requirements. Since there is no agency 
problem, profit maximisation, increasing net market value and minimising cost are the 
common aims of the members. Members also disregard outcomes of organisational activities 
that will cause disagreement. They are rewarded directly and as such need no incentives to 
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motivate them. Thus, disagreement does not exist and hence there is no need for corporate 
governance to resolve them.  
 
In spite of these arguments, there is a global concern for the application of corporate 
governance to SMEs. It is often argued that similar guidelines that apply to listed companies 
should also be applicable to SMEs. The ongoing tendency toward improving board 
functions within publicly listed firms will extend to SMEs by mimicry and institutional 
pressures (Corbetta, and Salvato, 2004). The extant empirical literature on corporate 
governance of SMEs focuses on a number of factors including board size, board skill level, 
board composition and control, CEO duality, percentage of shares closely held, family 
ownership, and foreign ownership. These are discussed in turn. 
 
Board Size 
There is a view that larger boards are better for corporate performance because they have a 
range of expertise to help make better decisions and it is harder for a powerful CEO to 
dominate. However, recent thinking has leaned towards smaller boards. Jensen (1993), and 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that large boards are less effective and are easier for the 
CEO to control. When a board gets too big, it becomes difficult to co-ordinate and often 
creates problems. Smaller boards also reduce the possibility of free riding by, and increase 
the accountability of individual directors. Large board size which influences firm 
performance negatively is found predominantly in businesses of larger sizes (see Mintzberg, 
1983; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Walsh et al.., 1988; Kosnik, 1990). It may also be that 
board size and diversity have non-linear influences on firm performance as size varies: 
producing increasing returns as board size/diversity increases, as we move from very small 
to medium-sized firms; but producing little additional improvement in performance, or even 
diminishing performance, as we move from medium to large firms. The pattern of these 
changes is also likely to vary considerably between types of firm, as the span of control, 
involvement and scope for internal conflict between directors’ response to the different 
managerial and trading conditions of each type of firm (Bennett and Robson, 2004). 
 
For SMEs, one of the most important transitions is that from a single/owner-manager to a 
wider board. Instituting a team approach permits clearer development and definition of the 
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choices facing the business. It also permits a stronger development of a more open and less 
oppressive internal human relations structure (Schein, 1987; Drucker, 1992; Sparrow, 1993). 
The benefit of encouraging team development through a larger board has been argued to be 
an important step in improved corporate governance in SMEs (Cadbury, 2000). Such 
widened board development for very small firms has been noted as directly improving firm 
performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Wynarczyk et al.., 1993; Goodstein et al., 1994), 
especially where these are non-executive directors (Cowen and Osborne, 1993). Eisenberg et 
al. (1998), however, found a negative correlation between board size and profitability when 
using a sample of small and midsize Finnish firms. 
 
Board Composition and Control 
The issue of whether directors should be employees of, or affiliated with, the firm (inside 
directors) or outsiders has been well researched, but no clear conclusion has emerged.. On 
the one hand, inside directors are more familiar with the firm’s activities and they can act as 
monitors to top management, if they perceive the opportunity to advance into positions held 
by incompetent executives. On the other hand, outside directors may act as “professional 
referees” to ensure that competition among insiders stimulates actions consistent with 
shareholder value maximisation (Fama, 1980). John and Senbet (1998) argue that boards of 
directors are seen to be more independent as the proportion of their outside directors 
increases. A number of empirical studies on outside directors support the beneficial 
monitoring and advisory functions to firm shareholders (see Brickley and James, 1987; 
Weisbach, 1988; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al.., 1994). Baysinger and Butler (1985), 
and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) showed that the market rewards firms for appointing 
outside directors. Brickley et al (1994) found a positive relation between the proportion of 
outside directors and stock-market reactions to poison-pill adoptions. However, Forsberg 
(1989) found no relation between the proportion of outside directors and various 
performance measures. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and Bhagat and Black (2002) found 
no significant relationship between board composition and performance. Yermack (1996) 





Board and Staff Skill Levels 
The board of directors is described as the “apex of the firm’s decision control system”. 
Though management also has a major role in the firm’s decision control system, boards face 
complex, multifaceted tasks that involve strategic-issue processing. Boards are responsible 
only for monitoring and influencing strategy, while top management teams are charged with 
implementing strategic decisions or the day-to-day administration of the firm (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Boards and management teams require a high degree of specialised knowledge 
and skill to function effectively. The level of training among board members and mangers 
could therefore have a strong influence on the performance of the firm. Crabtree and 
Gomolka (1991) and Lybaert (1998) argue that better performance is due to the proven 
positive relation of higher levels of education among entrepreneurs and their willingness to 
use external information, develop networks, make use of consultants or develop more 
detailed accounting and monitoring systems. However, there is contrary evidence about the 
level of training among SMEs owners and managers. Lawrie (1998) demonstrates that gaps 
in management expertise are less of a recognised barrier to SME development than the 
availability of specialist staff skills, chiefly IT and languages. Therefore, although higher-level 
management qualifications may be useful to SMEs, there is still some doubt as to their 
relevance. Powell (1991) maintains that there may even be a negative effect on firm 
performance as a result of the occupational and professional affiliations of highly qualified 
managers, which may encourage increased agency behaviour.  
 
CEO Duality 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that concentration of decision management and decision 
control in one individual reduces a board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management. 
The literature reveals a board structure typology, the system where the CEO also acts as 
chairman of the board and the system where the positions of CEO and chairman are 
occupied by two individuals. It has been noted that the system where the CEO also acts as 
board chairman leads to leadership facing conflict of interest and agency problems (Brickley 
et al., 1997) thus giving preference for the system where the CEO’s role is separated from 
that of the board chairman. Yermack (1996) argues that firms are more valuable when the 
CEO and board chair positions are separate. Relating CEO duality more specifically to firm 
performance, researchers however found mixed evidence. Daily and Dalton (1992) found no 
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relationship between CEO duality and performance in entrepreneurial firms. Brickley et al 
(1997) showed that CEO duality is not associated with inferior performance. Sanda et al 
(2003) found a positive relationship between firm performance and separating the functions 
of the CEO and Chairman. Rechner and Dalton (1991) however, reported that companies 
with CEO duality have stronger financial performance relative to other companies. 
 
Inside Ownership 
A high level of inside ownership is said to create conditions conducive for managerial 
entrenchment and self-aggrandising behaviour. Consequently, it reduces the outside owner’s 
ability to monitor and control the behaviour of the firm’s leadership, which reduces the 
value of the firm. The firm actually incurs high agency cost for the lack of transparency 
(Randoy and Goel, 2003). In the case of SMEs which receive less scrutiny from other 
stakeholders that can provide corporate governance monitoring compared to large publicly 
listed firms, a high level of insider ownership is not efficient, given that managers will pursue 
policies to their own advantage instead of aiming at innovative entrepreneurial opportunities 
and shareholder value maximisation. Randoy and Goel (2003) found that a high level of 
board and insider ownership has a positive impact on firm performance in founder-led 
firms, but a negative performance effect in non-founder firms. 
 
Family Ownership 
It is often argued that the benefit of founding family leadership of firms is that family traits, 
such as trust, altruism and paternalism can create an atmosphere of love and commitment 
towards the business (Danco, 1975; Poza, 1989; James, 1999) and therefore curtail agency 
costs. Previous studies by Kang (1998), James (1999) and Mishra et al (2001) showed that 
founding family businesses provide special kind of corporate governance that offers lower 
agency costs and improves performance. Other studies however indicated that entrepreneurs 
and managers of founding family firms are more likely to engage in managerial entrenchment 
to the detriment of the firm, resulting in weaker performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Other studies revealed inconclusive results (see Dalton and Daily, 





Foreign ownership is said to facilitate stronger monitoring of managers (Randoy and Goel, 
2003). In addition, the firms cost of capital can be reduced by having large foreign 
institutional investors who actively monitor the actions of management (Randoy et al., 2001). 
Prior empirical evidence suggests that the existence of foreign institutional investors leads to 
lower agency cost (Stulz, 1999) and this is especially relevant in small countries with smaller 
investor community and in small businesses (Oxelheim et al., 1998). Firms with high foreign 
ownership may tend to institute certain control measures such as auditing and frequent 
reporting systems. These actions are likely to reduce agency cost and thus result in higher 
firm performance. 
 
6.3 Data and Empirical Methods 
 
This study explores the interaction between corporate governance, ownership structure and 
performance of SMEs in Ghana. The data used in the empirical analysis was derived from 
the financial statements of SMEs in both the industrial and services sectors during the six-
year period 1998-2003. Information on governance and ownership issues was also obtained 
through interviews with the management of the firms. The selection of the sample was based 
on the criteria set by Regional Project on Enterprise Development for SMEs in Ghana. That 
means firms with employee size of fewer than 100 were included in the study sample. In all 
120 firms were selected from the databases of the National Board for Small Scale Industries 
and the Association of Ghana Industries for this study. The data was unbalanced panel.  
 
Measures of performance include profitability and level of employment. Profitability is 
defined as return on assets. This is given as earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets. Employment level is defined as the number of employees. Though the level of 
employment as a performance measure is usually not relevant to entrepreneurs in a direct 
manner, given that it is a cost, including this measure will give a better general sense of the 
growth of the firm than profit, which is often subject to temporal fluctuation and capital 
building cycles. Including this measure will help in determining whether the board is able to 
influence employment decisions of SMEs (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). The independent 
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variables include board size, board composition, board skill, management skill, CEO duality, 
inside shareholding, family ownership, and foreign ownership.  
 
The measure for board size is the number of board members. Board composition is the 
proportion of outside directors. Board skill is the number of board members with a degree 
or professional qualification. Management skill is also the number of management members 
with a degree or professional qualification. The measure for CEO duality is a binary that 
equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Inside ownership refers to the 
percentage of shares owned or controlled by the employees as well as the CEO. Family 
ownership is a dummy variable that equals one, if the firm is family owned. Family 
ownership is defined by a majority ownership (more than 50%) held by a family or a family 
group, while they are family-owned-and-managed if owners are also managers for the daily 
operations of the firms. This definition is consistent with the definition given by Dyer 
(1986), a widely accepted definition, but no information about the succession issue proposed 
by Chua et al (1999) was included in this study. Foreign ownership is also a dummy variable 
that equals one, if it is a foreign firm and zero if it is a Ghanaian-owned firm. In addition, we 
control for firm size, firm age, and debt ratio. Size is defined as the log of total assets. Age is 
the number of years between the observation year and the firm’s year of incorporation. Debt 
ratio is the ratio of total debt to total capital. 
 
This study employs a panel regression model which involves the pooling of observations on 
a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not 
detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. The panel regression equation 
differs from a regular time-series or cross section regression by the double subscript attached 
to each variable. A heteroscedastic Generalised Least Squares (GLS) for this unbalanced 
panel is used (see Baltagi, 1995). The general form of the panel data model can be specified 
more compactly as: 
 
ititititiit CWXPerf µκδβα ++++= ………………………………….(1) 
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where itPerf , represents the firm's performance, itX is a vector of  board factors, itW  is a 
vector for the ownership variables, itC  includes the set of control variables, iα  is taken to 
be constant overtime ‘t’ and specific to the individual cross-sectional unit ‘i’ and itµ  is the 
error term in the model. Since performance is given as a function of both board and 
ownership characteristics, our model can be restated as: 
 
        µκδβα +++ += ).()()(  factorscontrolownershipboardPerf  …..(2) 
 
Our method of pooling cross-sectional and time series data is susceptible to 
heteroscedasticity. We therefore checked for this problem using White heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors and covariance. To ensure the robustness of the model, we also 
included three control variables, size, age, and debt ratio to minimise specification bias. 
These are standard variables in performance models. 
 
6.4 Empirical Results 
 
6.4.1 Descriptive Summary Statistics   
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The average (median) 
profitability (measured as earnings before interest and taxes/ total assets) is 11.6% (8.77 %), 
meaning the average return on assets stands at approximately 12%. On average SMEs 
employ approximately 36 workers. Average board size for this sample of SMEs is about 4. 
The average board composition is given as 46.27%. The mean board skill is 2 and the mean 
management skill is also shown as 2. This means that, on average there are 2 board members 
with a degree or professional qualification and also 2 members of management with a degree 
or professional qualification. Most (86.02%) of the SMEs have the CEO also acting as 
chairperson on the board. Further analysis of the data showed that a high proportion 
(81.67%) of shares is owned by employees of the firms or insiders. The results also indicate 
that our sample includes 68.01% and 7.45% family-owned and foreign-owned businesses 
respectively. The average value of the firms’ assets is 3.05e+09 Ghanaian cedis and the 
average number of years the firms have been in business is 9.6 years. The average (median) 
debt ratio is also shown as 0.3823 (0.3192). 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Return on Assets     0.1160    0.1701 -0.7712 0.0877   1.6393 
Employee Size  35.5559   26.1921 6.0000 28.0000 95.0000 
Board Size  3.6957 1.4958  2.0000 4.0000  8.0000 
Board Composition  0.4627 0.2921  0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
Board Skill  2.1211 1.6218  0.0000 2.0000 7.0000 
Management Skill  2.2671 2.1480  0.0000 2.0000  11.0000 
CEO Duality 0.8602 0.3473  0.0000   1.0000 1.0000 
Inside Ownership 0.8167 0.2810  0.0000   1.0000     1.0000 
Family Ownership  0.6801  0.4672  0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Foreign Ownership            0.0745           0.2630 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Size of the Firm 3.05e+09 5.26e+09 11509706 1.05e+09 3.71e+10 
Age of the Firm 9.6118 6.8533 1.0000 7.0000 29.0000 
Debt Ratio 0.3823 0.3102 0.0009 0.3193 0.9930 
 
6.4.2 Regression Results 
Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between measures of corporate 
governance, ownership structure and performance. The results of the GLS White 
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors panel regression are presented in Tables 6.2 and 
6.3. The results from the regression model denote that the independent variables explain the 
performance determination of the firms at 39.17% and 97.04% for the profitability and 
employment models respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models.  
 
The board of directors is charged with the responsibility of managing the firm and its 
operation. The statistically significant and positive association between board size and 
profitability suggests that relatively larger boards perform better compared to very small 
boards, because larger boards have a range of expertise to help make better decisions. In the 
case of SMEs, encouraging team development through a wider board has been argued to be 
an important step in improved corporate governance and this in turn leads to improved firm 
performance. It is expected that adopting a larger board membership system will result in 
wider provision of skill and interorganisational links to the firm. The finding here is 
consistent with results of previous empirical studies (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Wynarczyk et 
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al.., 1993; Goodstein et al.., 1994). Though it is evident in most empirical works on large 
firms that large board membership may be underperforming, in this study of SMEs the 
mean board size was approximately only four. The largest board was composed of eight 
board members and the minimum board size was made up of two members. In Ghana the 
companies’ code stipulates a minimum number of two board members for registering a 
company. This may explain why some SMEs would have only two board members. Clearly, 
the results of this study have shown that SMEs with a board size of four would demonstrate 
better performance than those with only two board members. This suggests that, depending 
on the size of the firm, having a board size of less than four may not be advisable. It is 
important for SMEs to learn to move away from a single/owner or employing only a two-
membership board to including others with different expertise. This allows for clearer 
development and definition of the choices facing the business and consequently increases 
performance. 
 
The proportion of external board members on the board is also very important in explaining 
the firm’s performance. The results of this study reveal that board composition has a 
significantly positive relationship with firm profitability. In this regard, the importance of 
outside directors in terms of their external experience in sound financial and legal affairs is 
revealed in the positive relationship the variable has with firm performance. Thus, as the 
ratio of board composition (number of outside board members/total board members) rises, 
firms tend to perform better. It is clear that widening board development for very small 
firms has been noted as directly improving firm profitability especially where these are non-
executive directors. The outside directors are considered important in assisting management 
with advice, expertise and external influences. Also, the presence of external board members 
could influence the provision of resources available to the SME. This is because external 
board members may have knowledge and information on financing sources. Increasing 
access to finance thus has the tendency of boosting the firm’s bottom line.  
 
The level of training among directors and managers could have a strong influence on the 
performance of the firm. The results of this study show a significantly positive relationship 
between performance and skill level of the management, but an insignificantly negative 
relationship in the case of skill level of the board. This is indicative of the fact that SMEs 
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with highly qualified management team tend to exhibit high profitability. In other words, the 
presence of highly qualified and skilled management is likely to lead to higher efficiency and 
subsequently result in improved performance. This stresses the importance of managerial 
skills and business experience as means of promoting firm performance. The results of this 
study also support the position of Crabtree and Gomolka (1991), and Lybaert (1998) that 
better performance is due to the proven positive relation of higher levels of education 
among entrepreneurs and their willingness to use external information, develop networks, 
make use of consultants or develop more detailed accounting and monitoring systems. 
 
The results of this study indicate a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance. This suggests that in SMEs where an individual 
combines the roles of both the CEO and board chairman demonstrate better performance 
than those with two individuals performing such roles. This result supports the findings of 
Rechner and Dalton (1991). In this study a high percentage (about 86%) of the firms has the 
CEO also serving as the chairman of the board. This is not particularly surprising in the case 
of SMEs, which tend to exhibit control aversion. 
 
Contrary to the theoretical expectation, the results of this study indicate that the coefficient 
for inside ownership is positive and statistically significant. This could be explained by the 
fact that in Ghana SMEs with a high percentage of inside shareholding generally exhibit 
better performance. High inside shareholding suggests that owners have good knowledge 
and appreciation of the operations of the firms and this is capable of translating into 
improved performance. In other words, managers who are also shareholders seem to 
understand the business better and are often in the position to take decisions that are in the 
interest of maximising shareholder value instead of engaging in opportunistic behaviour. The 
result here suggests that in firms with a lower percentage of inside ownership, managers 
would be more interested in seeking perquisites and taking decisions in their own favour to 
the detriment of outside shareholders. Having managers as owners of the business provides 
a source of motivation for them to take performance-improving measures.    
 
Similarly, the significantly positive interaction between family ownership and profitability 
signals the fact that family ownership creates an atmosphere of love and commitment 
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necessary for better performance. Family-owned firms are more likely to experience 
cooperation, unity, commitment and lesser conflicts, thus resulting in lower agency costs. 
Such an environment is more likely to be conducive for enhanced performance. This 
appears to be consistent with the findings of Kang (1998), James (1999), and Mishra et al 
(2001) who argue that founding family businesses provide special kind of corporate 
governance that offers lower agency costs and better performance. 
 
The results of this study also show a statistically significant positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and profitability. This suggests that SMEs with a high percentage of 
foreign ownership are significantly more likely to record higher profitability. It may be that 
foreign-owned SMEs would have internalised commonly accepted norms of international 
business practice, whereas as the indigenous Ghanaian-owned SMEs would not have had the 
chance to do so. Such foreign owner-managers, for instance, may be assumed to have better 
international exposure and skills in modern management techniques. Also, foreign-owned 
firms may have more sophisticated management control systems for monitoring the actions 
of management to reduce agency cost. This finding seems to support the position of Stulz 
(1999) that the existence of high foreign ownership leads to lower agency cost. Lower agency 
cost would therefore result in better firm performance. 
 
The control variables in the model show signs which are consistent with the standard 
literature. The negative relationship between size and performance suggests that relatively 
smaller firms perform better than relatively bigger firms. The significantly positive 
relationship between age and profitability suggests that older firms are more likely to record 
higher profits. The results also indicate a significantly negative association between debt ratio 
and firm performance. SMEs with less debt in their capital structure appear to perform 








Table 6.2: Regression Model Results: Profitability (Return on Assets) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.237526 7.545032 0.0000 
Board Size 0.009212 4.303988 0.0000 
Board Composition 0.025741 2.365813 0.0185 
Board Skill -0.001666 -0.676215 0.4993 
Management Skill 0.002999 3.943819 0.0001 
CEO Duality 0.023958 3.976077 0.0001 
Inside Ownership 0.035513 6.760126 0.0000 
Family Ownership 0.010555 2.859055 0.0045 
Foreign Ownership 0.029814 1.856645 0.0641 
Size of the Firm -0.010153 -6.754938 0.0000 
Age of the Firm 0.001770 4.102122 0.0000 
Debt Ratio -0.132811 -12.26133 0.0000 
R-squared 0.391655 
Adjusted R-squared 0.374842 




With respect to level of employment, the results show a statistically significant positive 
interaction between board size and employment level, indicating that large boards favour 
increased employment levels. It could also be inferred that firms with larger boards may not 
only be interested in increasing profitability, but also in how socially responsible the firm is. 
It is important to caution that the high level of employment may denote a bigger firm size or 
development phase of the firm, which may also explain the large board size. The level of 
employment could be used as an aggregate measure of firm size. Thus, firms with high 
employee size are assumed to be large firms and as such would, arguably, have a large board 
membership. The coefficient for board composition is not significant in the employment 
model.  
 
The interaction between board skill level and employment level is negative and statistically 
significant. The relationship between management skill and employment is also significant, 
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but show a positive sign. The results of this study indicate that boards with highly qualified 
members discourage high employment levels in the firm, while SMEs with highly qualified 
management team rather support high levels of employment.  
 
It is argued that high level of employment is not usually relevant to SME owners in an exact 
manner since employment is regarded as a cost (Bennett and Robson, 2004). Given that 
owners may not be particularly enthusiastic about a high number of employees because of 
the associated increase in labour cost, it is expected that they would be interested in pursuing 
a low-cost strategy by cutting down on employment. This means owners mostly perceive 
increased employment levels as cost rather than as a performance measure. CEOs who are 
also board chairs would want to be seen as being efficient by recording higher profitability 
by cutting down on employment cost in the short term. The significantly negative interaction 
between CEO duality and employment attests to this fact. CEOs or owner-managers who 
are also board chairpersons are more likely to influence the board into reducing employment 
levels in order to minimise operational costs.  
 
However, the results of this study indicate a statistically significant positive relationship 
between inside ownership and level of employment, suggesting that closely held SMEs 
support high levels of employment. This suggests that having many inside shareholders 
would force the firm into pursuing a long-term growth strategy as against short-term profit 
goals by increasing employment levels. Owner-managers would therefore regard increasing 
employment as a form of long-term investment in its growth agenda. The coefficient of 
family ownership is negative but not significant in the employment model. 
  
The results of this study also reveal a statistically significant association between foreign 
ownership and employment. One would have expected that foreign-owned firms would be 
interested in cutting down on cost by reducing employment levels in order to repatriate huge 
profits. The results, however, suggest that foreign-owned SMEs support high employment 
levels. Foreign-owned SMEs may prefer to increase employment levels as an investment in 
the long term. Also, foreign-owned firms may be interested in being perceived as 
contributing to reducing the present high unemployment rate in the economy. Most foreign-
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owned firms seem to be particular about the corporate social responsibility of the firm as 
well, thus implementing high levels of employment.  
 
The coefficients for size of the firm, age of the firm and debt ratio are all positive and 
statistically significant. These findings imply that bigger and older firms have a bigger 
employee size than smaller and newer firms. Also debt levels increase with size. Since 
employee size also connote the size of the firm, by implication bigger firms or firms with 
bigger employee size have higher debt ratios. This is consistent with the size effect in capital 
structure theories. 
 
Table 6.3: Regression Model Results: Employment 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant -1.329842 -6.453402 0.0000 
Board Size 0.205662 17.89436 0.0000 
Board Composition -0.010804 -0.175355 0.8609 
Board Skill -0.048084 -3.760763 0.0002 
Management Skill 0.024130 3.080589 0.0022 
CEO Duality -0.200201 -5.902768 0.0000 
Inside Ownership 0.280570 5.117371 0.0000 
Family Ownership -0.044440 -1.310241 0.1909 
Foreign Ownership 0.114829 2.700241 0.0072 
Size of the Firm 0.185280 19.12413 0.0000 
Age of the Firm 0.007549 3.156550 0.0017 
Debt Ratio 0.097268 2.640490 0.0086 
R-squared 0.970374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.969555 








6.5 Conclusion and Implications 
 
The importance of corporate governance has been discussed mostly within the context of 
large, publicly listed firms. However, less attention has been paid to this area with respect to 
SMEs. This current paper investigated the effects of corporate governance, and ownership 
structure on the performance of SMEs in Ghana. The results of this study showed that 
board size, board composition, management skill, CEO duality, inside ownership, family 
ownership, and foreign ownership have significantly positive impacts on profitability. The 
results also showed that board size, management skill, inside ownership, and foreign 
ownership have statistically significant and positive interactions with employment level. 
However, we found that board skill, and CEO duality have significantly negative impacts on 
the level of employment. 
 
The results of this study generally suggest that the adoption of corporate governance 
structures has some important implications for Ghanaian SMEs. Corporate governance can 
greatly assist the SME sector by infusing better management practices, stronger internal 
auditing, greater opportunities for growth and new strategic outlook through external 
directors. Good governance mechanisms among SMEs are likely to result in boards exerting 
much needed pressure for improved performance by ensuring that the interests of the firms 
are served. One major implication of a well-functioning corporate governance system is 
easier access to funding from investors and financial institutions. SMEs have generally been 
noted to encounter greater difficulty in gaining access to financing due to problems of 
information asymmetry and moral hazards. Ensuring proper accounting practices, internal 
control systems and adequate information disclosure are likely to increase the confidence of 
investors in the firm, reduce the problems associated with information asymmetry and make 
the SME less risky to invest in. The presence of external supervisory parties and monitoring 
system could also curtail the problem of moral hazard by discouraging entrepreneurs from 
redirecting borrowed funds to invest in unapproved projects. 
 
The existence of non-executive directors could lead to better management decisions and 
help SMEs to attract better resources. Also, external board members may have good 
knowledge or useful information on financing facilities. Small firms are particularly weak and 
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often ignorant about sources of finance open to their firms. Most of the times they do not 
know how to position themselves correctly to be viewed favourably by these sources of 
finance providers. The infusion of external board membership in this case is crucial since 
there is a high incentive for the board members to introduce ways of attracting finance. 
Corporate governance also allows firms to prepare for their pending initial public offering. 
Often businesses seeking new funds find that they have much work to do before confidently 
going to the market. A consistent track record of good governance will greatly assist when 
that point arrives. For example, in Ghana early introduction of corporate governance would 
prepare an SME well enough even before it gets listed under the provisional listing regime. 
Efforts by the Ghana Stock Exchange to encourage listing by SMEs on the market can be 
complemented and sped up where such firms have effective governance structures. The 
existence of a board will induce rapid growth strategies in the SME for rapid profits; this will 
at a point require the firm going public for more finances. Thus, the transition from a small 
to medium and finally large company could be smoothly aided by an effective corporate 
governance system. 
 
This study has shed some light on the relevance of corporate governance for SMEs in 
Ghana. However, further research is necessary in order to further develop some of the 
insights provided by this study and increase confidence that there is a simple and systematic 
structure that provides a best-practice guide as to how corporate governance structures can 
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AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE AGENCY PROBLEMS AND CAPITAL 





Conventional corporate finance theories assume that firms’ management will pursue policies 
aimed at maximising the wealth of shareholders. It is, however, argued that this is not always 
the case. The agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership and control in firms 
creates conflicts of interest between the firm’s shareholders and managers. This is mainly 
because managers have the opportunity to use the resources of the firm in ways that benefit 
themselves personally to the detriment of shareholders’ wealth maximisation. For instance, 
managers may be involved in appropriating an excessive number of perks, shirking their 
responsibilities, and investing in negative net present value projects that offer them personal 
diversification benefits. Managers are prone to spending available funds in “empire-building” 
projects that enhance their own entrenchment and public reputation even if paying out cash 
is better for the shareholders (see Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Stulz, 1990). 
Furthermore, managers are averse to relinquishing control of the firm. Hence, liquidation 
and takeovers are often opposed even though they may be in the best interest of the 
shareholders (Harris and Raviv, 1988). The question is how can shareholders protect their 
interests and ensure that the managers do not appropriate excessive perks for themselves or 
make bad investments that will affect shareholders’ wealth?  
 
The agency problem is particularly important in explaining the capital structure of large, 
publicly quoted companies, where the separation of ownership and control is very 
pronounced. Managers have numerous opportunities to exercise their discretion with respect 
to capital structure decisions. The choice of capital could be determined, for example, by the 
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extent of the wealth that managers have tied up in the firm's common stock and firm-
specific human capital (i.e the experience and skills invested in the firm by managers). In the 
case where the managers’ personal wealth is heavily invested in the firm, they are likely to 
employ less debt in the firm’s capital structure in order to reduce their level of risk (Friend 
and Hasbrouck, 1988).  
 
In spite of the importance of the agency problem and capital structure choice, the area 
remains empirically under-researched. Limited empirical studies have been done within the 
context of developed markets (see Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Theis, 1999; Ang et al, 2000; 
Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Forsberg, 2004). This present study seeks 
to add to previous research by investigating the issue among listed SMEs from the 
perspective of a developing country. The paper specifically examines the effect of the agency 
problems on the capital structure decisions of quoted SMEs in South Africa. It is often 
assumed that the agency problems are less likely to exist in SMEs because they tend to have 
a less pronounced separation of ownership and management than larger firms. However, in 
this study of quoted SMEs agency problem is likely to be an issue because of the separation 
of management and outside shareholders. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 7.2 provides a discussion of the 
background literature. Section 7.3 contains a discussion of the research methodology. 
Section 7.4 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, section 7.5 
summarises the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion. 
 
7.2 Literature Review 
 
Compared to publicly traded firms, small businesses come closest to the type of firms 
depicted in the stylised theoretical model of agency costs developed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). At one extreme of ownership and management structures are firms whose managers 
own 100 percent of the firms. These firms, by definition, have no agency costs. At the other 
extreme are firms whose managers are paid employees with no equity in the firms. In 
between are firms where the managers own some, but not all, of their firm’s equity. That is 
they own less than 100 percent of the firm’s equity capital (Ang et al., 2000; Cole and Lin, 
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2000). Clearly, the sample of firms used in this study falls within the third category. Since 
they are quoted SMEs, managerial shareholders own some of the firms’ equity.  
 
Agency costs arise as a result of the relationships between equity-holders or managers of the 
firm and debt-holders. The relationships can be characterised as principal-agent 
relationships. While the firm’s management is the agent, both the debt-holders and 
stockholders are the principals. The agent may choose not to maximise the principals’ 
wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified two types of conflicts: those between debt-
holders and shareholders, and those between shareholders and managers. The conflict 
between debt-holders (creditors) and shareholders is due to moral hazard. Conflicts between 
shareholders and creditors may arise because they have different claims on the firm. Equity 
contracts do not require firms to pay fixed returns to investors, but offer a residual claim on 
a firm’s cash flow. However, debt contracts typically offer holders a fixed claim over a 
borrowing firm’s cash flow. When a firm finances a project through debt, the creditors 
charge an interest rate that they believe is adequate compensation for the risk they bear. 
Since their claim is fixed, creditors are concerned about the extent to which firms invest in 
excessively risky projects. For example, after raising funds from debt-holders, the firm may 
shift investment from a lower- to a higher-risk project. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), the conflict between equity and debt claimants is such that shareholders expropriate 
wealth from debt-holders by investing in new projects that are riskier than those presently 
held in the firm’s portfolio. In the event of an investment yielding high returns, equity-
holders receive the majority of the benefits.  
 
However, in the case of the investment failing, because of limited liability, debt-holders bear 
the majority of the consequences. In other words, if the project is successful, the creditors 
will be paid a fixed amount and the firm’s shareholders will benefit from its improved 
profitability. If the project fails, the firm will default on its debt, and shareholders will invoke 
their limited liability status. In addition to the asset substitution problem between 
shareholders and creditors, shareholders may choose not to invest in profitable projects 
(under-invest), if they believe they would have to share the returns with creditors. The 
agency costs of debt can be resolved by the entire structure of the financial claim. Barnea et 
al (1980) argue that the agency problems associated with information asymmetry, managerial 
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(stockholder) risk incentives, and forgone growth opportunities can be resolved by means of 
the maturity structure and call provision of the debt. For example, shortening the maturity 
structure of the debt and the ability to call the debt before the expiration date can help 
reduce the agency costs of underinvestment and risk-shifting. Barnea et al (1980) also 
demonstrate that both features of the corporate debt serve identical purposes in solving 
agency problems. 
 
The conflict between shareholders and managers arises because managers hold less than 100 
percent of the residual claim (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Consequently, they do not capture the 
entire gain from their profit-enhancing activities but they do bear the entire cost of these 
activities. Separation of ownership and control may result in managers performing 
insufficient work, claiming perquisites, and choosing inputs and outputs that suit their own 
preferences. Managers may invest in projects that reduce the value of the firm but enhance 
their control over its resources. For instance, although it may be optimal for the investors to 
liquidate the firm, managers may choose to continue operations to enhance their position. 
Harris and Raviv (1990) suggest that managers have an incentive to continue a firm’s current 
operations even if shareholders prefer liquidation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that, 
as ownership and management separate, the need for monitoring by the external market 
increases.  
 
One main reason for employing debt is the advantage of tax subsidy. The tax deductibility of 
interest lowers the cost of debt financing and makes debt capital the cheapest type of outside 
financing available to most firms (Fosberg, 2004). However, one major disadvantage of debt 
financing is that it increases the risk of bankruptcy, if the firm is not able to service its debt 
obligations. This bankruptcy risk may not necessarily pose a problem for an investor who 
holds a well-diversified portfolio of investments, because the bankruptcy of any one firm in 
their portfolio of investments will not have a large impact on their wealth. Therefore, a well-
diversified investor will prefer that most firms use significant amounts of debt capital in their 
capital structures. Amihud and Lev (1981), and Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) argue that 
managerial insiders (officers and directors) have a somewhat different perspective since 
many of them have large portions of their personal wealth invested in their employers. The 
personal wealth that managerial insiders have invested in their employer is composed largely 
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of their employer’s common stock and the firm-specific human capital they have 
accumulated while working for their employer. As these items tend to represent a large 
proportion of an insider’s total wealth, the bankruptcy of their employer would have a major 
impact on their personal wealth. As a result, managerial insiders should be much more 
sensitive to the bankruptcy risk that debt financing induces and may be inclined to minimise 
this risk by using less than the optimal (shareholder-wealth maximising) amount of debt in 
the firm’s capital structure. Furthermore, the more wealth managerial insiders have invested 
in their employer, the greater the incentive they have to minimise the use of debt financing 
(Friend and Hasbrouck, 1988). 
 
Relying on the managerial theory of capital structure, Noe and Rebello (1996) suggest that 
the locus of control within a firm is an important determinant of the choice of finance. 
When the corporate decisions are dictated by the manager, equity issues will be favoured 
over debt, because of the manager's inclination to protect his undiversified human capital 
and to avoid the performance pressure associated with debt commitments (Berger et al., 
1997). However, if the locus of control rests with substantial shareholders that are not 
represented on the management board, the company may take on more debt to limit the 
scope for managerial discretion. 
 
The shareholders concern is to ensure that managerial insiders do not pursue policies that 
would promote their own personal financial incentives by employing less than the optimal 
amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure that has the tendency of reducing shareholder 
value. If managerial insiders engage in opportunistic behaviour, shareholders bear a 
proportion of the costs of such actions, since shareholders have a residual claim on the 
earnings and assets of the firm. A shareholder’s incentive to monitor insiders and ensure that 
the firm is being properly managed is directly related to the proportion of the firm’s shares 
that the shareholder owns. It stands to reason that a particular type of shareholder; 
blockholders (those who own at least 5 percent of a firm’s common stock), have a strong 
incentive to seek to monitor and control the opportunistic behaviour of the firm’s 
managerial insiders. Therefore, the high proportion of shares owned by blockholders should 
motivate them to want to monitor the behaviour of the firm’s managerial insiders. This is 
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likely to result in more debt financing being used by the firm than its managerial insiders 
desire (Fosberg, 2004). 
 
Schleifer and Vishny (1997), and La Porta et al (1998) point out that controlling shareholders 
(blockholders) may prevent the agency problems between the management of the firm and 
outside investors from arising; however, these controlling shareholders may consider their 
own benefits and act against creditors and minority shareholders. Therefore, the presence of 
a group of blockholders may create both advantages and disadvantages for the firm. For 
instance, Gursoy and Aydogan (2002) found that the market value performance of Turkish 
firms increases with a high percentage of blockholding whereas their accounting 
performance dips. 
 
7.2.1 Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Development     
Previous studies have operationalised the agency problem in terms of insider shareholding 
and institutional shareholding or blockholding (Friend and Lang, 1988; Berger et al., 1997; 
Fosberg, 2004). Managerial share ownership (insider shareholding) could provide managers 
with an incentive to use the appropriate amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure. 
Managers who own shares of their company suffer wealth losses (just like other 
shareholders), if the firm uses less than the optimal amount of debt financing. Since these 
wealth losses are proportional to managers’ share ownership, the more shares managers own, 
the more wealth they lose if they do not employ the optimal amount of debt financing. 
Therefore, the more shares managers own, the greater their incentive not to engage in 
wealth-reducing activities such as suboptimal debt usage. Kim and Sorenson (1986) found 
that high insider holding is associated with greater levels of debt. This result was interpreted 
as signifying that firms with higher levels of insider holdings have lower agency costs of 
debt, or alternately, higher agency costs of equity. Casey and Anderson (1997) suggest that 
insider ownership is positively related to the level of debt. Ooi (2000) also found that firms 
closely held by managers prefer debt to equity. He argued that managers with a bigger stake 
in a company's equity will pursue actions which are more aligned to the shareholders’ 
interests. It suggests that managers may refrain from issuing equity shares, if there is a 
chance that their control over the firm will be challenged. It is important to note, however, 
that the findings by Casey and Anderson (1997), and Ooi (2000) could also be influenced by 
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industry-specific factors, given that their studies focused solely on particular industries. Stulz 
(1988) and Jung et al (1996) contend that since equity issues have a diluting effect on their 
voting rights, the managers may choose to issue debt voluntarily as an anti-takeover device 
against the challenge of potential corporate raiders.  
 
Jensen et al (1992), however, reported a negative relation between insider holdings and debt. 
Theis and Casey (1999) found that the percentage of shares closely held is negatively related 
to debt level. They argued that shareholders may be less diversified than others and prefer to 
incur lower levels of debt to reduce risk of insolvency. Friend and Lang (1988), and Fosberg 
(2004) also found an inverse relationship between insider stockholding and the amount of 
debt in the firm’s capital structure.  
 
Friend and Lang (1988), and Berger et al (1997) found that the presence of a blockholder was 
associated with higher levels of debt financing by the firm. Berger et al. (1997) found that the 
percentage of a firm’s shares owned by the Chief Executive Officer is directly related to the 
amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure. Casey and Anderson (1997) found that 
institutional ownership is positively related to the level of debt. They argued that large blocks 
of concentrated shareholders may prefer to use debt more extensively in order to increase 
returns. Fosberg (2004) also found a positive and significant relationship between percentage 
of blockholdings and debt. He explained that blockholders are effective monitors of the 
firm’s managers and directors and that they force managerial insiders to use more debt in the 
firm’s capital structure than the insiders personally desire. He, however, found a negative 
association between the number of blockholders and debt. This was explained by the fact 
that the greater the number of blockholders the firm has, the smaller the share ownership of 
each blockholder and the less incentive a blockholder has to monitor the firm’s officers and 
directors.  
 
Other factors that may result in agency problems are the level of tangible fixed assets and the 
growth opportunities of the firm. According to Titman and Wessels (1988), the degree to 
which the firm’s assets are tangible should result in the firm having greater liquidation value. 
Booth et al (2001) suggest that the relationship between tangible fixed assets and debt 
financing is related with the maturity structure of the debt. In such a situation, the level of 
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tangible fixed assets may help firms to obtain more long-term debt, but the agency problems 
may become more severe with more tangible fixed assets, because the information revealed 
about future profit is less in these firms. If this is the case, then it is likely to find a negative 
relationship between tangible fixed assets and debt ratio. In terms of growth opportunities, it 
is argued that firms with high growth opportunities often tend to be risky projects. High 
level of debt escalates the agency cost of debt and prevents the firms from taking risky 
investment projects. Debt-holders may want to monitor and prevent the firm from 
undertaking such projects. This may be due to protective covenants or the conditions on 
collateral. Given that firms with high growth opportunities may prefer a low debt level, it is 
expected that there will be a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt 
capital structure. Bradley et al (1984) found that firms with higher growth opportunities use 
less debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995) confirmed that firms with higher market-to-book ratios 
carry less debt in their capital structure. Following from the above discussion, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
       H1: Percentage of shares closely held is positively related to level of debt; 
 
        H2: Percentage of blockholding is positively associated with level of debt; 
 
H3: High number of institutional blockholders is negatively related with debt ratio; 
 
H4: High proportion of tangible fixed assets has a negative relation with debt ratio;  
 
H5: Growth opportunities should have a negative association with level of debt.  
 
7.3 Research Methods and Sample Characteristics 
 
7.3.1 Data and Sample    
The paper examines the relationship between the agency factors and the capital structure of 
listed SMEs in South Africa. The study used all listed SMEs on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) that satisfy, at least, two of the following criteria; have fewer than 200 
employees; turnover of less than 50 million South African rand; gross assets excluding fixed 
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property of less than 18million South African rand. This definition is consistent with that of 
the National Small Business Act for SMEs.  In all, 68 listed SMEs qualified for this study. 
The sample includes non-financial companies. This is because financial institutions tend to 
be regulated differently in terms of their capital adequacy requirements. Information was 
obtained from the annual reports of the selected firms and the JSE Fact Books during the 
period, 1998-2004. The data collected was unbalanced panel given that not all the firms have 
been listed since 1997. The majority (42) of the firms had data covering the period 1998-
2004. All the firms had at least five years of data from 2000-2004. Considering that there are 
only few missing observations, this should not affect the results of this study. 
 
Agency factors include, percentage of shares closely held by management and directors of 
the firm (proportion of shares owned by managers and directors of the firm), percentage of 
shares held by blockholders (blockholders are shareholders who own at least 5 percent of a 
firm’s common stock), and number of institutional blockholders (institutions that own at 
least 5 percent of the firm’s common shares). Asset tangibility (proportion of tangible fixed 
assets in the firm’s total assets), and market-to-book value are also included to capture the 
effects of growth and investment opportunities. It is believed that agency issues will arise as 
the firm expands and tries to finance its growth opportunities. Capital structure is 
operationalised in terms of total debt ratio. The variables are specifically defined as follows: 
      Shares closely held = number of shares owned by managers and directors divided by                                       
                                         total shares as a percentage. 
      Blockholdings = number of shares owned by blockholders divided by total shares as a  
                                 percentage. 
      Institutional blockholders = number of institutions owning at least 5 percent of                                             
                                                   shares. 
      Asset tangibility = tangible fixed assets divided by total assets as a percentage. 
      Market-to-book value = market value of shares divided by book value of shares. 
      Capital structure = total debt divided by total debt plus equity.  
 
7.3.2 Statistical Analysis     
The analysis is done using Pairwise correlation and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests. 
This specifically examines the relationships between the agency factors and the capital 
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structure. The variables were classified for ease of analysis. Considering that closely held 
shares, blockholding, and asset tangibility are in percentages, the classification was based on 
Hamilton and Fox’s (1998) classification of ownership structure. This is given as: less than 
26%; 26% – 50%; 51% - 75%; and more than 75%.  The other variables (i.e. number of 
institutional blockholders and market-to-book value) were classified based on the nature of 
the data. We classified the number of institutional blockholders into three groups - that is, 
firms with 1 institutional blockholder; firms with 2 institutional blockholders; and firms with 
3 institutional blockholders. Market-to-book value ratio was classified as: less than 1; 1 – 5; 5 
– 20; and above 20. Test for differences in means was then carried out to evaluate the 
relative effects of percentage of closely held shares, percentage of blockholders, number of 
institutional blockholders, asset tangibility, and market-to-book value on the capital 
structure. 
 
7.4 Results and Discussion 
 
This section reports the empirical results and discusses the associations between the agency 
factors and the capital structure of SMEs. The section provides the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used and discusses the correlation and ANOVA results. 
 
7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics    
Table 7.1 reports on the summary individual statistics of the variables used for this study. 
The mean debt ratio for the SME sample is shown as 0.5230, meaning that on average listed 
SMEs in South Africa employ 52.3% of debt in their capital structure. The average 
percentage of shares owned by managerial insiders including directors is given as 35.96%, 
while the percentage of shares held by blockholders is 48.41%. It is interesting to find in this 
study that a high proportion of the firms’ shares are owned by outsiders. Such a situation is 
unlikely for unquoted SMEs. On average, the SMEs have two institutional shareholders. 
Less than 40% (38.38%) of the SMEs’ total assets is made up of tangible fixed assets. The 
quoted SMEs demonstrate very high growth prospects with a mean market-to-book value 
ratio of 14.9607. With the exception of the mean value of market-to-book value ratio, which 
is significant at 10% level, the mean values of all the other variables are significant at 1% 
level. 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean       Std. Err.      Std. Dev.     t-stats.       p-value 
Debt ratio 0.5230      0.0486        0.4126      10.7543       0.0000 
Percentage of shares  
closely held 
0.3596      0.0346        0.2350      10.3774       0.0000 
Percentageof  blockholdings 0.4841      0.0220        0.2434      21.9642       0.0000 
Number of  
institutional blockholders 
2.1393      0.0983        1.0857      21.7644       0.0000 
Proportion of tangible              
fixed assets 
0.3804      0.0418        0.3544       9.1066        0.0000 
Market-to-book value ratio 14.9607    7.9362        67.3406     1.8851        0.0635 
 
7.4.2 Correlation Results    
Table 7.2 presents the correlation matrix between capital structure and the agency factors. It 
is clear that the number of institutional blockholders has a statistically significant negative 
correlation with debt ratio. The correlation between the market-to-book value ratio and debt 
ratio is significantly positive. The results show a statistically significant negative correlation 
between the percentage of blockholding and percentage of closely held shares, and a 
significantly positive correlation between the number of institutional blockholders and 















Table 7.2: Correlation Coefficients 
                        Debt ratio    % of shares   % of blockholding   No. of Inst.   Fixed    MTBV 
                                            closely held                                  blockholders  Assets                                            
Debt ratio         1.0000          
                         
% of shares     -0.2825         1.0000 
  closely held   (0.1915) 
% of                -0.0251         -0.2831              1.0000             
  blockholders  (0.8392)      (0.0595) 
No. of Inst.      -0.2943        -0.2003              0.2115 
  blockholders  (0.0148)      (0.1872)           (0.0194) 
Fixed Assets     0.0031       -0.0334             -0.0986 
                        (0.9797)      (0.8799)           (0.4239) 
MTBV             0.2180         0.0898               0.0644 
                        (0.0658)      (0.6837)           (0.6018) 




        
 
          1.0000 
              
         -0.0366 
         (0.7673) 
          0.0167             











 0.0169    1.000 
(0.8881)   
Note: P-values are in brackets 
 
7.4.3 Closely held shares and capital structure 
Table 7.3 shows the relationship between the percentage of closely held shares and the 
capital structure of the firms. The results show that the total debt ratio falls with increasing 
percentage of inside shareholding. This finding indicates that firms with the highest 
percentage of closely held shares (those within the range of 76% - 100%) exhibit the lowest 
debt ratio of 0.0666, while those with the lowest percentage of closely held shares (less than 
26%) have the highest debt ratio of 0.6678. However, the results show that the relationship 
between closely held shares and capital structure is not statistically significant. The 
differences in the debt ratios are therefore not attributable to the proportion of shares held 








Table 7.3: Capital Structure and Percentage of Closely Held Shares 
Capital structure    Shares closely held (%)    Mean     Std. Dev.    F-value   Prob. 
Debt                              less than 26                0.6678 
                                       
                                        26 – 50                     0.6334 
                                         
                                        51 – 75                     0.5421 
                                        
                                      more than 75              0.0666 









7.4.4 Percentage of blockholding and capital structure 
It is usually expected that firms with high percentage of blockholders exhibit high debt ratio. 
This is simply because such blockholders are often able to monitor the behaviour of the 
firms’ managers and directors to avoid their taking decisions that would jeopardise the value 
of the firm. Blockholders typically impress upon management to employ more debt in order 
to maximise the value of the firm. In other words, if blockholders own a high proportion of 
shares, then there would be a high agency problem between managers and shareholders. 
Such conflict would put pressure on management to seek to maximise their returns by using 
more debt. The results of this study as indicated in Table 7.4, however, fail to confirm this 
hypothesis. Firms with block holding within the range of 26% - 75% employ relatively 
higher debt ratio than those with less than 26% and, those between 76% and 100%. The 
results show that the difference in debt ratios is not statistically significant across the 











Table 7.4: Capital Structure and Percentage of Blockholding 
Capital structure     Block holding (%)          Mean     Std. Dev.   F-value   Prob. 
Debt                             less than 26                 0.4858      
                                       
                                        26 – 50                     0.5872 
                                         
                                        51 – 75                     0.4948 
                                        
                                     more than 75              0.4771 









7.4.5 Number of institutional blockholders and capital structure 
Table 7.5 shows the relationship between the number of institutional blockholders and 
capital structure. The results seem to support the third hypothesis, in that capital structure 
varies significantly with the number of institutional blockholders. The mean debt ratio 
(0.7125) appears to be very high with only one blockholder, and it is low when the 
blockholders are more than one. This could be explained by the fact that, in firms where 
there is only one major institutional blockholder, such a blockholder would be more 
effective in monitoring the behaviour of the managers and directors of the firm in taking 
decisions in the interest of the firm. This suggests that the sole blockholder would tend to 
take ownership of the firm and strictly monitor the activities of management and inside 
owners. Where the blockholder is also an institution, it is able to set up departments or 
monitoring systems to regulate the firms’ activities frequently. Such strict monitoring should 
result in the management employing more debt to maximise shareholder value.  
 
On the other hand, where you have more than one or many institutional blockholders, it is 
likely that such blockholders would not keenly follow the progress of the firm by monitoring 
managerial behaviour, since one blockholder’s percentage of shareholding may not be high 
enough to warrant setting up such costly monitoring systems. The lack of proper monitoring 
by the blockholders is likely to lead to opportunistic behaviour by management and inside 
shareholders. The results of this study seem to also support the finding of Fosberg (2004) 
that the greater the number of blockholders the firm has, the smaller the share ownership of 
each blockholder and the less incentive a blockholder has to monitor the firm’s officers and 
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directors. It is obvious in the South African case that the number of institutional 
blockholders is important in influencing capital structure decisions of quoted SMEs. 
 
Table 7.5: Capital Structure and Number of Blockholders 
Capital structure    Number of blockholders    Mean     Std. Dev.   F-value   Prob. 
Debt                                     1                          0.7125 
                                                                                                                    
                                             2                          0.4261 
                                        
                                             3                          0.4502 







7.4.6 Asset tangibility and capital structure 
Previous empirical studies seem to suggest that firms with high proportion of fixed assets are 
more capable of attracting a high debt ratio. Others argue that firms with high asset structure 
encounter greater agency problems since the asset is used as collateral in obtaining debt 
finance. The relationship between asset tangibility and capital structure is shown in Table 
7.6. Though, firms with asset structure within the range of 26% - 75% exhibit higher debt 
ratio than those with asset structure of less than 26%, and those with asset structure above 
75%, the results of this study again did not indicate statistical significance with respect to the 
differences in the debt ratios across the proportion of fixed assets in the firm’s total assets.  
 
Table 7.6: Capital Structure and Asset Tangibility 
Capital structure       Asset tangibility (%)       Mean     Std. Dev.   F-value   Prob. 
Debt                             less than 26                 0.5234    
                                       
                                        26 – 50                     0.5741 
                                         
                                        51 – 75                     0.6824 
                                        
                                     more than  75              0.4360 











7.4.7 Growth opportunities and capital structure 
The association between the level of growth opportunities of the SMEs and capital structure 
is indicated in Table 7.7. The results show that capital structure varies significantly with the 
level of growth opportunities (p < 0.05). The mean debt ratio (0.8717) is highest when the 
market-to-book value ratio is above 20, followed by a mean debt ratio of 0.5753 when the 
market-to-book value ratio is between 5 and 20, and then followed by a mean debt ratio of 
0.5656 when the market-to-book value ratio is within the range 1 – 5. As seen in Table 7.7, 
the mean debt ratio is lowest (0.3727) with the lowest market-to-book value of less than 1. 
The results clearly indicate that debt ratio increases with increasing market-to-book value 
ratio or growth opportunities, suggesting that SMEs with high growth potential tend to 
attract more debt finance than those with low growth opportunities. High-growth firms may 
use debt financing to ensure that the benefits arising from new projects accrue to existing 
shareholders. Also, SMEs with low growth opportunities may not require more debt, 
because they are able to finance their lower growth from internally generated funds. It stands 
to reason that, if a firm issues debt, it indicates the firm has an investment opportunity that 
exceeds its internally generated funds. The results may also suggest that potentially high-
growth SMEs that attract more finance may want to invest heavily in financing their growth 
opportunities or even divert resources into very risky projects. Shareholders of such firms 
have the benefit of invoking their limited liability status in the event of such projects failing. 
This situation has the tendency of creating severe agency problems between shareholders, 
especially managerial shareholders and debt-holders. 
 
Table 7.7: Capital structure and Growth Opportunities 
Capital structure              MTBV                    Mean     Std. Dev.   F-value   Prob. 
Debt                               less than 1                 0.3727      
                                       
                                        1 – 5                        0.5656 
                                         
                                        5 – 20                      0.5753 
                                        
                                       above 20                  0.8717 










7.5 Conclusion  
 
This paper has analysed the relationship between agency factors and the capital structure of 
South African quoted SMEs. Agency conflicts exist between a firm’s owners and managers 
because of the separation of ownership and management. Consequently, managers pursue 
activities that enhance their interests rather than those of the shareholders. Though it is 
often assumed that agency problems are less likely to exist in SMEs, because they have less 
pronounced separation of ownership and management than larger firms, agency conflicts are 
likely to exist in the case of quoted SMEs. This study represents one of the few empirical 
studies to examine the agency issue and capital structure of SMEs in the context of sub-
Saharan African. The study identified such agency factors as percentage of shares closely 
held, percentage of block shares, number of institutional block shareholders, asset tangibility, 
and growth potential, by investigating how these factors relate to the proportion of debt 
employed by SMEs. Apart from the number of blockholders and growth potential, the 
results did not indicate any statistical significance in terms of the relationships between 
capital structure and the other variables. 
 
In terms of number of institutional blockholders, the results of this study showed that where 
there is only one major institutional blockholder, such a blockholder would be more 
effective in monitoring the behaviour of the managers and directors of the firm in taking 
decisions in the interest of shareholder value maximisation. This suggests that the sole 
blockholder would take ownership of the firm and strictly monitor the activities of 
management and inside owners. The institutional blockholder is able to institute monitoring 
systems to regulate managerial activities frequently. Such strict monitoring should result in 
the management employing more debt in order to maximise shareholder value. The theory 
on management incentive mechanism proposes the use of debt to discipline management 
and keep it focused on meeting performance metrics.  
 
On the other hand, having many institutional blockholders may result in weak monitoring of 
managerial activities since one blockholder’s percentage of shareholding may not be high 
enough to warrant setting up such costly monitoring systems. The lack of proper monitoring 
by blockholders is likely to lead to opportunistic behaviour by management and inside 
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shareholders to the detriment of the firm. With respect to firms’ growth opportunities, the 
results of this study indicated that debt ratio increases with increasing market-to-book value 
ratio or growth opportunities, suggesting that SMEs with high growth potential tend to 
attract more debt finance than those with low growth opportunities. High-growth firms may 
use debt financing to ensure that the benefits arising from new projects accrue to existing 
shareholders. Also, SMEs with low-growth opportunities may not require more debt, 
because they are able to finance their lower growth from internally generated funds. It stands 
to reason that, if a firm issues debt, it indicates the firm has an investment opportunity that 
exceeds its internally generated funds. The results may also suggest that potentially high-
growth SMEs that attract more finance may therefore be interested in investing heavily in 
financing their growth opportunities or even divert resources into very risky projects. 
Shareholders of such firms have the benefit of invoking their limited liability status in the 
event of such projects failing. This situation has the tendency of creating severe agency 
problems between shareholders, especially managerial shareholders and debt-holders.  
 
The results of this study have indicated that the number of institutional blockholders, and 
growth potentials are important in explaining the capital structure decisions of quoted SMEs 
in South Africa. However, further research on the effects of agency factors on capital 
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Financial markets have been noted to play an important role in the financing choice of firms. 
Previous studies point out that features in the financial markets and institutions are as 
important as the firm-specific variables in explaining financing decisions (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Agarwal and Mohtadi, 2004). Recently, the 
financial markets, especially in most developing economies, seem to be assuming a more 
prominent role than they did previously, mainly as a result of the trade and financial 
liberalisation policies adopted by these countries over the past decade (Agarwal and Mohtadi, 
2004).  
 
An important financial decision that firms face is the choice between debt and equity capital 
(Glen and Pito, 1994). The issue of firms’ financing choice is important because of the need 
to maximise returns or value of the firm. Since the cost or value of the firm could be 
affected by the combination of debt and equity, the development of markets that facilitate 
the issuance and trading of equity and debt should be reflected in the financing decisions of 
the individual firms. In spite of the importance of financial market in the financing decisions 
of firms, very few empirical studies exist in this area. Previous studies have tended to 
concentrate on large quoted companies. A major gap in the literature is how the 
development of financial markets affects SMEs’ financing options. SMEs have been noted as 
important contributors to the economic growth of most countries, especially in Africa and 
the role of finance has been viewed as a critical element for the development of this 
important sector (Cook and Nixson, 2000).  
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In this study, we examine how the development of the South African financial market affects 
the financing choice of SMEs in South Africa. South Africa is of interest for a number of 
reasons. First, South Africa is one of the relatively few sub-Saharan African countries with 
an established corporate sector and a company accounts database which is long-established 
and of good quality. South Africa was one of the three African countries that Agarwal and 
Mohtadi (2004) included in their sample. The others were Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Even 
though Agarwal and Mohtadi (2004) included South Africa in their sample, they used only 21 
large companies and their study reported on an aggregate level only. They did not show 
results at the country-level. The second reason, for sampling South African quoted SMEs is 
because South Africa has the oldest stock exchange in sub-Saharan Africa, the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). Third, the JSE has the highest number of quoted firms and seems to 
have a well-defined listing regime for SMEs. Lastly, economic liberalisation after the collapse 
of apartheid in 1994 offers a particularly interesting setting within which to examine the issue 
of financial sector growth and SMEs’ financing choices.   
 
This paper explores the relationship between the choice of finance (debt-equity) and the 
development of the financial market (including the stock market and banking sector). The 
study investigates the extent to which the capital structure of quoted SMEs could be 
explained by the level of development of the financial market and firm-specific factors that 
have been identified in standard capital structure models. The paper also compares the 
results with what the situation is for large, listed firms in South Africa. Using data of 61 
quoted SMEs and 100 large, quoted firms for a period of seven years, static and dynamic 
panel frameworks are adopted for this study.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 8.2 reviews the main theories of capital 
structure of firms. Section 8.3 explains the data and variable definitions and also sets out the 
model to be tested. Section 8.4 presents and discusses the empirical results of estimating the 






8.2 Literature Review 
 
Financial markets have a direct impact on firms’ capital structures. Banks, for instance, have 
a primary function of monitoring borrowers of bank loans. Financial intermediaries such as 
banks have greater incentives to use collected information to discipline borrowers than do 
small investors subject to free-rider problems (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999), since 
there are economies of scale in obtaining such information (Diamond, 1984). It is therefore 
expected that an efficient and well developed banking system would assist in facilitating 
access to external financial resources, especially debt finance to firms and more importantly 
to SMEs. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argue that a well developed banking 
sector leads to an increase in the availability of short-term financing since this form of 
financing enables intermediaries to use their comparative advantage in monitoring maturity. 
They explain, however, that banks’ economies of scale and their ability to monitor covenants 
also permit them to offer long-term loans that would not be available in a market without 
intermediaries. Agarwal and Mohtadi (2004) caution that in developing countries, banks 
cannot adequately provide these financial resources to firms because government credit 
demand seems to crowd out the private sector and also the macroeconomic environment in 
these countries poses a risk for long-term loans.  
 
A well developed stock market is capable of providing opportunities for diversification by 
entrepreneurs. Such a market is said to be liquid, meaning it is easier to convert one financial 
asset to the other with minimal or no loss in value. For instance, switching from long-term 
debt to equity, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) explain that in economies with 
imperfect stock markets, entrepreneurs face the cost of diversifying their portfolios. Outside 
investors may require a premium in order to acquire the stock of a firm that is traded on an 
illiquid market. Apart from the primary role of supplying capital to the economy, stock 
markets have an important role in terms of transmission of information that is useful to 
creditors. The markets aggregate information about the prospects of the firms whose shares 
are traded (Grossman, 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). The information provided by the 
stock market on listed firms facilitates the monitoring of these firms and enables them to 
access long-term finance more easily. Investors generally perceive such listed firms as less-
risky investment avenues. Informed investors are, thus, able to avoid investing in risky firms. 
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In addition to aggregating information, the markets provide incentives for the investors’ 
acquisition of information (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996). As markets for publicly 
traded stocks increase in size, the more profitable it is for analysts to invest in acquiring 
information about firms. Increase in the quality of information would further facilitate 
monitoring by investors. Ooi (1999) suggests that debt ratio is negatively related to the 
underlying stock market performance. Studies by Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), 
and Bayless and Diltz (1991) have also shown that firms time their equity issues to coincide 
with favourable market conditions, because the prospect of their shares being under-valued 
in a buoyant stock market is low. 
 
It is important to note that the amount of long-term and short-term debt that is optimal 
even when the financial markets are perfect may depend on the opportunities that the firm’s 
insiders have for diverting resources and the assets the firm can provide as collateral. Firms 
with high growth opportunities and high fixed assets values are more likely to attract sources 
of finance than those that have low growth opportunities and low fixed assets values. The 
size and profitability of the firm are also likely to influence the firm’s access to capital.  
 
The growth of the economy is also important in affecting firms’ financing choice. Boyd and 
Smith (1998) developed a model where capital accumulation is financed by both debt and 
equity. Investments require external finance, but subject to costly state verification. Investors 
have access to two investment technologies: one with a return that is only privately 
observable (debt), and the other path with a publicly observable return (equity). Boyd and 
Smith (1998) found that along the growth path, as the relative price of capital falls, 
verification is more difficult and the costly state verification is more likely to rise. Thus, 
investors employ the observable technology more intensively. They argue that economic 
growth would result in increase in equity financing and a fall in debt-equity ratio.   
 
In addition to these explanations, the extant literature indicates that some firm-specific 
characteristics have an influence on the financing choice of firms. These include size of the 
firm, asset composition, profitability, firm growth opportunities, and tax. Size of the firm is 
identified to have a positive relationship with debt, since large firms may have lower level of 
probability of bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999).  It is also possible to find 
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a negative relationship because large firms are more likely to have agency problems with 
external investors and therefore would require less debt finance.  
 
Asset composition is also a factor. Due to the conflict between providers and shareholders, 
lenders face the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard. Thus, lenders may demand 
security or collateral (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The literature undoubtedly suggests a 
positive relationship between the asset composition and the level of debt, based on the role 
of asset tangibility as collateral value. The larger the share of tangible fixed assets in the total 
assets of the firm, the higher the collateral value when requesting for debt finance. In other 
words, firms with a high level of fixed assets are able to present collateral to acquire more 
debt finance.  
 
Another important firm characteristic is profitability. Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) explain the negative relationship between profitability and capital structure by the 
pecking order theory. The pecking order theory suggests that firms will initially rely on 
internally generated funds or retained earnings, where there is no existence of information 
asymmetry, then they will turn to debt if additional funds are needed, and finally, they will 
issue equity to cover any remaining capital requirements. It is also argued that profitable 
firms are more capable of tolerating more debt, since they may be in a position to service 
their debt easily. Profitable firms are said to be more attractive to financial institutions as 
lending prospects, thus they are likely to attract more debt capital (Ooi, 1999). 
 
Firms’ growth opportunity is also likely to affect debt ratio. Michaelas et al (1999) argue that 
future growth opportunities will be positively related to firms’ debt ratio. Myers (1977), 
however, holds the view that firms with growth opportunities will have smaller proportion 
of debt in their capital structure. This is due to the fact that conflicts between debt and 
equity holders are especially serious for assets that give the firm the option to undertake such 
growth opportunities in the future. High growth potential corresponds to higher market 
capitalisation; it enables the firm to have lower costs of equity financing. Therefore, debt is 




Tax debt shield as a determinant of debt ratio focuses on the tax advantages of debt 
financing. Firms prefer debt financing because interest payment is tax deductible. Previous 
empirical studies have concluded that taxation has an impact on corporate financing 
decisions (see Auerbach, 1984; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Graham, 1996; Shum, 1996). Mackie-
Mason (1990) provided evidence of substantial tax effect on the choice between debt and 
equity. He concluded that changes in the marginal tax rate for any firm should affect 
financing decisions. This suggests that firms with high marginal tax rates would prefer high 
debt levels. Negash (2002), however, found a negative association between tax rate and 




8.3.1 Data and Variable Description    
The sample data consists of 61 South African quoted SMEs and 100 large, quoted firms. The 
sample includes non-financial firms that satisfy, at least, two of the following criteria: have 
fewer than 200 employees; turnover of less than 50 million South African rand; gross assets 
excluding fixed property of less than 18million South African rand. This definition is 
consistent with that of the National Small Business Act for SMEs. The selection of the large 
firms was based on the 100 biggest non-financial firms in terms of value of assets. Financial 
firms (finance, banking and insurance) were excluded because of their different capital 
adequacy and financial reporting requirements. Financial data on the firms was obtained 
from their annual financial statements covering the period 1998 - 2004. Information on the 
financial market variables was obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics database. The variables used for this study are explained as 
follows: 
 
Long-term debt/ equity and short-term/ equity: Long-term debt/ equity is defined as the firm’s 
outstanding debt that is repayable over one year divided by equity. Short-term debt/equity 
also includes the firm’s outstanding debt repayable within one year divided by equity. The 
essence of decomposing the total debt into long-term and short-term is to allow us to test 
whether SMEs differentiate between financing instruments (banks and stock market) to 
finance short-term, as compared to long-term needs. 
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Stock market capitalisation ratio (SMCR) measures access to publicly traded equity market. It is 
computed as the value of listed shares divided by GDP. The assumption here is that the 
overall market size is positively correlated with firms’ ability to raise capital and diversify on 
an economy-wide risk. 
 
Total value of traded shares ratio (STR) measures the organised trading of the firms’ equity as a 
share of the national output and should positively reflect liquidity on an economy-wide basis. 
It is computed as the value of shares traded on the stock market divided by GDP.    
 
Turnover ratio (TOR) is an indicator of the level of activity on the stock market. It is calculated 
as total value of shares traded divided by market capitalisation. Higher value of turnover 
indicates a higher level of liquidity and low transaction costs. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) suggest that high turnover also increases the incentives for investors to 
become informed and facilitates external monitoring. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1996, 1999) found that the turnover ratio is a good indicator of stock market development. 
 
Ratio of banks’ liquid liabilities M3 to GDP measures the size of the banking sector in relation to 
the GDP or the economy as a whole. It also measures the financial deepening of the banking 
sector and is computed as banks’ liquid liabilities divided by GDP. Previous empirical studies 
have also used this indicator to examine the effect of financial sector on the growth of the 
economy (Levine and Renelt, 1992; King and Levine, 1993). 
 
Ratio of banks’ deposit of domestic assets to GDP is also an indicator of access to financial 
intermediaries by firms and measures the size of the banking sector. It is computed as 
domestic assets of deposit banks divided by GDP. This measure gives evidence of the 
importance of the banking services performed by the banking sector relative to the size of 
the economy. The assets include claims on the whole non-financial real sector, including 
government, public enterprises and the private sector. 
 
Control variables: We also isolate the effect of financial market development on firms’ 
financing choice by controlling for other variables that may also influence the firms’ 
financing choice. These include individual firm-specific characteristics, such as: size, asset 
 187
composition, profit levels, growth opportunities and tax rates. These are defined as: Size = 
log of total assets; asset composition = tangible fixed assets/ total assets; profit levels = 
profit before interest and tax/ total assets; growth opportunities = ratio of market-to-book 
value; tax rates = the ratio of tax paid to operating income for each firm. 
 
8.3.2 The Model    
This study adopts the model used by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), and also 
adopted by Agarwal and Mohtadi (2004). The model assumes that the debt-equity ratio of 
the firm, ∗DE  is a function of a vector, X , of independent variables. These variables include 
the stock market, banking indicators, and firm-level variables. The model for the empirical 
investigation is given as follows: 
  




where subscript i and t represent the firm and time, respectively, and δ, y, and ε represent the 
firm-specific effects, time-specific effects, and the stochastic term in the equation. The use 
of this model helps in estimating the effects of the stock market and the banking sector on 
the financing choice of the firms. A negative coefficient for the stock market variable 
denotes that the firms’ debt position decreases with a marginal development in the stock 
market, resulting in the firms employing more equity as opposed to debt. A positive 
coefficient estimate suggests a direct relationship between development in the stock market 
and firms’ debt use. An insignificant coefficient estimate indicates that the developments in 
the stock market do not affect the firms’ financing choice. To examine whether the stock 
market and the banking sector act as compliments or substitutes in affecting the debt and 
equity decision, it is necessary to consider the coefficient of the banking sector along with 
those of the stock market.  We also consider a dynamic panel model, where we introduce a 
lagged dependent term to test whether firms try to maintain a specified debt-equity ratio, as 
the reason given by Agarwal and Mohtadi (2004). This is given as: 
 








If the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is below unity, then the conclusion can be 
drawn that debt-equity ratio will be stable and convergent over time. This would then imply 
that firms do not vary the debt-equity ratio over time. If, on the other hand, the coefficient is 
greater than unity, then the debt-equity ratio is not stable but divergent, suggesting that firms 
will choose different debt-equity ratio over time, depending on the stage of development of 
the economy and do not aim at maintaining a fixed debt-equity ratio over time.  
 
8.4 Empirical Results 
 
8.4.1 Summary Statistics   
Table 8.1 presents the descriptive summary statistics of the financial market indicators and 
firm-level variables for both the SMEs and large firms. For SMEs, the mean short-term debt 
to equity and long-term debt to equity ratios are 1.9688 and 2.5305 respectively. The average 
asset value is 3.05e+08 (South African rand). The proportion of tangible fixed assets in total 
assets is about 32%. Average market-to-book value ratio and profitability are 11.2355 and 
22.75%. The mean tax rate is shown as 14.27%. In the case of large firms, the mean short-
term debt to equity and long-term to equity ratios are 1.1617 and 0.3687 respectively. The 
average size of large, listed firms is more than twice that of the SMEs with mean value of 
7.54e+08 (South African rand). The mean asset composition of 35.63% is slightly higher 
than that of SMEs. The large firms’ average market to book value of 1.7068 is lower than 
that of the SMEs’. The large firms’ average profitability rate of 11.90% is also lower than the 
profitability of SMEs.  The mean tax rate of the large firms is given as 23.20%. In terms of 
the stock market indicators, the mean stock market capitalisation ratio, the ratio of value of 
shares traded to GDP, and the stock turnover ratio for the seven-year period are given as 
1.5174, 0.5260, and 0.4119 respectively. The banking variables show average figures of 
0.4639 for the banks’ liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, and 0.7650 for the banks’ deposit of 
domestic assets to GDP ratio for the seven-year period. With the exception of the mean 
value of market-to-book value or growth which is insignificant, the mean values of all the 





Table 8.1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. t-stats. p-value 
SMEs 
 
   
Short-term debt/equity                    1.9688           7.4361           5.4517         0.0000        
Long-term debt/equity                    2.5305         27.7217          1.8796         0.0608 
Size 3.05e+08      8.21e+08       8.0061         0.0000 
Asset composition                           0.3218           0.3267          20.6007         0.0000 
Growth 11.2355       182.3768          1.3170         0.1885 
Profit 0.2275           0.9718            4.2207        0.0000 
Tax   0.1427           0.1719           15.8200        0.0000 
     
Large Firms 
 
    
Short-term debt/equity                    1.1617          1.6421           18.8243        0.0000 
Long-term debt/equity                    0.3687          0.9258           10.6195        0.0000 
Size 7.54e+08      1.72e+09       11.7110        0.0000 
Asset composition                          0.3563          0.2381           40.1445        0.0000 
Growth 1.7068          2.3993           19.1406        0.0000 
Profit     0.1190          0.1931           16.5834        0.0000 
Tax 0.2320          0.1368           42.1657        0.0000 
     
Financial Market Variables     
Market cap/GDP                            1.5174        0.2577           127.2165       0.0000 
Shares traded/GDP                         0.5260        0.0852           133.3431            0.0000 
Stock turnover ratio                        0.4119        0.0363           244.9226       0.0000 
Bank liability/GDP                         0.4639        0.0301           333.0142       0.0000 
Bank deposit/GDP                         0.7650        0.0381           434.2737       0.0000 
 
8.4.2 Correlation Results    
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 present the correlation matrix between the leverage variables (short-term 
debt/equity and long-term debt/equity) and financial market indicators for the SMEs and 
large firms. For SMEs, it is obvious that the correlation values between the financial market 
variables and leverage variables are not significant (as shown in Table 8.2). The banking 
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variables have significantly negative correlations with all the stock market indicators, except 
the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP, which shows significantly positive correlation.  
 
Table 8.2: Correlation Coefficients (SMEs) 
                                     Short-term  Long-term  Market   Shares     Stock         Bank       Bank  
                                       debt/             debt/         cap/     traded/   turnover    liability   
deposit/ 
                                      equity           equity       GDP      GDP        ratio          GDP       GDP 
Short-term debt/equity  1.0000          
 
Long-term debt/equity   0.4085     1.0000       
                                      (0.000) 
Market cap/GDP          -0.0428     -0.0026     1.0000 
                                     (0.3789)    (0.9580) 
Shares traded/GDP       0.0359     -0.0329      -0.6049     1.0000 
                                     (0.4608)    (0.4998)    (0.0000) 
Stock turnover ratio      0.0607     -0.0013     -0.5108      0.8929     1.0000 
                                     (0.2121)    (0.9784)    (0.0000)    (0.000) 
Bank liability/GDP      -0.0196      0.0360       0.9070     -0.7604    -0.5186    1.0000     
                                     (0.6873)     (0.4597)    (0.000)     (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Bank deposit/GDP        0.0086       0.0405       0.7385    -0.4105    -0.0465    0.8685    1.0000 
                                     (0.8594)    (0.4051)    (0.0000)    (0.0000)  (0.3157)  (0.0000) 
Note: P-values are in brackets 
 
Table 8.3 shows the correlation coefficient results for large firms. In the case of large firms, 
only one stock market variable (stock turnover ratio) shows statistically significant positive 
correlations with both short-term debt/equity and long-term debt/equity ratios. The results 
also indicate a significantly positive correlation between only one banking variable (bank 
deposit/GDP ratio) and short-term debt/equity ratio. Banks’ liability to GDP ratio and 
banks’ deposit to GDP ratio show significantly positive correlations with stock market 
capitalisation ratio, but negative correlations with value of shares traded to GDP ratio. Stock 
turnover ratio also shows a statistically significant negative correlation with banks’ liability to 
GDP ratio.  
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Table 8.3: Correlation Coefficients (Large Firms) 
                                     Short-term  Long-term  Market   Shares     Stock         Bank       Bank  
                                       debt/             debt/         cap/     traded/   turnover    liability   
deposit/ 
                                      equity           equity       GDP      GDP        ratio          GDP       GDP 
Short-term debt/equity  1.000 
 
Long-term debt/equity  0.2926        1.000 
                                     (0.0000) 
Market cap/GDP          0.0442        -0.0387     1.0000 
                                     (0.2405)     (0.3025) 
Shares traded/GDP      0.0306         0.0428     -0.5477    1.0000 
                                    (0.4163)      (0.2546)    (0.0000) 
Stock turnover ratio     0.0624        0.0672     -0.4181     0.8921     1.0000 
                                    (0.0971)      (0.0733)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
Bank liability/GDP     0.04444      -0.0205      0.9123    -0.6993    -0.4294     1.0000 
                                    (0.2378)      (0.5846)    (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Bank deposit/GDP      0.0808         0.0172      0.7534     -0.3258     0.0513     0.8700   1.0000 
                                   (0.0316)      (0.6476)    (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.1673)   (0.0000)   
Note: P-values are in brackets 
 
8.4.3 Regression Results     
The Generalised Least Squares (GLS) and White’s adjustment for heteroscedasticity 
regression results explaining the debt to equity ratios for the static and dynamic models are 
presented in Tables 8.4 and 8.5 respectively. The paper examines the effects of stock market 
and banking variables on SMEs’ financing by comparing the results with those of large firms. 
The comparison is necessary because it is anticipated that the impact of stock market 
development may differ for large and small firms. In particular, the information aggregate 
role of the market is likely to be more significant for large firms that trade often and are 
followed keenly by many market analysts. The dependent variables are the ratio of short-
term debt to equity and the ratio of long-term debt to equity. The explanatory variables are 
the financial market indicators and the firm-specific factors. 
 
 192
Table 8.4 reports the results of the static model. The coefficients of stock market 
capitalisation ratio and the stock turnover ratio for both SMEs and large firms are 
significantly and negatively related with long-term debt to equity ratio, but the value of 
shares traded to GDP ratio indicates a significantly positive relationship with long-term debt 
to equity ratio for both sample groups. The stock market capitalisation ratio and the stock 
turnover ratio for large firms again show significantly negative relationships with short-term 
debt to equity ratio, while the value of shares traded to GDP ratio shows a significantly 
positive relationship with short-term debt to equity ratio. In the SME sample, all the 
relationships between the stock market variables and short-term debt to equity ratio are not 
statistically significant.  
 
With respect to the banking variables, banks’ liability to GDP ratio shows a significantly 
negative association with both short-term debt to equity, and long-term debt to equity ratios, 
while banks’ deposit to GDP ratio indicates a statistically significantly positive relation with 
long-term debt to equity ratio for the SME sample. In the case of large firms, the results 
show that all the banking variables have statistically significant positive associations with 
both long-term debt-to-equity and short-term debt-to-equity ratios with the exception of 
banks’ liability to GDP ratio, which was not significant in the short-term debt/equity model. 
On the whole, the results indicate that the financial market indicators significantly influence 
both long-term debt to equity and short-term debt to equity for the large firms, while in the 
case of SMEs it is the long-term debt to equity ratio which is mainly influenced by the 
financial market indicators. These findings suggest that developments in the South African 
financial market greatly affect both long-term debt/equity and short-term debt/equity 
decisions of large firms. However, for SMEs, it is long-term debt/equity decision that is 
mostly affected by developments in the financial market. 
 
The control variables also show interesting results. Size of the firm shows positive relations 
with both the long-term debt-to-equity and short-term debt-to-equity ratios, except long-
term debt-to-equity ratio in the case of large firms, which points to a statistically significant 
negative relationship. This may suggest that relatively larger SMEs depend more on debt but 
for large firms, very large firms tend to rely more on equity finance. Higher ratios of tangible 
fixed assets to total assets are associated with higher long-term debt-to-equity ratio and lower 
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short-term debt-to-equity ratio. This finding is consistent with the notion that fixed assets 
serve as good collateral for long-term debt and also confirms the asset matching principle in 
business finance. High growth is associated with increasing debt use. The results for the 
large firms sample confirm the pecking order theory with a negative relation between 
profitability and both long-term debt-to-equity and short-term debt-to-equity ratios. The 
results of the SME sample point to a significantly positive relationship between profit and 
long-term debt-to-equity ratio, suggesting that profitable SMEs are capable of attracting 
more debt finance. The tax rates indicate a significantly negative relationship with debt-
equity ratios for both large firms and SMEs, except the short-term debt-to-equity ratio for 
SMEs, which was insignificant. The negative sign for tax rate coefficient contradicts 























Table 8.4: Impact of Financial Market Variables (Static Model) 
 
Dependent variables                      SMEs                                              Large Firms 
                                               
                                 Short-term debt     Long-term debt     Short-term debt     Long-term debt 
Constant                       1.4515                  -3.3366***            -3.2780***            -1.7398*** 
                                    (1.8785)                 (0.7774)                (0.5825)                  (0.2004) 
Market cap/GDP         0.3778                  -0.7678***           -0.8447***             -0.5629*** 
                                    (0.6426)                 (0.2673)                (0.1721)                  (0.0668) 
Shares traded/GDP     -1.5165                   4.1762***            3.2632***               2.0586*** 
                                    (2.8423)                 (1.4314)                (0.9092)                  (0.3202) 
Stock turnover ratio     1.2392                  -13.6848***         -8.6786***             -4.4963*** 
                                    (6.7229)                 (3.4124)                (2.1778)                  (0.7725) 
Bank liability/GDP   -12.1745*                 -5.2879**               -2.8669                 2.9355*** 
                                    (6.9085)                 (2.4937)                (2.0192)                  (0.6998) 
Bank deposit/GDP       5.4380                  13.2037***           11.2856***             3.3244*** 
                                    (4.5392)                 (1.9856)                (1.5126)                  (0.5153) 
Log(Size)                     0.0402**                0.0215***            0.0345***              -0.0177*** 
                                    (0.0200)                 (0.0039)                (0.0033)                  (0.0010) 
Asset composition      -0.7621***              0.9782***           -1.2804***               0.3548*** 
                                    (0.0875)                 (0.0581)                (0.0370)                  (0.0135) 
Growth                         0.0292                   0.0387***             0.0725***              0.0248*** 
                                    (0.0197)                 (0.0054)                (0.0105)                  (0.0027) 
Profit                          -0.0162                    0.0263**             -1.4262***             -0.7559*** 
                                    (0.0198)                 (0.0065)                (0.1157)                  (0.0318) 
Tax                             -0.2304                   -0.5245***           -0.2621***             -0.1079*** 
                                    (0.1744)                 (0.0662)                (0.0512)                  (0.0131) 
R-squared                    0.1142                    0.2287                  0.5774                     0.5765 
F-statistic                    3.2863***              7.5621***            81.7176***             81.8111*** 
Number of firms           61                            61                        100                           100 
Years                             7                              7                            7                               7  




The results of the dynamic panel estimation are presented in Table 8.5, where the lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side is included. In all cases the results show 
statistically significant and positive relationships between the lagged term and the dependent 
variables. The coefficients are also less than unity, implying that the debt-equity mix remains 
stable in the long run. Both large firms and SMEs do not vary their debt-equity ratio over 
time. The positive sign of the lagged dependent variable suggests that each year’s debt ratio 
(short-term and long-term debt ratios) of both sample groups is also influenced by the debt 
ratio of the previous year. With respect to the SME sample, stock turnover ratio indicates a 
significantly positive association with short-term debt-to-equity ratio and a significantly 
negative relation with long-term debt-to-equity ratio. The coefficients for the other stock 
market variables are not significant in both the short-term debt/equity and long-term 
debt/equity models.  
 
With respect to the banking variables, banks’ liability to GDP ratio point to a significantly 
inverse relationship with long-term debt-to-equity ratio, while banks’ deposit to GDP ratio 
shows a significantly direct association with long-term debt ratio. Regarding the large firms’ 
sample, the stock market capitalisation ratio and stock turnover ratio suggest positive 
relationships with short-term debt-to-equity ratio. The coefficient of the shares traded to 
GDP ratio is not significant. In terms of the long-term debt/equity dynamic model, the 
results reveal that all the coefficients of the financial market variables show precisely the 
same pattern as was found under the static panel. The stock market variables (i.e. market 
capitalisation ratio and stock turnover ratio), except the value of shares traded to GDP ratio, 
indicate significantly inverse relationship with long-term debt-to-equity ratio. All the banking 
variables again show direct and significant relationship with long-term debt-to-equity ratio. 
The coefficients of the control variables also exhibit the same signs as shown under the 







Table 8.5: Impact of Financial Market Variables (Dynamic Model) 
 
Dependent Variables                       SMEs                                            Large Firms 
                                               
                                 Short term debt     Long-term debt     Short term debt     Long-term debt 
Constant                        0.2207                 -1.3612*              -1.0861***            -1.3653*** 
                                     (2.0555)                 (0.7909)               (0.3894)                 (0.2135) 
Debt-equity ratiot-1             0.0165**              0.0192***           0.3753***              0.0582*** 
                                      (0.0078)                (0.0004)               (0.0296)                 (0.0067) 
Market cap/GDP           0.3952                  -0.0495                 0.2437**               -0.3995*** 
                                      (0.6893)                (0.2799)               (0.1099)                 (0.0650) 
Shares traded/GDP       -4.3755                  1.3952                 -0.4989                   1.5439*** 
                                      (2.9446)                (1.5076)               (0.5333)                 (0.3019) 
Stock turnover ratio      12.3366*              -8.2305**              3.4241***              -2.6557*** 
                                      (6.9060)                (3.7221)               (1.2982)                 (0.7175) 
Bank liability/GDP       -1.0176                -11.3112***         -0.1645                   3.7529*** 
                                      (7.8383)                (2.5931)               (1.3484)                 (0.7937) 
Bank deposit/GDP        -3.9440                 11.8207***          -0.3214                   1.1651** 
                                      (4.8379)                (2.4271)               (0.9246)                 (0.5020) 
Log(Size)                       0.0449*                 0.0223***          0.0352***              -0.0166*** 
                                      (0.0247)                (0.0043)               (0.0019)                 (0.0011) 
Asset composition        -0.7737***             0.9957***          -0.8718***              0.4091*** 
                                      (0.0947)                 (0.0736)              (0.0285)                 (0.0135) 
Growth                           0.0484*                 0.0178***           0.0888***             0.0221*** 
                                      (0.0272)                (0.0033)               (0.0068)                 (0.0048) 
Profit                             -0.0319                   0.0400***          -0.6679***            -0.4951*** 
                                      (0.0229)                 (0.0072)              (0.0635)                 (0.0358) 
Tax                                -0.0790                 -0.7216***         -0.2304***             -0.0955*** 
                                      (0.1700)                 (0.0631)              (0.0313)                 (0.0205) 
R-squared                      0.1865                    0.4167                0.7572                    0.4503 
F-statistic                      4.3779***             13.6379***         142.8523***          37.5296*** 
Number of firms              61                             61                     100                         100 
Years                                7                               7                         7                             7 
(***), (**), (*) significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, standard errors in parenthesis. 
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8.5 Conclusion  
 
Financial markets have been noted to play an important role in the financing choice of firms. 
Previous studies point out that features in the financial markets and institutions are as 
important as the firm-specific variables in explaining financing decisions. Recently the 
financial markets, especially in most developing economies, seem to be assuming a more 
prominent role than they did previously, mainly as a result of the trade and financial 
liberalisation policies adopted by these countries over the past decade. This paper explored 
the relationship between the choice of finance (debt-equity) and the development of the 
financial market (including the stock market and banking sector) in South Africa. The paper 
investigated the extent to which the capital structure of quoted SMEs could be explained by 
the level of development of the financial market. The paper also compared the results with 
what the situation is for large, listed firms in South Africa. 
 
The coefficients of stock market capitalisation ratio and the stock turnover ratio for both 
SMEs and large firms were significantly and negatively related with long-term debt-to-equity 
ratio, whilst shares traded to GDP ratio indicated a significantly positive relationship with 
long-term debt-to-equity ratio for both sample groups. The stock market capitalisation ratio 
and the stock turnover ratio for large firms again showed significantly negative relationship 
with short-term debt-to-equity ratio and shares traded to GDP ratio showed a significantly 
positive relationship with long-term debt-to-equity ratio. In the SME sample the 
relationships between all the stock market variables and short-term debt-to-equity ratio did 
not register statistical significance. In terms of the banking variables, the banks’ liability to 
GDP ratio showed a significantly negative association with both short-term debt-to-equity 
and long-term debt-to-equity ratios, whilst banks’ deposit to GDP ratio indicated a 
statistically significant positive relation with long-term debt-to-equity ratio. In the case of 
large firms, the results showed that all the banking variables have statistically significant 
positive associations with both long-term debt-to-equity and short-term debt-to-equity 
ratios, with the exception of banks’ liability to GDP ratio which was not significant in the 
short-term debt/equity model. The results also revealed that both large firms and SMEs do 
not alter their debt-equity ratio over time. 
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The results of this study generally suggest that the financial market indicators significantly 
influence both long-term debt-to-equity and short-term debt-to-equity ratios of the large 
firms whilst in the case of SMEs, it is the long-term debt-to-equity ratio which is mainly 
influenced by the financial market indicators. These findings suggest that developments in 
the financial market greatly affect both long-term debt/equity and short-term debt/equity 
decisions of large firms. However, for SMEs, it is long-term debt/equity decision that is 
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DEBT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE OF SMES: EVIDENCE FROM 
GHANAIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN FIRMS§§ 
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
An important financial decision firms are confronted with is the debt policy or capital 
structure choice. This decision is particularly crucial given the effect it has on the value of the 
firm. The capital structure of a firm is a specific mix of debt and equity the firm uses to 
finance its operations. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital 
structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease 
financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. 
It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations. It is important for the 
firm, however, to find the particular combination of debt and equity that maximises its 
overall market value. Managers who are astute enough to identify and deploy the appropriate 
mix of debt and equity are amply rewarded in the market place, because, all things being 
equal, this appropriate mix of debt and equity minimises a firm’s cost of financing. Given 
revenue and prefinancing profit streams that are generated through non-financial factors, 
minimising the cost of financing, maximises net returns for the firm, thereby improving its 
competitive advantage in the marketplace (Gleason et al., 2000). It is suggested that 
utilisation of different levels of debt and equity in the firm’s capital structure is one such 
firm-specific strategy used by managers in search for improved performance (Gleason et al.., 
2000). 
 
This interplay of debt and equity and corporate performance has been the subject of a 
number of studies. Such empirical studies on the effect of capital structure on profitability 
have tended to concentrate on large firms (see Krisham and Moyer, 1987; Majunmdar and 
                                                 
§§
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Conference at the Ghana Institute for Management and Public Administration, Ghana, May, 2006.  
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Chibber, 1999; Abor, 2005). Previous empirical studies on SMEs, though limited have also 
focused on the determinants of capital structure. A major gap in the literature is the 
examination of the effect of capital structure on the performance of SMEs. This paper 
examines the effect of debt policy on financial performance of SMEs in Ghana and South 
Africa. Using data of Ghanaian and South African SMEs for a period of six years, a panel 
regression model is employed for this study. The study also limited the sample to quoted 
South African SMEs in order to evaluate the effect of the debt policy using the Tobin’s q as 
a measure of performance. The results of the study generally suggest that agency conflicts 
may be largely responsible for the excessive use of debt by SMEs, leading to a negative 
relationship between capital structure and financial performance.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section gives a review of the extant 
literature on the subject. Section 9.3 describes the methodology used for this study. Section 
9.4 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, section 9.5 
summarises the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion. 
 
9.2 Literature Review 
 
Recent theory on capital structure is based on the Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal 
work on the effect of capital structure on the value of the firm. Their theory assumes perfect 
markets and perfect competition in which firms operate without taxes or transaction costs 
and where all relevant information is available without cost. However, these assumptions do 
not hold in the real world or in practice, and factors such as taxes, agency cost, cost of 
financial distress and information asymmetry are important in explaining the capital structure 
of firms.  
 
Modigliani and Miller have been criticized on the grounds that their theory assumes rational 
economic behaviour and perfect markets conditions, owners’ goals are targeted only at 
maximizing profits (Grabowksi and Mueller, 1972), and that it has limited applicability to 
small firms (Chaganti et al., 1995). Modigliani and Miller (1963) revised their former stance 
by incorporating tax benefits as determinant of the firms’ capital structure choice. They 
argue that firms are able to maximize their value by employing more debt because of the tax-
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shield benefits associated with debt use. Interest on debt is considered as a tax-allowable 
expense.  Some researchers have subsequently suggested alternatives to the Modigliani and 
Miller theory of capital structure including the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
the bankruptcy cost (Titman, 1984) and the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf; 1984). The extant literature offers different perspectives about how the decision to 
acquire debt affects firm value. 
 
Hutchinson (1995) argue that in more general terms, financial leverage has a positive effect 
on the firm’s return on equity provided that earnings power of the firms assets (the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets) exceed the average interest cost of debt to 
the firm. He argues that the extent to which a firm’s earnings’ power is likely to remain 
above the breakeven point and the potential speed or flexibility with which it can adjust its 
debt usage, if its earnings’ power falls below average interest costs, should help to determine 
the level of debt that the firm is willing to commit itself to at a given point in time. Taub 
(1975) found significantly positive relationship between debt ratio and measures of 
profitability. Nerlove (1968), Baker (1973), and Petersen and Rajan (1994) also identified 
positive association between debt and profitability but for industries. In their study of 
leveraged buyouts, Roden and Lewellen (1995) established a significantly positive relation 
between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package. 
Champion (1999) pointed out that the use of leverage was one way to improve the 
performance of the firm. Hadlock and James (2002) also concluded that companies prefer 
debt financing because they anticipate higher returns. It is believed that large debt holders 
have an interest in seeing that managers take performance-improving measures. Kaplan and 
Minton (1994), and Kang Shivdasani (1995) found higher incidence of management turnover 
in Japan in response to poor performance in companies that have a principal banking 
relationship relative to companies that do not. 
 
Other studies such as those by Ross (1977), Heinkel (1982) and Noe (1988) suggest that 
increasing leverage, by acquiring debt, should have positive implications for firm value and 
performance. In general, these theories ascribe a signaling or disciplinary role for debt. Since 
increasing debt would also increase bankruptcy and liquidation costs, only managers who 
expect better future performance will choose to issue debt. Graham and Harvey (2001) 
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surveyed CFOs and report that managers are concerned with maintaining financial flexibility 
and their firm’s credit rating when considering debt issues. Since firm performance is 
frequently used as an input into the credit rating decisions, this provides indirect survey 
evidence that managers issue debt keeping in view of expected future performance. The 
agency model of Jensen (1986) suggests that, since debt sales bring additional cash into the 
firm, this could exacerbate agency problems. Alternatively, if firms use the debt issue 
proceeds to address the gap between investments needs and internal sources of funding, this 
would not necessarily lead to an increase in excess cash within the firm. The periodic interest 
payments on debt would then commit managers to pay out excess free cash flow. Hence, 
debt issues could reduce agency costs and have positive effects on firm value. In contrast, 
Miller and Rock (1985), and Smith (1986) argue that all securities sales (including debt) 
indicate decreases in future operating performance, and hence impact negatively on firm 
value. 
 
However, some studies have shown that debt has a negative effect on firm profitability. 
Fama and French (1988), for instance argue that the use of excessive debt creates agency 
problems among shareholders and creditors and that could result in negative relationship 
between leverage and profitability. Majumdar and Chibber (1999) found in their Indian study 
that leverage has a negative effect on performance, while Krishnan and Moyer (1997) 
connect capital and performance to the country of origin. Gleason et al (2000) support a 
negative impact of leverage on the profitability of the firm. In a Polish study, Hammes 
(1998) also found a negative relationship between debt and firm’s profitability. In another 
study, Hammes (2003) examined the relation between capital structure and performance by 
comparing Polish and Hungarian firms to a large sample of firms in industrialised countries. 
He used panel data analysis to investigate the relation between total debt and performance as 
well as between different sources of debt namely, bank loans, and trade credits and firms’ 
performance, measured by profitability. His results showed a significantly negative effect for 
most countries. He found that the type of debt, bank loans or trade credit is not of major 
importance. What matters is debt in general.  
 
Mesquita and Lara (2003), in their study found that the relationship between rates of return 
and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. They however, found a 
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positive relationship for short-term financing and equity. In a recent study, Abor (2005) 
examined the effect of capital structure on the corporate profitability of listed firms in 
Ghana using a panel regression model. His measures of capital structure included short-term 
debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and total debt ratio. His findings showed a significantly 
positive relation between the short-term debt ratio and profitability. However, a negative 
relationship between long-term debt ratio and profitability was established. In terms of the 
relationship between total debt ratio and profitability, the results of his study indicated a 
significantly positive association between total debt ratio and profitability.  
 
In summary, empirical studies have given inconclusive results regarding the capital structure 
choice and its effect on firms’ performance. This present study contributes to the issue by 
investigating the effect of debt policy or capital structure on firm performance by focusing 
on SMEs, which are often neglected in most empirical studies.  
 
9.3 Research Methodology 
 
9.3.1 Data and Measurement     
This study sampled both Ghanaian and South African SMEs. The Ghanaian sample was 
obtained from the databases of the National Board for Small Scale Industries and the 
Association of Ghana Industries. The South African SMEs were sampled from the register 
of the Small Business Advisory Bureau database. An SME in Ghana is defined as firms 
having fewer than 100 employees. This is based on the definition given by the Regional 
Project on Enterprise Development for SMEs in Ghana. South African SMEs are defined as 
firms that satisfy, at least, two of the following criteria: have fewer than 200 employees; 
turnover of less than 50million South African rand; gross assets excluding fixed property of 
less than 18million South African rand. This definition is also consistent with that of the 
National Small Business Act for SMEs in South Africa. The financial data was obtained from 
the financial statements of the firms for the six year period, 1998 - 2003. In all 160 Ghanaian 
SMEs and 200 South African SMEs were used for this study, with 68 of the South African 
sample being listed firms.  
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The dependent variable is performance and the independent variables are the debt ratios. 
Measures of financial performance include, gross profit margin, return on assets and, for the 
listed SMEs, Tobin’s q. The debt ratios include short-term debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, 
total debt ratio and trade credit. Trade credit is included to examine its effects on 
performance. Trade credit is expected to have a positive impact on performance. Trade 
creditors extend credit to firms with risky but positive net present value (NPV) projects due 
to their superior knowledge and higher ability to salvage value as compared to other 
providers of debt finance, and their ability to discipline debtors by withholding future 
deliveries (Hammes, 2003). Two control variables (size and growth) are also included as 
standard determinants of performance. The model for the empirical investigation can be 
stated as follows: 
 
   ittitititi SGFSSDCePerformanc µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10, ……….1 
 
   ittitititi SGFSLDCePerformanc µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10, ….……2 
 
   ittitititi SGFSTDCePerformanc µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10, …..……3 
 
   ittitititi SGFSTCCePerformanc µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10, ..………4 
 
     where: 
 tiSDC ,  = short-term debt/ total capital for firm i in time t 
 tiLDC ,  = long-term debt/ total capital for firm i in time t 
      tiTDC ,  = total debt/ total capital for firm i in time t 
 tiTCC ,  = trade credit/ total capital for firm i in time t 
              tiFS ,  = firm size (log of total assets) for firm i in time t 
   tiSG ,  = log of sales growth for firm i in time t 
        itµ  = the error term. 
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The performance measures are defined as: gross profit margin = gross profit divided by 
sales; return on assets = net profit divided by total assets. Besides analysing the effect of the 
debt policy on the profitability, the study also limited the sample to 68 listed South African 
SMEs in order to observe the effect of the debt policy using Tobin’s q as a measure of 
performance. Market-to-book value is used as a proxy for Tobin’s q. The regression model 
can also be estimated as follows: 
 
    ittitititi SGFSSDCqTobins µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10,. …………...5 
     
    ittitititi SGFSLDCqTobins µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10,. …………...6 
 
    ittitititi SGSFSTDCqTobins µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10,. …………...7 
 
    ittitititi SGFSTCCqTobins µββββ ++++= ,3,2,10,. ………….8 
 
      where the explanatory variables are as defined above. 
 
9.3.2 Estimation Methods     
The study employs Generalised Least Squares (GLS) panel model for the estimation. Panel 
data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time 
periods. Panel data approach is more useful than either cross-section or time-series data 
alone. One advantage of using the panel data set is that, because of the several data points, 
degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced, 
thus improving the efficiency of economic estimates. Also, panel data can control for 
individual heterogeneity due to hidden factors, which, if neglected in time-series or cross 
section estimations leads to biased results (Baltagi, 1995).  The panel regression equation 
differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression by the double subscript attached 
to each variable. The general form of the model can be written as: 
 
       ititoit XY µββ ++= 1 ……………………………………… (9) 
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Here, itµ  is a random term and itµ  = iti νµ + ; where iµ  is the firm specific effects and itν  
is a random term.  
 
The choice of the model estimation, whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on 
the underlying assumptions. In a random effect model, iµ  and itν  are random with known 
disturbances. In a fixed effects iµ , the firm-specific effects, and itν , a random term, are fixed 
parameters and are estimated together with the other parameters. For most panel 
applications, a  one-way error component model for the disturbances is adopted, with itµ  = 
iti νµ + ; where iµ  accounts for any unobservable firm-specific effects that is not included 
in the regression model, and itν  represents the remaining disturbances in the regression 
which varies with individual firms and time. 
 
9.4 Empirical Results 
 
9.4.1 Descriptive Summary Statistics   
Table 9.1 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables used. The mean short-term 
debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, total debt ratio, and trade credit to capital ratio for the 
Ghanaian sample are shown as 0.3761, 0.0518, 0.4001, and 0.2427 respectively. The total 
assets of the sampled Ghanaian SMEs are valued on the average at 7.67e+09 Ghanaian cedis. 
The mean growth rate in sales is 50.39%. Gross profit margin and return on assets also 
register average rates of 39.51% and 9.25%. The mean values of all the variables are 
significant at 1% level. With respect to the South African sample, the mean debt ratios are 
given as 0.3317 for short-term debt; 0.1874 for long-term debt; 0.4989 for total debt and 
0.1963 for trade credit to capital ratio. The average value of total assets is 1.94e+08 South 
African rand and the average growth rate is 219.14%. The mean gross profit margin and 
return on assets are also indicated as -116.44% and -18.62% respectively. The average 
market-to-book value ratio or Tobin’s q for only the listed South African SMEs is given as 
11.7399. The mean values of short-term debt, long-term debt, total debt ratio, trade credit 
and size are all significant at 1% level. The mean values of the performance variables (i.e. 
gross profit margin, return on assets and Tobin’s q) are not significant at conventional levels.    
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Table 9.1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std Error Std. Dev. t-stats. p-value 
 
 Ghana  
    
SDC 0.3761 0.0109 0.2876 34.3483 0.0000          
LDC 0.0518 0.0058 0.1507 8.9855 0.0000           
TDC 0.4001 0.0113 0.2985 35.4914 0.0000          
TCC 0.2427 0.0095 0.2534 25.5503 0.0000          
SIZE 7.67e+09 1.69e+09 4.42e+10 4.5329 0.0000          
SG 0.5039 0.4588 1.0503 10.9822 0.0000          
GPM 0.3951 0.1202 3.1948 3.2862 0.0011          
ROA 0.0925 0.0130 0.3391 7.1236 0.0000          
 
South Africa 
     
SDC 0.3317 0.0112 0.2975 29.6616 0.0000          
LDC 0.1874 0.0143 0.3770 13.1375 0.0000          
TDC 0.4989 0.0180 0.4783 27.6529 0.0000          
TCC 0.1963 0.0091 0.1999 21.6262 0.0000          
SIZE 1.94e+08 2.44e+07 6.64e+08 7.9611 0.0000          
SG 2.1914 1.0231 23.7519 2.1420 0.0326          
GPM -1.1644 1.0798 22.2872 -1.0783 0.2815          
ROA -0.1862 1.3958 36.5051 -0.1334 0.8939          
TOBIN’S Q 11.7399 8.3907 181.324 1.3992 0.1624          
 
 
An additional test was also performed to compare the debt ratios of Ghanaian and South 
African SMEs. The t-test of hypothesis of equal means had t-test values of 2.8366, -8.8091, -
4.6433, and 3.5323 for short-term debt, long-term debt, total debt, and trade credit 
respectively, as shown in Table 9.2. These values are all significant at 1% levels. The test 
results suggest that the null hypothesis that capital structure is the same across the countries 
can be rejected. That is, capital structure varies across the two countries. The results show 
that Ghanaian SMEs exhibit significantly higher short-term debt and trade credits than 
South African SMEs, whereas South African SMEs are significantly more likely to employ 
long-term debt than Ghanaian SMEs. In terms of total debt, the results again indicate that 
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South African SMEs have significantly more total debt in their capital structure than their 
Ghanaian counterparts. These differences may be attributable to differences in economic 
environments, financial markets and economies of scale.  
 









































t-statistics 2.8366*** -8.8091*** -4.6433*** 3.5323*** 
(***): significant at 1% level.  Test: Ho: mean (Xi)Ghana - mean (Xi)South Africa = 0;  
Ha: mean (Xi)Ghana - mean (Xi)South Africa ≠ 0; where, Xi = measures of capital structure 
 
9.4.2 Regression Results     
Regression analyses are carried out to establish the relationship between capital structure and 
performance. Measures of performance are regressed against different measures of capital 
structure. The F-statistic and Hausman test were used to test the validity of fixed and 
random effects. The GLS regression was, however, found to be a more robust and 
appropriate specification. The GLS regression results of this study with, White 









Table 9.3: Regression Results: Debts on Gross Profit Margin (Ghana) 
                                                            Profitability: Gross Profit Margin 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 








SDC -0.2198***                                 
(0.0017) 






TDC   -0.1710*** 
(0.0094) 
 


















R-squared                            0.5862 0.5217 0.6875 0.5425 
Adjusted R-squared       0.5834 0.5185 0.6854 0.5395 
F-statistics                       208.2544*** 159.2693*** 329.2537*** 180.6463*** 
(***) indicate significance at levels of 1%, standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
(1) represents regression results for short-term debt 
(2) represents regression results for long-term debt 
(3) represents regression results for total debt 
(4) represents regression results for trade credit 
 
Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show the regression results, using gross profit as a measure of 
performance. The effect of short-term debt is significantly and negatively associated with 
gross profit margin for both Ghana and South Africa. This indicates that increasing the 
amount of short-term debt will result in a decrease in the gross profit margin of the firms. 
The results also show that long-term debt has a significantly positive relationship with gross 
profit margin for both countries. SMEs that employ more long-term debt record higher 
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gross profit margin. The relation between total debt to capital ratio and gross profit margin 
was found to be significant and negative for both countries.  
 
In terms of trade credit, the results indicate a statistically significant and negative association 
between trade credit and gross profit margin for both Ghana and South Africa. Increasing 
trade credit in the firms’ capital structure is associated with decreasing gross profit margin. In 
the Ghanaian sample, the control variables (size and sales growth) reveal statistically 
significant positive effects on gross profit margin for all measures of debt, with the 
exception of the total debt measure, where growth is shown to have significantly negative 
relation with gross profit margin. Also, in the South African sample the size indicates 
positive relations with gross profit margin for measures of short-term debt and trade credit. 
The result for total debt is negative and that of long-term debt is insignificant. But sales 





















Table 9.4: Regression Results: Debts on Gross Profit Margin (South Africa) 
                                                            Profitability: Gross Profit Margin 
 
Variable (1)                   (2)                       (3)                       (4)                                                          
Constant   0.2757***                                             
(0.0127)                    
0.1349***
(0.0433)        
0.3865***  











TDC   -0.2664***                                                                                                
(0.0090) 
 
TCC    -0.4651*** 
(0.0098) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0036***     
(0.0008)                
0.0003      
(0.0024)                          
-0.0037*    
(0.0020)                   
0.0128*** 
(0.0012) 
Log(SG)                             0.0023*                                          
(0.0013)                  
0.0059**
(0.0027)           
0.0034**    
(0.0017)                 
0.0083***  
(0.0015) 
R-squared                            0.5983               0.1883                0.4450              0.5358 
Adjusted R-squared                                      0.5926              0.1768                 0.4372              0.5293 
F-statistics                       105.7319***      16.4685***         56.9347***        56.9347***        
(***), (**), (*) indicate significance at levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively,  
standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Tables 9.5 and 9.6 report the regression results using return on assets as the performance 
measure. In the case of Ghana, the results as shown in Table 9.5 exhibit significantly 
negative relations between all the measures of capital structure and return on assets. For 
Ghanaian SMEs, adopting a high debt policy is significantly more likely to lead to lower 
profitability (return on assets). Increasing the proportion of debt in the firms’ capital 
structure could result in high bankruptcy cost and this is likely to impact negatively on return 
on assets. Also, the results provide support for the argument that due to agency conflicts, 
SMEs over-leverage themselves, thus negatively affecting their own performance. This is 
also consistent with the findings of Gleason et al. (2000). In the Ghanaian sample, firm size 
indicates significantly negative relation with return on assets for all the measures of debt. 
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Sales growth also shows statistically positive relation with long-term debt, total debt, and 
trade credit. The relationship between sales growth and return on assets for short-term debt 
is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 9.5: Regression Results: Debts on Return on Assets (Ghana) 
                                                                Profitability: Return on Assets 
 
Variable (1)                       (2)                       (3)                       (4)                                  
Constant   0.3701***  
(0.0265)                       
0.3854***    
(0.0245)                  
0.3003***  
(0.0220)                           
0.3534*** 
(0.0242)
SDC -0.1021***  
(0.0063) 




(0.0102)                                                                      
   
TDC   -0.1003***                                                                                                    
(0.0044) 
 
TCC    -0.0854***   
(0.0049)                             
Log(SIZE) -0.0109***  
(0.0013)                   
-0.0132***   
(0.0011)                     
-0.0076***      
(0.0011)                          
-0.0112*** 
(0.0011) 
Log(SG)                             0.0018       
(0.0016)                     
0.0055***    
(0.0017)                      
0.0038***    
(0.0011)                       
0.0030** 
(0.0014) 
R-squared                            0.3384                0.3104                 0.3346                 0.3258 
Adjusted R-squared                                      0.3339                 0.3057                0.3301                  0.3214 
F-statistics                       75.1794***        65.7221***         75.2553*** 73.6115 
(***), (**) indicate significance at levels of 1% and 5% respectively, standard errors in  
parenthesis. 
 
In the South African sample the results as illustrated in Table 9.6 reveal a statistically 
significant positive relationship between short-term debt and return on assets. Similarly, the 
results indicate a statistically significant positive relationship between trade credit and return 
on assets. This might be attributed to the fact that short-term debt and trade credit seem to 
be relatively less costly, and therefore, increasing short-term debt or trade credit with 
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relatively low interest rate could result in high profit levels. The regression results show a 
significantly negative association between return on assets and long-term debt, and total 
debt. This also suggests that long-term debt attracts higher cost and therefore employing 
high proportions of long-term debt in the SMEs’ capital structure could lead to low return 
on assets. The results from the South African data imply that pursuing a high long-term debt 
strategy might be associated with low profitability. This position supports the findings of 
previous empirical studies (see Fama and French, 1998; Graham, 2000; Booth et al.., 2001; 
Abor, 2005). The results from the South African data also reveal significantly negative 
interaction between firm size and return on assets for measures of short-term debt, long-
term debt, and total debt, but a statistically significant positive association between size and 
return on assets for the trade credit model. The sales growth variable exhibits significantly 
negative effect on return on assets for measures of short-term debt and total debt but 
statistically significant positive impact on return on assets for measures of long-term debt 




















Table 9.6: Regression Results: Debts on Return on Assets (South Africa) 
                                                                Profitability: Return on Assets 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 








SDC 0.3003***  
(0.0017) 
   
LDC 
 
 -0.3994***                                                                      
(0.0076) 
 
TDC   -0.0374***                                                                                               
(0.0021) 
 
TCC    0.0236**                                                                                                            
(0.0094) 








Log(SG)                             -0.0509*** 
(0.0001) 






R-squared                            0.6557 0.1597 0.0601 0.5128 
Adjusted R-squared                                      0.6525 0.1518 0.0513 0.5060 
F-statistics                       204.3887*** 20.0893*** 6.8050*** 74.7429*** 
(***), (**) indicate significance at levels of 1% and 5% respectively, standard errors in  
parenthesis. 
 
The analysis was also done considering only listed SMEs in South Africa. The essence of this 
was to examine the effects of the various measures of capital structure on Tobin’s q. The 
results as shown in Table 9.7 show statistically significant positive relationships between 
Tobin’s q and two measures of capital structure (short-term debt and trade credit). The 
results, however, indicate significantly negative relations between the Tobin’s q and long-
term debt, and total debt ratios. In other words, increasing the amount of short-term debt 
and trade credit in the firms’ debt structure is significantly more likely to positively influence 
their Tobin’s q or market-to-book value. Also, a rise in the long-term debt and total debt 
implies a reduction in the Tobin’s q. The results of this study suggest that for listed SMEs 
employing more short-term debt and trade credit has the tendency of to result in an 
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improvement in their market-to-book value, but having more long-term debt would lead to a 
negative impact on the market-to-book value of the firms. The results show that large firm 
size and high sales growth are associated with improvement in the Tobin’s q or market-to-
book value.  
 
Table 9.7: Regression Results: Debts on Tobin’s q (South Africa) 
                                                                                Tobin’s q 
 
Variable (5)                       (6)                       (7)                    (8)                                                          
Constant   0.2276*                                              
(0.1210)                             
-0.0456
(0.1617)                  
0.2745   











TDC   -0.6517***                                                                                                     
(0.0534) 
 
TCC    1.1332*** 
(0.0468) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0510***                                               
(0.0070)                        
0.0850***
(0.0085)                     
0.0737***    
(0.0096)              
0.0528*** 
(0.0059) 
Log(SG)                             0.1584***    
(0.0082)                  
0.0972***   
(0.0110)                               
0.1376***   
(0.0094)           
0.1575*** 
(0.0084) 
R-squared                            0.5620                   0.5480                0.4018              0.5527 
Adjusted R-squared       0.5556                  0.5412                0.3929              0.5460 
F-statistics                       85.9838***           81.2276***         45.0018***      82.7885*** 
(***), (*) indicate significance at levels of 1% and 10% respectively, standard errors in  
parenthesis. 
(5) represents regression results for short-term debt 
(6) represents regression results for long-term debt 
(7) represents regression results for total debt 




9.5 Conclusion and Implications 
 
One important financial decision firms are confronted with is the debt policy or capital 
structure choice. This decision is particularly crucial given the effect it has on the value of the 
firm. This study has examined the relationship between capital structure and performance of 
SMEs in Ghana and South Africa, during the six-year period 1998-2003. The empirical results 
indicated that short-term debt is significantly and negatively related to gross profit margin for 
both Ghana and South Africa. The results showed that long-term debt has a significantly 
positive relationship with gross profit margin for both countries. The relation between total 
debt ratio and gross profit margin was found to be significant and negative. The results also 
revealed a statistically significant and negative association between trade credit and gross 
profit margin for both Ghana and South Africa. In the case of Ghana the results showed 
significantly negative relations between all the measures of capital structure and return on 
assets. In the South African sample, the results revealed significantly positive relationships 
between return on assets and short-term debt, and trade credit. However, in terms of long-
term debt and total debt, the results showed statistically significant negative relationship 
between return on assets and both long-term debt and total debt. The results of this paper 
also showed, for the listed SMEs, statistically significant positive relationships between 
Tobin’s q and two measures of capital structure (short-term debt and trade credit), but 
indicate significantly negative relations between the Tobin’s q and long-term debt, and total 
debt ratio.  
 
The results of this study have shown that, in the presence of control variables, capital 
structure has a significant influence on the performance of SMEs. By and large, the results 
indicate that capital structure, especially long-term and total debt ratios, negatively affect 
performance of SMEs. The negative relationships imply that SMEs generally are averse to 
using more equity, because of the fear of loosing control and therefore employ more debt in 
their capital structure than would be appropriate. Apart from the problems SMEs face in 
acquiring equity, one reason for increasing debt use may be to avoid agency conflicts. 
Employing debt excessively is likely to result in high bankruptcy costs, which could 
negatively affect performance. SMEs that pursue very high debt policy compared to the 
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industry average should also consider increasing the equity component in their capital 
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SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
10.1     Introduction 
 
In this final chapter, the important points emerging from the results of the various papers 
are summarised. Conclusions from all the papers are based on the findings, and valid 
suggestions and recommendations in line with the objectives of the entire thesis are made. 
This chapter also provides directions for future research in the area.  
 
10.2 Summary  
 
This thesis is a collection of stand-alone essays on the capital structure and financing of 
SMEs in Ghana and South Africa. Chapter Two of this thesis contains a review of SME 
development in Ghana and South Africa. Chapter Three to Chapter Nine are empirical 
essays examining various issues on the capital structure and financing in the two countries.  
 
Chapter Two discussed the roles, characteristics, contributions of SMEs to economic 
development, and the constraints to SME development in developing countries with 
particular reference to Ghana and South Africa. SMEs are noted to constitute a vital element 
of the development process, and their contributions in terms of production, employment 
and income in developing countries are widely recognised. Interest in the role of SMEs in 
the development process for that matter, will continue to be high on the agenda of policy 
makers. Notwithstanding this recognition, the development of SMEs has always been 
constrained by a number of factors, such as lack of access to appropriate technology, limited 
access to international markets, the existence of laws, regulations and rules that impede the 
development of the sector, weak institutional capacity and lack of management skills and 
training. The problem of financing, however, remains the greatest concern for the majority 
of SMEs.  
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Chapter Three empirically compared the capital structures of large, publicly quoted firms and 
SMEs in Ghana. The results showed that quoted firms exhibit significantly higher debt ratios 
than those of SMEs, confirming the fact that larger firms have easier access to debt finance 
than smaller ones. Short-term debt represents a greater proportion of total financing of both 
SMEs and listed firms. The regression results indicated that the age of the firm has 
statistically significant positive relationships with long-term debt and total debt ratios among 
SMEs. Age was also significantly and positively related to short-term debt and total debt 
ratios among quoted firms. However, in the case of quoted firms the results revealed a 
statistically significant negative association between age and long-term debt ratio. Size of the 
firm was found to have a statistically significant positive relationship with short-term debt 
and total debt ratios of SMEs. In the case of large firms, size was found to have positive 
associations with long-term debt and total debt ratios. The results revealed significantly 
negative relationships between asset structure and the debt ratios, except in the case of 
SMEs, where the long-term debt model was positive, and long-term debt ratio of large firms, 
which was insignificant. The results of this study seem to support the pecking order 
hypothesis, given that all debt ratios for both sample groups (except short-term debt ratio of 
large firms) registered significantly negative associations with profitability. Firm growth was 
found to be significant and positive in only the long-term debt model of listed firms. Only 
the SME sample showed significantly direct relationship between risk and short-term debt, 
and total debt ratios. For the SME sample it was found that, factors such as level of 
education of the entrepreneur, gender of the entrepreneur, industry and location of the firm 
are also important in explaining the capital structure of Ghanaian SMEs.  
 
Chapter Four examined two main issues. First, the paper examined the determinants of 
SMEs’ reliance on bank financing in Ghana. The results revealed that bank finance account 
for less than a quarter of SMEs’ total debt financing, with short-term bank credit 
representing a greater proportion of bank finance. The results also showed that the age of 
the firm, size of the firm, asset tangibility, and growth have significantly positive associations 
with long-term bank debt, while profitability is negatively related to long-term bank debt. 
With respect to the short-term debt model, the results indicated significantly positive 
relationship between short-term debt and size, but showed significantly negative 
relationships between short-term debt ratio and profitability, and growth. Second, this paper 
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investigated the awareness and use of various financing schemes (quasi-commercial credit) 
available to the Ghanaian SME sector. The study also ascertained the difficulties SMEs 
encounter in accessing these financing sources. The results of the study revealed low 
awareness and usage levels of the various financing initiatives among SMEs. Most of the 
schemes are perceived as difficult to access. 
 
In Chapter Five, we explored the determinants of Ghanaian small and medium sized NTEs’ 
choice of formal/informal finance. The results of this study showed that Ghanaian NTEs 
largely depend on formal financing sources with bank finance representing a greater 
percentage of NTEs’ total financing. The empirical results revealed a negative relationship 
between age and formal finance, suggesting that, newer firms depend more on formal 
finance and less on informal finance. The results also showed a positive and significant 
relationship between formal finance and size of the firm suggesting that as firms expand, 
they require more funds to finance their expansion and therefore tend to rely more on 
formal finance as opposed to informal finance. In addition, the study showed a significantly 
positive association between growth and formal finance. 
 
Chapter Six assessed how ownership and corporate governance structures affect the 
performance of SMEs in Ghana and what the implications are for financing opportunities. 
The results showed that board size, board composition, management skill level, CEO 
duality, inside ownership, family business, and foreign ownership have significantly positive 
impacts on profitability. The results also showed that board size, management skill level, 
inside ownership, and foreign ownership have statistically significant and positive 
associations with employment level. However, we found that board skill level, and CEO 
duality have negative impacts on level of employment. It is clear that corporate governance 
structures influence performance of SMEs in Ghana. The paper concluded that the adoption 
of good corporate governance structures could lead to better management decisions and 
help SMEs to attract better financing resources. 
 
Chapter Seven focused on South African SMEs. This chapter examined the relationship 
between agency factors and the capital structure decisions of SMEs quoted on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The results indicated that firms with one major institutional 
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blockholder are able to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of management more 
effectively than those with more than one institutional blockholders. Effective monitoring 
could result in more debt being used by management to increase shareholder value. This 
suggests that the sole blockholder would take ownership of the firm and strictly monitor the 
activities of management and inside owners. Also firms with high growth potential tend to 
exhibit high debt ratio than those with low growth opportunities. With the exception of the 
number of institutional blockholders and growth opportunities, the associations between the 
other factors and capital structure were not significant. 
 
In Chapter Eight, we explored the relationship between the choice of finance (debt-equity) 
and the development of the financial market (including the stock market and banking sector) 
in South Africa. The study investigated the extent to which the capital structure of quoted 
SMEs could be explained by the level of development of the financial market. The paper 
also compared the results with what the situation is for large, listed firms in South Africa. 
The results indicated that developments in the financial market greatly affect both long-term 
debt/equity and short-term debt/equity decisions of large firms. However, for SMEs, it is 
the long-term debt/equity decision that is mostly affected by developments in the financial 
market. The results of this study suggest that over time, both SMEs and large firms do not 
vary their debt-equity ratio. 
 
Chapter Nine, which is the final empirical paper, examined the effect of debt policy (capital 
structure) on the financial performance of SMEs in Ghana and South Africa. The paper 
investigated the relations between measures of capital structure and financial performance. 
Using various measures of performance, the results of this study indicated that capital 
structure influences financial performance, although not exclusively. By and large, the results 
of this study indicate that capital structure, especially long-term debt and total debt ratios, 
negatively affect performance of SMEs. This also suggests that agency issues may lead to 








In the light of the above observations made during the entire research, the following 
recommendations are made with the aim of enhancing the capital structure and financing of 
SMEs. 
 
It is essential to put in place strategies aimed at developing long-term capital market. 
Government and donor funding agencies could consider developing long-term innovative 
financial packages for SMEs. Policy makers would have to place greater emphasis on the 
facilitation of equity capital, since it provides a base for further borrowing, reduces 
businesses’ sensitivity to economic cycles, and provides SMEs with access to syndicates of 
private and institutional venture capital suppliers. There could also be policies aimed at 
encouraging SMEs to access public equity capital through the reduction of listing 
requirements and subsidising flotation cost. This should enable SMEs to restructure their 
financing so as to rely on less debt, particularly short-term debt, and thereby improve their 
liquidity. Also, for academics, trainers and consultants, it may be beneficial to help SMEs 
access equity capital and to work at structuring deals that minimise perception of threats to 
control. 
 
It is also important to consider giving female-owned businesses access to long-term credit on 
more flexible terms. Financial institutions should be encouraged to have special credit 
schemes for promoting female-owned businesses. There should be incentives for developing 
female banking models like the Women’s World Banking. Government, for instance, could 
grant tax relief to financial institutions that focus more on financing female-owned SMEs. 
Government and donor funding agencies should consider developing special funding 
packages for promoting female-owned SMEs. These policy directions would not only help 
improve upon female-owned SMEs’ access to long-term finance, but would also encourage 
women to aspire to be more entrepreneurial. Special financing schemes could be created to 
assist SMEs located in the rural areas. Sole-proprietorship SMEs are encouraged to move 
towards more organised forms of business such as limited liability companies, since such 
firms are often viewed positively by debt finance providers. SMEs with limited liability status 
tend to gain easier access to debt finance than SMEs that are sole-proprietorships.  
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It is evident that SMEs that have long business relationships and those with adequate 
collateral tend to gain easier access to bank sources of finance. SME entrepreneurs and 
managers should seek to develop and improve on their information management practices 
by keeping proper and accurate records of the firm’s operations. This has the potential of 
reducing banks’ perception of risks and also facilitates easier access to financing at 
favourable terms of credit. To expand SME lending, banks also need to develop alternatives 
to property as collateral to secure loans. Personal guarantee, sales contracts, and lien on 
equipment financed could be explored. Banks could also collaborate with informal finance 
providers in granting credit. With this arrangement, banks are able to take advantage of 
informal finance lenders’ superior information on small clients and the relatively low cost of 
frequent small transactions. Banks are encouraged to set up departments that will 
concentrate solely on granting credits to the SME sector.  
 
Policy actions should include better information provision regarding financing sources 
available to SMEs. This could involve the financing initiatives pursuing a more aggressive 
and continuous marketing communication campaign to inform SMEs of the various 
financing schemes available to the sector. Eligibility criteria should be made a bit more 
flexible to enable more SMEs to qualify for access to these funds. Routing these facilities 
through the commercial banks should be reconsidered. Evaluation of applicants’ proposals 
could be done by qualified consultants affiliated to these schemes and the banks should 
rather be appointed as managers of the loan facilities for a fee. In that case, government 
bears the credit risk. This could further expedite processing and give applicants a better 
chance of accessing these facilities. These policy prescriptions could go a long way towards 
improving SMEs’ access to long-term financing to spur on growth.  
 
SMEs initiatives could be encouraged to assist SMEs NTEs to reduce information 
asymmetries by means of improving managerial capabilities and also building on their asset 
base. Such an important move could give SMEs easier access to external financing. Growth 
in terms of export diversification is also encouraged among SMEs NTEs. This has the 




One way by which SMEs could improve on their managerial capacity is by adopting good 
corporate governance structures. Corporate governance can greatly assist the SME sector by 
promoting better management practices, stronger internal auditing, greater opportunities for 
growth and new strategic outlook through external directors. Good governance mechanisms 
among SMEs are likely to result in boards exerting much needed pressure for improved 
performance by ensuring that the interests of the firms are served.  
 
One major implication of a well functioning corporate governance system is easier access to 
funding from investors and financial institutions. SMEs have generally been noted to 
encounter greater difficulty in gaining access to financing due to problems of information 
asymmetry and moral hazards. Ensuring proper accounting practices, internal control 
systems and adequate information disclosure are likely to increase the confidence of 
investors in the firm, reduce the problems associated with information asymmetry and make 
the SME less risky to invest in. The presence of external supervisory parties and monitoring 
system could also curtail the problem of moral hazard by discouraging entrepreneurs from 
redirecting borrowed funds to invest in unapproved projects. Often, businesses seeking new 
funds find that they have much work to do before confidently going to the market. A 
consistent track record of good governance will greatly assist when that point arrives. The 
existence of a board will induce rapid growth strategies in the SME for rapid profits; this will 
at a point require the firm going public for more finances. 
 
It is not enough only to encourage SMEs to go public, but it is also necessary to focus on 
improving the financial markets, given that developments in the financial markets could have 
implications for the financing of firms. Also, SMEs that pursue very high debt policy 
compared to the industry average should also consider increasing the equity component in 
their capital structure in order to avoid the negative effects of excessive debt on 
performance.  
 
10.4 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
 
The findings of this thesis provide a framework for understanding the capital structure and 
financing of SMEs, and have significant theoretical and practical implications. This thesis, 
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contributes to the literature on small business finance in a number of respects. The study 
identified such determinants of SMEs’ capital as age, size, asset structure and profitability of 
the firm and that unquoted SMEs exhibit different financing behaviour from large, quoted 
firms, confirming results of previous studies. The findings of this study also identified 
unconventional factors such as industry and location of the firm, level of education and 
gender of the entrepreneur as important in explaining SMEs’ capital structure. It is clear that 
SMEs tend to rely more formal finance especially bank sources of financing. However, they 
are often discriminated against since age, size, and asset ‘collateralbility’ are used as measures 
for SMEs’ access to long-term credit. SMEs are mostly unaware of other alternative sources 
of funding, as hitherto these financing sources have not been proactive enough in creating 
awareness among SMEs on available funding for the sector. The existence of proper 
governance structures among SMEs could help in resolving problems of financing. External 
board members for instance may have good knowledge or useful information on financing 
facilities. The adoption of good governance system is likely to address two main problems 
SMEs tend to experience with finance suppliers. It may reduce the problems associated with 
information asymmetry and make the SME less risky to invest in. Also, the presence of 
external supervisory parties and monitoring system could curtail the problem of moral 
hazard by discouraging entrepreneurs from redirecting borrowed funds to invest in 
unapproved projects. A good governance system will enable the SME to qualify for listing 
on the stock market. It is noteworthy that a well developed financial market may have 
important implications for SMEs access to long-term financing and this is evident in our 
research. Listed SMEs are able to gain access to both long-term financing from both the 
debt market and stock market. Encouraging SMEs to get listed on the stock market may 
help to reduce the negative effects associated with the excessive reliance on debt finance. 
 
One major limitation with respect to research in the area of small business finance is access 
to financial data. SMEs and institutions in charge of small business issues must be 
encouraged to make financial data available for researchers. Research institutions must also 
focus on getting sufficient information on SMEs, including financial issues. Our findings 
raise a number of issues for future research, such as, Determinants of capital structure of 
unquoted SMEs in South Africa, Corporate governance issues and financing choice of 
unquoted SMEs in South Africa, and Agency costs and the capital structure of unquoted 
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SMEs in Ghana and South Africa. This research also suggests a need for similar studies to be 
carried out in other sub-Saharan African countries to confirm or refute the model emanating 
from this thesis. In spite of these limitations, the thesis provides results that are interesting 
for the capital structure and financing issues of SMEs from the perspective of developing 
economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
